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Re´sume´
La migration internationale d’e´tudiants est un investissement couteux pour les fa-
milles dans plusieurs pays en voie de de´veloppement. Cependant, cet investissement
est susceptible de ge´ne´rer des be´ne´ﬁces ﬁnanciers et sociaux relativement importants
aux investisseurs, tout autant que des externalite´s pour d’autres membres de la fa-
mille. Cette the`se s’inte´resse a` deux aspects importants de la migration des e´tudiants
internationaux : (i) Qui part ? Quels sont les de´terminants de la probabilite´ de mi-
gration ? (ii) Qui paie ? Comment la famille s’organise-t-elle pour couvrir les frais de
la migration ?
Entreprendre une telle e´tude met le chercheur en face de de´ﬁs importants, no-
tamment, l’absence de donne´es comple`tes et ﬁables ; la dispersion ge´ographique des
e´tudiants migrants en e´tant la cause premie`re. La premie`re contribution importante de
ce travail est le de´veloppement d’une me´thode de sondage en  boule de neige  pour
des populations diﬃciles a` atteindre, ainsi que d’estimateurs corrigeant les possibles
biais de se´lection. A partir de cette me´thodologie, nous avons collecte´es des donne´es
incluant simultane´ment des e´tudiants migrants et non-migrants du Cameroun en uti-
lisant une plateforme internet. Un second de´ﬁ relativement bien documente´ est l’en-
doge´ne´ite´ de la variable mesurant le niveau ﬁnal d’e´ducation de l’e´tudiant. Nous tirons
avantage des re´cents de´veloppements the´oriques dans le traitement des proble`mes
d’identiﬁcation dans les mode`les de choix discrets avec variables instrumentales pour
re´soudre cette diﬃculte´, tout en conservant la simplicite´ des hypothe`ses ne´cessaires.
Ce travail constitue l’une des premie`res applications de cette me´thodologie a` des
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questions de migration.
Le premier chapitre de la the`se e´tudie la de´cision prise par la famille d’investir dans
la migration e´tudiante. Il propose un mode`le structurel empirique de choix discret qui
reﬂe`te a` la fois le rendement brut de la migration et la contrainte budge´taire lie´e au
proble`me de choix des agents. Nos re´sultats de´montrent que le choix du niveau ﬁnal
d’e´ducation, les re´sultats acade´miques et l’aide de la famille sont des de´terminants
importants de la probabilite´ d’e´migrer, au contraire du sexe de l’e´tudiant qui ne
semble pas aﬀecter tre`s signiﬁcativement la de´cision familiale.
Le second chapitre s’eﬀorce de comprendre comment les agents de´cident de leur
participation a` la de´cision de migration et comment la famille partage les proﬁts
et de´courage le phe´nome`ne de  passagers clandestins . D’autres re´sultats dans la
litte´rature sur l’identiﬁcation partielle nous permettent de conside´rer des compor-
tements strate´giques au sein de l’unite´ familiale. Les re´sultats empiriques sugge`rent
que le mode`le  unitaire , ou` un agent repre´sentatif maximise l’utilite´ familiale, est
incompatible avec nos donne´es. Les aidants exte´rieurs a` la famille nucle´aire subissent
un couˆt strictement positif pour leur participation, ce qui de´courage leur implication.
Les obligations familiales et sociales semblent expliquer les cas de participation d’un
aidant, mieux qu’un possible altruisme de ce dernier.
Finalement, le troisie`me chapitre pre´sente le cadre the´orique plus ge´ne´ral dans le-
quel s’imbriquent les mode`les de´veloppe´s dans les pre´ce´dents chapitres. Les me´thodes
d’identiﬁcation et d’infe´rence pre´sente´es sont spe´cialise´es aux jeux ﬁnis avec informa-
tion comple`te. Avec nos co-auteurs, nous proposons notamment une proce´dure com-
binatoire pour une imple´mentation eﬃcace du bootstrap pour eﬀectuer l’infe´rence
dans les mode`les cite´s ci-dessus. Nous en faisons une application sur les de´terminants
du choix familial de soins a` long terme pour des parents aˆge´s.
Mots cle´s : Mobilite´ e´tudiante, Technique d’e´chantillonage de re´seau, Mode`les struc-
turels incomplets, Identiﬁcation partielle.
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Summary
International migration of students is a costly investment for family units in many
developing countries. However, it might yield substantial ﬁnancial and social return for
the investors, as well as externalities for other family members. This thesis addresses
primarily two aspects of international student migration : (i) Who goes ? What are
the determinants of the probability of migration ? (ii) Who pays ? How does the family
organize to bear the cost of the migration ?
Engaging in this study, one faces the challenge of data limitation, a direct conse-
quence of the geographical dispersion of the population of interest. The ﬁrst important
contribution of this work is to provide a new chain-referral sampling methodology for
hard-to-reach populations, along with estimators to correct for selection biases. We
collected data which include both migrant and non-migrant students from Came-
roon, using an online platform. A second challenge is the well-documented problem
of endogeneity of the educational attainment. We take advantage of recent advances
in the treatment of identiﬁcation problems in instrumental variable discrete choice
models to solve this issue while keeping assumptions at a low level. In particular,
validity of the partial identiﬁcation methodology does not rest on the existence of an
instrument. To the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst empirical application of this
methodology to migration related issues.
The ﬁrst chapter studies the decision made by a family to invest in student migra-
tion. It proposes an empirical structural decision model which reﬂects the importance
of both the return on the investment and the budget constraint in agent choices.
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Our results show that the choice of level of education, the past academic results in
secondary school are signiﬁcant determinants of the probability to migrate, unlike the
gender which does not seem to play any role in the family decision.
The objective of the second chapter is to understand how agents decide to be
part of the migration project and how the family organizes itself to share proﬁts and
discourage free riding-behavior. Further results on partial identiﬁcation for games of
incomplete information, allow us to consider strategic behavior of family. The results
suggest that models with a representative individual are not compatible with our
data. Helpers (signiﬁcant extended family members) incur a non-zero cost of partici-
pation that discourages involvement in the migration process. Kinship obligation and
obligation for male members to participate, and not altruism, appear as the main
reason of their participation.
Finally, the third chapter presents the more general theoretical framework in which
the preceding models are embedded. The method presented is specialized to ﬁnite
games of complete information, but is of interest for application to the empirical ana-
lysis of instrumental variable models of discrete choice (Chapter 1), cooperative and
non-cooperative games (Chapter 2), as well as revealed preference analysis. With our
co-authors, we propose an eﬃcient combinatorial bootstrap procedure for inference in
games of complete information that runs in linear computing time and an application
to the determinants of long term elderly care choices.
Keywords : Student mobility, Network sampling, Incomplete structural models, par-
tial identiﬁcation.
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Introduction ge´ne´rale
La croissance importante du nombre d’e´tudiants internationaux dans les dernie`res
de´cennies a suscite´ un inte´reˆt particulier de la litte´rature en sciences e´conomique pour
cette forme de migration. Deux caracte´ristiques importantes justiﬁe cette spe´cialisation.
En premier, la migration e´tudiante peut eˆtre conside´re´e comme une voie pour une
migration de plus long-terme. Comme mis en e´vidence par Rosenzweig (2008), a` la
diﬀe´rence de plusieurs types de visas, le visa e´tudiant ne fait pas l’objet de restrictions
de quotas. De plus, la probabilite´ pour un e´tudiant ayant comple´te´ ses e´tudes dans un
pays tiers de rester dans son pays hoˆte domine largement la probabilite´ d’e´migration
de celle d’un e´tudiant forme´ uniquement dans son pays d’origine. Finalement, la
diﬀe´rence de qualite´ entre universite´s, ainsi que la diﬀe´rence de re´mune´ration pour
un niveau de qualiﬁcation donne´ entre les pays a` revenu par habitants e´leve´s et tra-
villeurs de pays en de´veloppement, sont autant de facteurs qui attirent les migrants.
Entrer dans un pays hoˆte avec un statut e´tudiant apparaˆıt naturellementcomme une
strate´gie dominante pour une migration e´ventuelle.
En second, du fait du couˆt e´leve´ de la vie et des frais de scolarite´, la contrainte bud-
getaire joue un roˆle cle´. Les ressources de toute la famille (et pas seulement celle
du candidat a` la migration) sont a` conside´rer. Selon des donne´es colloecte´es en 2006
par l’international de l’e´ducation, le ﬁnancement des e´tudes a` l’e´tranger provient
premie`rement de fonds  personnelles et familiaux  pour 64% des e´tudiants inter-
nationaux.
Cependant, surtout du fait de l’absence d’e´tudes quantitatives sur les me´nages, la
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litte´rature s’est concentre´e sur une analyse macroe´conomique des de´terminants de la
mobilite´ e´tudiante. L’article de Batista, Lacuesta, and Vicente (2012) constitue une
exception notable. Les re´centes contributions de Rosenzweig, Irwin, and Williamson
(2006), Rosenzweig (2008), Beine, Noel, and Ragot (2012) et Perkins and Neumayer
(2011) parmi d’autres e´tendent les re´sultats de la litte´rature plus e´tablie sur la mi-
gration internationale des individus hautement qualiﬁe´s. Ils e´tudient notamment les
de´terminants dans le pays d’origine et/ou de migration qui encouragent, attirent ou
retiennent les e´tudiants internationaux. ces de´terminants sont connus sous le nom de
 push-factors  et  pull-factors . L’aspect ayant rec¸u le moins d’attention jusque
la` est la perspective microe´conomique de cette de´cision d’e´migration ; des questions
importantes telles que celle de l’inﬂuence du choix de niveau d’e´ducation sur la pro-
babilite´ de migration, des caracte´ristiques propres a` l’e´tudiant et a` sa famille qui
augmentent ou de´te´riorent ses chances de migration, de l’organisation de l’unite´ fa-
miliale pour couvrir les frais des e´tudes a` l’e´tranger.
Cette the`se s’inte´resse a` deux aspects importants de la migration des e´tudiants
internationaux : (i) Qui part ? Quels sont les de´terminants de la probabilite´ de mi-
gration ? (ii) Qui paie ? Comment la famille s’organise-t-elle pour couvrir les frais de
la migration ?
Comme mentionne´ plus haut, la famille nucle´aire est grandement implique´e dans
l’investissement pour l’e´migration d’un e´tudiant et ses caracte´ristiques doivent eˆtre
prises en compte dans notre analyse. De plus, comme documente´ dans la litte´rature
sur la migration e´tudiante (Perkins and Neumayer (2011)), les migrants rec¸oivent
un soutien non-ne´gligeable de la diaspora dans le pays de destination ; par exemple,
un membre de la famille e´loigne´ pourvoie au logement de l’e´tudiant migrant en l’ac-
cueillant sous son toˆıt. Cet eﬀet, connu dans la litte´rature comme un eﬀet de re´seau,
procure a` la famille un capital implicite, ce qui inﬂue sur la contrainte budge´taire.
Les caracte´ristiques de cet aidant devraient e´galement faire partie de notre analyse.
Entreprendre une telle e´tude met le chercheur en face de de´ﬁs importants, no-
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tamment, l’absence de donne´es comple`tes et ﬁables ; la dispersion ge´ographique des
e´tudiants migrants en e´tant la cause premie`re. La premie`re contribution importante de
ce travail est le de´veloppement d’une me´thode de sondage en  boule de neige  pour
des populations diﬃciles a` atteindre, ainsi que d’estimateurs corrigeant les possibles
biais de se´lection,. Elle baˆtit sur les contributions de Heckathorn (1997) et Thompson
(2006). A partir de cette me´thodologie, nous avons collecte´es des donne´es incluant
simultane´ment des e´tudiants migrants et non-migrants du Cameroun en utilisant une
plateforme internet. Cette me´thodologie est developpe´e en Annexe du chapitre 1.
Dans le premier chapitre, nous nous inte´ressons a` la question des de´terminants
de la migration e´tudiante, particulie`rement, les caracte´ristiques de la famille et du
candidat a` la migration. Nous de´veloppons un mode`le structurel de choix discrets,
dans lequel la famille (au sens large) de´cide d’un investissement dans la migration
e´tudiante. En accord avec la litte´rature sur la formation du capital humain, nous
supposons que le choix d’e´ducation est un investissement de la famille pour maxi-
miser le revenu pendant la dure´e de vie. La famille de´cide du pays dans lequel se
feront les e´tudes supe´rieures de l’e´tudiant ; ce choix est toutefois contingent a` celui
du niveau d’e´ducation ﬁnal. La migration a lieu lorsque les revenus espe´re´s sont po-
sitifs. Des mode`les similaires sont de´veloppe´s par Brezis and Soueri (2011) et Beine,
Noel, and Ragot (2012), a` la diﬀe´rence notable que nous introduisons une contrainte
budge´taire lie´e au capital disponible a` la famille. Une diﬃculte´ inhe´rente a` notre
mode`le et relativement bien documente´ (voir la discussion de Batista, Lacuesta, and
Vicente (2012)) est l’endoge´ne´ite´ du choix d’e´ducation, due notamment a` la simul-
tane´ite´ des de´cisions de migration et d’e´ducation. Nous tirons avantage des re´cents
de´veloppements the´oriques dans le traitement des proble`mes d’identiﬁcation dans
les mode`les de choix discrets avec variables instrumentales pour re´soudre cette diﬃ-
culte´, tout en conservant la simplicite´ des hypothe`ses ne´cessaires. Ce travail constitue
l’une des premie`res applications de cette me´thodologie a` des questions de migra-
tion. Nos re´sultats de´montrent que le choix du niveau ﬁnal d’e´ducation, les re´sultats
acade´miques et le soutien ﬁnancier familial sont des de´terminants importants de la
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probabilite´ d’e´migrer, au contraire du sexe de l’enfant qui ne semble pas aﬀecter tre`s
signiﬁcativement la de´cision familiale. La contribution de l’aidant semble se limiter a`
une contribution au capital de la famille.
Le second chapitre s’eﬀorce de comprendre comment les agents de´cident de leur
participation a` la de´cision de migration et comment la famille partage les proﬁts et
de´courage le phe´nome`ne de  passagers clandestins . En eﬀet, couvrir les frais at-
tenants a` la migration e´tudiante (frais de voyage, couˆt de la vie, frais de scolarite´)
dans un pays qui a potentiellement un niveau de vie plus e´leve´ que le pays d’origine,
est un investissement tre`s important. Deux explications pourraient eˆtre fournies a` la
participation des membres de la famille : soit cet investissement produit pour les in-
vestisseurs des be´ne´ﬁces ﬁnanciers et sociaux, soit, ces investisseurs sont altruistes et
tirent un certain proﬁt de l’utilite´ de l’enfant. L’objectif de ce chapitre est pre´cisement
de distinguer entre les motivations des agents qui sont le plus implique´s dans le ﬁ-
nancement de la migration e´tudiante. Le mode`le structurel propose´ de´crit un jeu
non-coope´ratif de participation entre les membres de la famille e´largie. La litte´rature
sur les comportements strate´giques dans d’autres contextes de de´cision familiale est
riche de mode`les similaires Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981),
Lundberg and Pollak (1994), Engers and Stern (2002). A l’inte´rieur de l’unite´ fami-
liale, les parents et l’aidant sont conside´re´s comme des investisseurs potentiels pour
la migration e´tudiante. Cependant, chacun d’eux a` des incitations a` ne pas participer
a` la de´cision puisque l’investissement produit des externalite´s pour toute la famille.
Les joueurs de´cident de leur participation en maximisant leur proﬁt a` l’e´quilibre,
l’e´quilibre de Nash e´tant ici conside´re´. Etant donne´ les proﬁts de chaque joueur,
notre mode`le pre´dit des e´quilibres de Nash, possiblement multiples. C’est la pre´sence
de ces e´quilibres multiples qui justiﬁe l’utilisation d’une proce´dure en identiﬁcation
partielle. Nous faisons appel a` des re´sultats dans la litte´rature sur l’identiﬁcation par-
tielle qui nous permettent de conside´rer des comportements strate´giques au sein de
l’unite´ familiale (Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011), Galichon and Henry
(2011)).
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Les re´sultats empiriques sugge`rent que le mode`le  unitaire , ou` un agent repre´sentatif
maximise l’utilite´ familiale, est incompatible avec nos donne´es. Les aidants exte´rieurs
a` la famille nucle´aire subissent un couˆt strictement positif pour leur participation,
ce qui de´courage leur implication. Les obligations familiales et sociales semblent ex-
pliquer les cas de participation d’un aidant, mieux qu’un possible altruisme de ces
derniers.
Finalement, le troisie`me chapitre pre´sente le cadre the´orique plus ge´ne´ral dans le-
quel s’imbriquent les mode`les de´veloppe´s dans les pre´ce´dents chapitres. Les me´thodes
d’identiﬁcation et d’infe´rence pre´sente´es sont spe´cialise´es aux jeux ﬁnis avec informa-
tion comple`te. Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) et Galichon and Henry
(2011) montrent que de tels mode`les sont e´quivalents a` une collection d’ine´galite´s de
moment dont le cardinal augmentent exponentiellement avec le nombre d’alternatives
discre`tes. Avec nos co-auteurs, nous proposons une caracte´risation e´quivalente, base´e
sur des me´thodes d’analyse combinatoires classiques, qui re´duit les contraintes compu-
tationelles. Nous proposons notamment une proce´dure combinatoire pour une imple´mentation
eﬃcace du bootstrap pour eﬀectuer l’infe´rence statistique dans les mode`les cite´s ci-
dessus. Nous en faisons une application sur les de´terminants du choix familial de soins
a` long terme pour des parents aˆge´s.
1
Chapter 1
The determinants of International
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identiﬁcation analysis
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Abstract
This paper studies the decision made by a family to invest in student migration and
the consequences of the migration of skilled individuals for the sending country. We
propose an empirical structural decision model which reﬂects the importance of both
the return of the investment and the budget constraint in agent choices. Taking ad-
vantage of recent advances in the treatment of identiﬁcation problems in IV-discrete
choice models, we circumvent the problem of endogeneity of the educational attain-
ment and conduct inference for the parameters of interest. The data are collected
on students from Cameroon, using a new snowball sampling procedure, which allow
the inclusion of both migrants and non-migrants in the sample. We propose bias
corrected estimators for this procedure. We study the characteristics of potential
candidates to migration that increase or decrease their probability to migrate. We
also test for existence of a brain gain eﬀect in Cameroon. The results show that educa-
tional attainment in tertiary education is not positively correlated with the prospect
of migration, invalidating the brain gain hypothesis.
1.1 Introduction
As the number of students choosing to study abroad has considerably increased since
1970’s, the interest of the economic literature in this speciﬁc form of migration has also
grown in the recent years. There is at least to features that make the specialization
to this topic relevant. First, student migration may be seen as a route to permanent
emigration. As pointed out by Rosenzweig (2008), unlike for many visas, there are no
country ceilings or kinship requirements for student visas. In addition, the probability
that a foreign-trained student will remain in the host country is higher than the overall
emigration probability for a domestically schooled student. Finally, universities are
often of better quality and for comparable skills levels, remuneration are higher in
high-income countries. Entering the host country as a student appears therefore as a
dominant strategy for prospecting migrants. Second, due to higher costs of living and
potentially higher fees in foreign countries, the budget constraint plays an important
role. The family (and not only the student) resources matter. According to data
released by the Institute of International Education (IE) in 2006, the primary source
of funding is “personal and family” for about 64 percent of foreign students.
However, mainly because of data constraints, the focus of the literature has
been largely directed to macroeconomic analyzes of determinants of student mobility,
Batista, Lacuesta, and Vicente (2012) (BLV, hereafter) being one notable exception.
The recent contributions from Rosenzweig, Irwin, and Williamson (2006), Rosenzweig
(2008), Beine, Noel, and Ragot (2012) and Perkins and Neumayer (2011) among oth-
ers build on the ﬁndings of the more established literature on international migration
to study determinants in origin and/or destination countries that encourage, attract
or retain student migrants, the so-called push and pull factors. What so far received
less attention are the determinants of the choice of location of tertiary studies from a
microeconomic perspective. Most importantly, how inﬂuential are the choice of ﬁnal
level of education, the characteristic of the candidate to migration, as well as family’s
socio-economic characteristics?
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As stated earlier, the nuclear family is highly involved in migration choices and
there characteristics should be included in any analysis of the decision process. More-
over, as documented by survey results and the literature of student migration (see for
example Perkins and Neumayer (2011)), migrants might receive some support from
the diaspora in their destination country, e.g a distant relative of the student’s family
living in the destination country provides some help by hosting the migrant, providing
food and accomodation. This eﬀect, known in the migration literature as a network
eﬀect, provides some implicit capital to the family. The characteristics of this helper
should therefore be relevant determinants within our analysis.
But engaging in this study, one faces major challenges, the main of them being the
data limitations. Most existing empirical studies are based on country-level samples
which fail to reﬂect the heterogeneity within a speciﬁc community. Conversely, as
the population of interest is often scattered around the globe, micro-level samples are
easily in danger of missing part of the population of interest. Furthermore, the perva-
sive problem of endogeneity renders the econometric analysis diﬃcult. In that strong
structral assumption are required for identiﬁcation and estimation of the structural
parameters, the robustness of the methods in use so far (in BLV for example) is de-
batable. These challenges explain the scarcity of the literature on the microeconomic
determinants of international student migration.
The objective of this paper is to provide a rigorous framework to study the invest-
ment decision made by the family of the candidate to emigration, while addressing
the above concerns. Throughout the paper, we work with a structural discrete choice
model of private investment of the family in the student migration. Reminescent
of the human capital litterature, our framework assume education of a child to be
an investment of the family unit which seeks to maximize it lifetime earning. The
family decides of the location of tertiary study of the sudent; however, this choice is
contingent on the choice of ﬁnal education level (hence the problem of endogeneity).
Migration occurs when the expected return of the investment is positive. Our model
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disentangles the liquidity constraints eﬀects from the expected return of the invest-
ment. We are interested in the determinants of the return component for the family,
as well as the deterring eﬀect of the ﬁnancial constraint component. The novelty of
our approach is that, albeit a monotonicity condition, we do not impose any restric-
tion on the relationship of the educational attainment and migration, neither do we
rely on a identifying instrument.
The contributions to the literature on the topic are three-fold: ﬁrst, we take ad-
vantage of recent developments in network sampling to construct a novel dataset on a
population of students from Cameroon, migrants and non-migrants. Second, we show
that our structural model of investment in student migration oﬀers itself quite nicely
to an inference procedure in an incomplete (partially identiﬁed) model framework.
This has two major advantages: frist, the structural assumptions are fairly parsi-
monious because mainly driven by the economic analysis and not impose to solve
technical shortcomings. Furthermore, we do not appeal to the use of a identifying
instrument, hence, circumventing the problems of validity and relevance. Following
the proposal in Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2011), we use sharp bounds for our
discrete choice models, with endogenous right-hand side regressor. These bounds
translate in moment inequalities and a large literature has developed in this ﬁeld. A
challenge though remains the computational burden of these methods, which is often
increased when considering models with relatively high number of covariates. Henry,
Me´ango, and Queyranne (2011) (Chapter 3, HMQ hereafter) proposes a combinatorial
approach to solve the above problem and their method is the best suited to inference
in our framework. As a ﬁnal contribution of this paper, we propose a methodology
to preestimate a number of parameters of interest, decreasing signiﬁcantly the com-
putational requirement. This step appears crucial, since the sample size required to
achieve informative inference, grows rapidly with the number of covariates.
For the purpose of the study, a survey has been conducted on the population
of Cameroonian, aged 18 or more, having completed secondary school by obtaining
6
the “Baccalaure´at”1. We gathered information on 418 respondents. Our survey data
show that close to three quarters of migrant rely on themselves or on family capital to
ﬁnance their study abroad. More than half of the respondants reports the existence of
a potential or eﬀective helper in the migration process. The “typical” helper is a male,
an uncle or a brother who have a university degree. Unsurprinsingly, families where at
least one of the parent have higher level of education, and families who possess higher
physical capital, have less diﬃculty to meet the budget constraint for migration.
Concerning determinants of the return of investment in migration, we ﬁnd that a
higher choice of educational attainment along with better candidate’s results during
secondary school signiﬁcantly increase returns to migration. This ﬁnding suggests a
positive selection of migrants. Interestingly, ﬁrst born-child has lower probability of
migration than the subsequent children, while the gender does not seem to aﬀect the
probability of migration.
This paper is mainly related to three strands of literature, the Network Sam-
pling literature, the student-mobility and the more general migration literature and
the partial identiﬁcation literature. With the recent expansion of social networking
services and advances in computational capabilities, a renewed interest has grown
for methods of data collection over networks. The procedure we propose has been
inspired by the Respondant-Driven Sampling methodology proposed by Heckathorn
(1997, 2007) and Wejnert and Heckathorn (2008). To estimate inclusion probabilities
and correct for oversampling of some population members, we use estimators ﬁrst
applied by Thompson (2006) in the context of network sampled data.
The incentives for international migration of skilled individuals have been ex-
tensively studied by a number of early key contributions for which the surveys by
Borjas(1989, 1994) serve as good references. Rosenzweig (2008) studies out-migration
of (Asian) students. One of his contributions is to distinguish the eﬀects of the return
1Similar to the french educational system, “Baccalaure´at” is a compulsory state exam for com-
pletion of secondary school.
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of out-migration and budgetary constraint on a candidate decision. Both appear
important in the ﬁnal decision of migration. Beine, Noel, and Ragot (2012) and
Perkins and Neumayer (2011) study the determinants of migration in multi-origin
multi-destination framework. Among interesting results, they ﬁnd a strong eﬀect of
the number of migrants in the destination country on the probability of migration.
Micro-level studies of the question of the incentives of international student mi-
gration are still rare. BLV studies the case of Cape Verde by taking advantage of
a speciﬁcally tailored survey on households in the country. They are interested in
testing the brain gain eﬀect, which in their framework, amounts to testing for a sig-
niﬁcant linear correlation between the own future probability of migration and the
schooling decisions. To achieve identiﬁcation, their econometric model relies on a
distributional assumption on the joint behavior of the latent variable and on some
exclusion restrictions. Additional, though not exhaustive, reference on international
student migration includes Dreher and Poutvaara (2011), Bessey (2011), Brezis and
Soueri (2011), Thissen and Ederveen (2006), Van Bouwel and Veugelers (2009).
Our work is also related to an increasing literature on partially identiﬁed models,
following the seminal works of Manski (1993) and Jovanovic (1989). Closely related
to our framework, the papers of Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011), Gali-
chon and Henry (2011) and Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2011), which relax the
requirement for point identiﬁcation in structural models and derive sharp bounds on
the parameters of these models. The ﬁrst two explore the case of strategic games
in complete information, while the last one is concerned with instrumental variable
model of discrete choice. As the bounds translate into moment inequalities, our in-
ference procedure is related to a large literature which has developed on inference
in moment inequality models since the seminal contribution of Chernozhukov, Hong,
and Tamer (2007). A major challenge is the computational burden of these methods,
here aggravated by the relatively high number of covariates.
In Section 1.2, we present a family investment decision model in a human capital
8
framework. Section 1.3 is devoted to the inference procedure. The data collection
procedure is presented in Section 1.4. Finally, we gather the results of the inference
on the parameters of the structural model in Section 1.5, before we conclude. Proofs
are collected in the appendix.
1.2 A structural Model of Private Investment in
Student Migration
Student migration displays two important characteristics. First, the choice of location
of tertiary education is the result of an arbitrage between the schooling and employ-
ment opportunities available in the origin country and in the host country. Second,
the amount of capital that the family can invest in the process is key to the migration
process. The model we present mirrors these two essential characteristics.
Following Beine, Noel, and Ragot (2012) (see also Brezis and Soueri (2011)),
we consider a framework based on the human capital literature, where “Education is
considered as an investment in future earnings and employment for rationale [families]
who seek to maximize the lifetime earnings.” The decision of a student migration is
then between (1) obtaining further education in a foreign country or (2) studying or
starting professional activities at home. Of course, this decision does not preclude
further international mobility when education is completed, although the above choice
aﬀects signiﬁcantly the probability of later migration - student migrants have better
opportunities on the labor market of their host country (some evidences in Rosenzweig
(2008)). Of equal importance, student migrants might return to their origin country
to work. Our explicit assumption is that the choice of location of tertiary education
and the choice of location of work are taken sequentially. Note that the beneﬁts
discussed here are not only pecuniary. For example, the utility enjoyed by having a
child entering the marriage market of the host country, or the disutility of having a
child living to a greater distance (e.g for provision of health care to elderly parents).
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To be more speciﬁc, the evaluation of beneﬁts depend on two main components:
one that depends on the characteristics of the child. Of particular interest for us,
his/her ﬁnal educational attainment. The unobserved innate ability of the child also
inﬂuences how likely he is to adjust to life in a foreign culture or how much he prefers
staying in his country2.
The other important part, on which these beneﬁts depend on, is the wealth of
the family. Indeed, obtaining tertiary education in a foreign country which has often
higher income per-capita entails signiﬁcant costs. Education costs, travel costs and
living costs. The family could possess some implicit capital that will lower the ﬁnan-
cial input required for the student migration investment. In particular, if a relative
lives in the destination country. This relative could provide material and ﬁnancial
support. Family characteristics will therefore inﬂuence the amount of money that the
familly needs to borrow for the student migration investment, if any. The availability
of a scholarship for the student might also signiﬁcantly relax the budget constraint
of the family.
The families form myopic expectations on the return on studying abroad or staying
home, observing skill prices and probabilities of later settlement in a foreign country.
The family compares returns on both alternatives, and invest in migration when the
migration option yields the largest expected beneﬁts. We introduce more formal
notation in the following.
Consider a family indexed by i. Here we think of an extended family (parents,
child and some relative of the family who might provide some support) with one mem-
ber (a child) who is a potential migrant. The family possesses a capitalK0i (explicit or
implicit, as discussed above). The child has observable characteristics Xi (e.g. educa-
tion, gender and previous academic result of the child) and characteristics εi, known
to all family members but unobservable for the econometrician (innate ability of the
child, cultural factors inﬂuencing evaluation of the migration alternative,etc.). When
2This component could be extend to speciﬁc preferences of the family.
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the child complete secondary school, the family has the opportunity of making an
investment of level I, known and ﬁxed across families, by ﬁnancing further education
of the child in a foreign country. The reader should understand I as the minimum
ﬁnancial input enabling student migration to the country of destination. It includes
travel, education and living expenses. We call If (Edi, Xi, εi, θ) the gross revenue from
the investment and r(Edi, Xi, εi, θ), its return, which both depend on the observable
and unobserved characteristics of the family. Note that the two variables are linked
by the following equation :
r(Edi, Xi, εi, θ) =
If (Edi, Xi, εi, θ)
I
− 1
θ are here the parameters of interest. Edi is the ﬁnal education level. The choice
of education will aﬀect the salary the agent expect after graduation but also the
probability of subsequent migration3. The endogeneity problem will arise primarily
from the potential correlation between the unobservable variable εi and the choice of
ﬁnal educational attainment. If K0i < I, the family must borrow capital to be able
to make the investment. Denote r0 the interest rate for borrowing. In the following,
we will reason in term of return or interest rate.
As mentioned above, the student has the alternative to remain in his origin coun-
try, either to obtain further education or to work. Again, later on, the individual
decides to migrate or not and his/her prospect of migration enters the valuation of
this given alternative. We will assume that this alternative, along with other poten-
tial investment alternatives in the origin country, yield an interest rate on the family
capital K0i , that we will denote r1. By assuming r1 to be constant, we implicitly
assume that the return on the investment of the family capital in the origin country,
is not (or only mildly) aﬀected by the choice of ﬁnal education. This would be the
case if the return to skills is low in Cameroon and the probability of work migration
3Dreher and Poutvaara (2011) points out that “ host countries are interested in educating foreign
students, partly to attract human capital beneﬁting the domestic economy”. Educational attainment
and probability of settlement in the host country increase together for a migrant student.
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when schooling has been completed in the origin country is low and not very sensitive
to the choice of education. As this seems to be case in the country where we conduct
our empirical application, for the level of education we consider (Masters) , we do
not expect our result to be very sensitive to this hypothesis (see IOM report, 2010).
As the reader might expect, education in many developing country is pretty cheap.
However, it yields low expected returns, we impose r1 ≤ r04.
The family compares investments with respect to their expected return. Knowing
the interest rates above, the family chooses the investment alternative to maximize
its expected proﬁt that we will denote Πi ≡ Πi (Edi, Xi, K0i , εi; r0, θ) (to simplify
notation, we drop the subscript i in the subsequent development). Choosing to remain
in the origin country yields an expected proﬁt of :
Π = r1K
0
While the investment student in migration, along with a choice of ﬁnal education
level of Ed gives:
Π = r (Ed,X, ε; θ) I +
(
K0 − I) (r11{K0 − I > 0}+ r01{K0 − I < 0})
with 1A = 1 if A is true, and 0 if not. The net proﬁt of the student migration for the
family can then be written:
Π˜ = (r (Ed,X, ε; θ)− r1) I + (r0 − r1)min
(
K0 − I, 0) (1.2.1)
Note that (r0 − r1) measures the eﬀect of the budget on the net proﬁt of student
migration. If r0 = r1, the family must simply compare its return from the student
migration investment to the return of alternative investment in the origin country.
All that matters in the decision is the additional return of investment and the budget
4For reference, the interest rate spread (the diﬀerence between the lending and the borrowing
rate) in Cameroon is about 0.2 for “tontines” which are very popular among Cameroonian households
for ﬁnancing even very large investments (Nemb and Jumbo (2011))
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constraint plays no role. We can simplify Eq. (1.2.1) to
Π˜
I
= r (Ed,X, ε; θ) + r0min
(
K0
I
− 1, 0
)
(1.2.2)
and r(.) and r0 can be reinterpreted “net of the interest rate r1”. We assume the
following separable formulation of return function:
r (Ed,X, ε; θ) = r˜ (Ed,X; θ)− ε
and deﬁne ﬁnally:
π˜
(
Ed,X,
K0
I
; r0, θ
)
≡ r˜ (Ed,X; θ) + r0min
(
K0
I
− 1, 0
)
.
The investment decision being denoted Y ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 means that the family
chooses student migration, is then characterized in the following way:
Y = 1
{
π˜
(
Ed,X,
K0
I
; r0, θ
)
− ε ≥ 0
}
We will assume later in Section 1.5 a linear return in the characteristics (see Eq.
1.5.1). It is assumed that the variable ε follows a logistic distribution of variance
normalized to 1. In an abuse of notation in the following and when the context is
clear enough to allow it, we will refer to the structural parameters of the function π˜
as θ, while meaning the pair (r0, θ). The parameter r0 will receive special attention
in Section 1.3.4.
1.2.1 Treatment of endogeneity of the educational attain-
ment
Among the observable characteristics inﬂuencing the migration decision, the schooling
attainment of the candidate must be seen as an endogeneous variable. The nature
of the potential endogeneity is here two-fold. First, the innate ability remains an
omitted variable correlated with the educational attainment. This problem is well
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known in the labor literature. For example, the signaling model in Spence (1973),
agents with high innate ability are assumed to ﬁnd school less diﬃcult and obtain
higher education as a signal of their high ability (see Willis (1985) for survey). Sec-
ond, as recognize in the migration literature, education choice and migration decision
are often simultaneously decided at household level (Hanson and Woodruﬀ (2003),
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007)). A change in educational attainment aﬀects the de-
cision to migrate, which aﬀects the working migration probabilities, impacting in turn
the return of student migration, and so forth. It is easy in fact to agree with the claim
that more education decreases the cost of migration procedures and, therefore, makes
it more likely to migrate. Indeed, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) ﬁnd that emigration
propensities are ﬁve to ten times higher for workers with more than twelve years of
education than for workers with less than twelve years of education. In the other
direction, the prospect of migration could be the incentive to acquire more education
since it ensures higher returns abroad. Rosenzweig (2008), for example, points out
that the choice of location of tertiary education signiﬁcantly aﬀects the probability
that a person can emigrate permanently.
The common methodology to deal with these two issues would amount in our
framework to specify further the relationship between the migration and schooling
decision, in the form of a simultaneous probability model. Identiﬁcation and es-
timation methodology then rely on a structural assumption about the error terms
(bivariate normal distribution), as well as strong (identifying) exclusion restriction
(see for example Mallar (1977)). Namely, we need variables that aﬀect the choice
of ﬁnal education level and are known at the time the migration decision is made,
but which do not directly aﬀect the migration decision. This methodology is used
by BLV, albeit the fact that they rather treat the problem of endogeneity of the
migration variable in the equation of the schooling choice. Our main critics to this
methodology are two-fold: ﬁrst, the imposed structural assumption on the error terms
are made for technical reason rather than sound economic intuition. Second, the ex-
clusion restriction should be teamed with conditions on the support of the excluded
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variable to obtain point identiﬁcation. The argument is similar to the one in ? (The-
orem 2): identiﬁcation of parameters occur through “independent variation in one
regressor while driving another to take extreme values on its support (identiﬁcation
at inﬁnity)”. Altogether, these assumptions are arguably very strong.
The strength of the methodology presented in this paper resides in that we need
not to model any further the relationship between Educational attainment (Ed) and
migration (Y ) to conduct inference5. In particular, the inference procedure does not
require the existence of a valid instrument. The model rests therefore upon fewer
structural assumption. It comes at the cost of losing identiﬁcation of parameters.
Indeed, allowing for endogenous explanatory variable in discrete choice models might
hinder point identiﬁcation of parameter of interests. Early treatments of this problem
can be found in Manski (1993).
In this paper, we pursue the avenue of set identiﬁcation rather than point identi-
ﬁcation. Recent contributions made by Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011),
Galichon and Henry (2011) (GH, hereafter) and Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2011)
(CRS) show that, without additional hypothesis to the model, bounds can be derived
on the structural parameters of an IV-discrete choice model. We present these results
in the context of our model and show how to conduct inference, following the proposal
of HMQ.
1.3 Inference procedure
In the model described above, we are ﬁrst interested in the determinants of migration.
We build on the work of GH, CRS and HMQ to conduct inference for the parameters
of the structural equation (1.2.2). A conﬁdence region is derived by using sharp
bounds on the structural parameters. However, because some data are incompletely
5We will however impose a condition on the ordering of returns on migration for diﬀerent level
of education, all other variables being controlled
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observed, further complications are added to the derivation of the sharp bounds,
independently of the inference procedure. In the following, we present sharp bounds
on the structural parameters of the model in its simplest form. On this simple model,
we show how to conduct inference. Section 1.3.3 then deals with the complications
mentioned above.
1.3.1 Sharp bounds
Suppose that we observe Y ∈ Y , Ed ∈ E and X ∈ X on a family i, as deﬁned by the
previous section. We suppose in this section that we can also observe V ≡ K0
I
− 1,
the fraction of the investment that the family needs to borrow. Note that V is a
random variable distributed on the real line. We denote the vector W ≡ (X, V ).
The unobservable latent variable is ε, distributed on the real line. It summarizes the
decision shifters that are known to the family but unknown to the econometrician.
Our interest is primarly in inference on θ, a ﬁnite dimensional parameter which char-
acterizes the return on student migration of the family. With the above notation, the
utility of the family can then be rewritten:
π˜ (Ed,W ; r0, θ)− ε = r (Ed,X; θ) + r0.min(V, 0)− ε (1.3.1)
We assume that X and V are exogeneous in the sense that ε and W are stochastically
independent. The above assumption implies in particular the innate ability of the
child will not be inﬂuenced by the capital possessed by his family. Let F 0Ed,Y |W , the
distribution of the (Ed, Y ) given W , and Fε;θ, the distribution of ε given W on R.
We will denote the respective densities accordingly P0(.|W ) and Pε(.|W ). As noted
above, endogeneity of the random variable Ed might preclude point identiﬁcation as
several parameter values θ from the model could be consistent with the data. We
deﬁne ΘI this set of parameter. A model which singles ΘI as the set of possible values
for θ is said to be set identiﬁed. Point identiﬁcation occurs when ΘI is reduced to a
singleton. A model is rejected by the data if ΘI is the empty set.
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We give here the sharp bounds induced on the structural parameters for a model
with two alternatives of migration and two levels of education.
Theorem 1 (Sharp bounds) Consider the set of parameters θ for which we have
positive return on student migration to education, i.e.
π˜ (1, w; θ) > π˜ (0, w; θ)), for all w. (1.3.2)
A parameter θ belongs to the identiﬁed set, if and only if we have :
P0 (Y = 1, Ed = 0 |W = w ) ≤ Fε (π˜ (0, w; θ)) , (1.3.3)
P0 (Y = 1, Ed = 1 |W = w ) ≤ Fε (π˜ (1, w; θ)) , (1.3.4)
P0 (Y = 0, Ed = 0 |W = w ) ≤ 1− Fε (π˜ (0, w; θ)) , (1.3.5)
P0 (Y = 0, Ed = 1 |W = w ) ≤ 1− Fε (π˜ (1, w; θ)) , (1.3.6)
P0 (Y = 1 |W = w ) ≤ Fε (π˜ (1, w; θ)) , (1.3.7)
P0 (Y = 0 |W = w ) ≤ 1− Fε (π˜ (0, w; θ)) , (1.3.8)
w a.e.
Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Propositon 1 in Appendix 1.7.1. The terms in
the left-hand side are derived from the Data Generating Process of the observable
variables. Note that they do not include the parameter θ. The terms in the right-
hand side are derived from the cumulative distribution of the latent variable ε. To
understand these inequalities, we can think of the observed outcome (y, e) as part of a
multiple equilibrium predicted by the model. For example, let θ0 be the true param-
eter. (Y = 0, Ed = 1) can only be observed if π˜ (0, w; θ0) ≤ ε (even after obtaining
education Ed = 1, the return of migration are not large enough to make migration at-
tractive). But if the latter is true, the model predicted also that (Y = 0, Ed = 0) was
a possible outcome i.e, returns to migration are also too small for those who choose
education Ed = 0. {(Y = 0, Ed = 1); (Y = 0, Ed = 0)} can be understood as a mul-
tiple equilibrium prediction. In other words, we cannot observe (Y = 0, Ed = 1) more
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often than the model predicted {(Y = 0, Ed = 1); (Y = 0, Ed = 0)}. Hence, (1.3.6).
Theorem 1 summarizes this fact: the probability that we observe a given outcome,
cannot be greater than the probability that the model predicts at least one of all the
multiple equilibria where this outcome is part of.
Under the condition (1.3.2), ΘI is deﬁned as the set of parameters for which (1.3.3)
- (1.3.8) are true. These bounds which can easily be derived as necessary conditions,
are also suﬃcient (see Appendix 1.7.1), hence the term “sharp” bounds. Note that
some of these inequalities are redundant, and only a subset of those is enough to
characterize ΘI . We now turn to the inference procedure.
1.3.2 Inference on the structural parameters
Condition (1.3.2) is not a stochastic condition which will be assumed through out the
rest of the paper. Here, we seek coverage of the identiﬁed set, ΘI with a prescribed
probability, 1 − α. The idea of the procedure is to deﬁne a new set of inequalities
which relaxes the bounds with a deﬁnite probability 1 − α, so that a parameter
satisfying (1.3.3) - (1.3.8) will satisfy this new set of inequalities with conﬁdence level
1 − α. The conﬁdence region will simply be the collection of all those parameters
satisfying the new set of inequalities. The relaxation occurs through the construction
of a function P n, dominated by the probability distribution P0. Suppose indeed that
we can construct a function P n such that for all (y, e) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}, and w a.e.:
P n (Y = y, Ed = e |W = w ) ≤ P0 (Y = y, Ed = e |W = w ) (1.3.9)
with probability 1−α. A new set of inequalities (1.3.3’) - (1.3.8’) can be obtained by
replacing P0 by P n in (1.3.3) - (1.3.8). Deﬁne now Θˆn has the collection of parameters
θ satisfying (1.3.3’) - (1.3.8’). Theorem 4 in Appendix 1.7.1 shows that we achieve
with Θˆn a proper coverage of the identiﬁed set ΘI .
Construction of a functional satisfying (1.3.9) is proposed by HMQ through a
procedure called “eﬃcient combinatorial bootstrap” that runs in linear computing
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time. It involves bootstrapping the empirical process of the distribution P0(.|W ), to
retrieve the (1− α)-quantile of this process, cα(W ). Then, the empirical distribution
Pˆ0(.|W ) is decreased by cα(W ). This decreased quantity oﬀers the desired functional
P n.
Although HMQ only covers the case of discrete variables, results from Cher-
nozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2009) (Section 4.1) makes it sensible to use the procedure
in the parametric case.
1.3.3 Incomplete observation of Educational attainment
The respondent’s educational attainment is not completely observed unless he/she
has completed her study. In fact, 48% of the respondents have not. Information
are available though on the level of education at the time of response, which we will
denote it Ed. To complement this information for those respondants who had not yet
completed there studies, a question in survey was relative to their highest expected
educational attainment. this variable is then observed in our dataset and we will
denote it Ed. Under the assumption that a person does not study more than the
expected level, i.e. Ed ≤ Ed ≤ Ed. We then have an interval [Ed;Ed] such that:
P
(
Ed ∈ [Ed;Ed]) = 1 (1.3.10)
This information can be incorporated to the earlier framework as a censored variable
problem. The non-redundant sharp bounds become:
P0
(
Y = 1, Ed = 0, Ed = 0 |W = w) ≤ Fε (π˜ (0, w; θ)) , (1.3.11)
P0
(
Y = 0, Ed = 1, Ed = 1 |W = w) ≤ 1− Fε (π˜ (1, w; θ)) ,
P0 (Y = 1 |W = w ) ≤ Fε (π˜ (1, w; θ)) , (1.3.12)
P0 (Y = 0 |W = w ) ≤ 1− Fε (π˜ (0, w; θ)) , (1.3.13)
w a.e.
See Proof in Appendix 1.7.1.
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1.3.4 First-step estimation of V: the proportion of the in-
vestment that the family needs to borrow
We assumed in Section 1.3.1 that the realization of the random variable V , the ratio
of the capital of the family to the amount to invest, was observable for each family.
As in many other studies, this information is absent from the dataset. The “natural”
method to get around this problem, would be to add to the covariates, all observable
variables which are known to inﬂuence the capital of the family, and conduct inference
with this new set of covariates. This, however, by augmenting the dimensionality of
W , increases the size of the data required to achieve informative inference and the
computational burden. We use instead additional information provided by the survey
to devise a two-step estimation in the same spirit as an Heckit estimation. This
simpliﬁcation will however be at the expense of informativeness of inference relative
to the parameter measuring the eﬀect of the budget constraint.
The dataset allows to distinguish families who need to borrow from families who
have suﬃcient funds to cover all the costs of the migration investment. In other words,
we observe 1 {V < 0} instead of V . From this information and the observation of other
socio-economic characteristics of the family, we construct a conﬁdence region for the
realization of V . Indeed, denote Li, the observable socio-economic characteristics of
the family i. We postulate for Vi the following single index functional form:
Assumption 1
Vi = βLi + ui where ui follows N(0, σu) (1.3.14)
where u is stochastically independent of ε given (W,L).
See the variables in included in L in Table 1.1.
Since 1{v < 0} is observed, the parameter of this model can be estimated through
a probit estimation, under a scale normalization. One word of caution is therefore
required here. If σu were known, for a real 0 < αv < 1, we would then have an interval
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[v; v] such that:
P (V ∈ [v; v]) = 1− αv (1.3.15)
Our inference problem becomes one where the covariates are deﬁned by an interval
rather than a point. By an appeal to the Composition Theorem of Galichon and Henry
(2006a) (Theorem 1), we can redeﬁne our identiﬁed set and propose a valid conﬁdence
region, following the same procedure as in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. However, σu is a
nuisance parameter here and the estimation procedure requires a scale normalization.
As the reader might expect, the probit model under the standard normalization σu = 1
gives us not a conﬁdence interval for V , but for a variable V|σ=1, related to the original
variable by the relation:
V|σ=1 = σ−1u V.
The nuisance parameter σu will aﬀect inference on the parameter r0. Indeed, using
V|σ=1 Equation (1.3.1) can be rewritten.
π˜ (Ed,W ; r0, θ)− ε = r (Ed,X; θ) + r0.σu.min(V|σ=1, 0)− ε (1.3.16)
The bounds that we obtain will be informative for the parameter r0.σu. However,
since σu remains unrestricted, the model will be uninformative on the parameter r0.
Note that, the inference methodology is in two steps, reminiscent of the two-steps
of an Heckit estimation. Prior to the inference in our partially identiﬁed framework,
we perform a ﬁrst step estimation to overcome the computational burden induced by
the high number of parameters. This ﬁrst step estimation consists in a probit of some
components of the parameter vector θ. Without it, the partial identiﬁcation inference
would be computationally infeasible, since it would involve searching over a parameter
grid with an unreasonable size. The price to pay is uninformativeness of our procedure
on the parameter r0. A mathematically rigorous treatment of the inference procedure
in a general case is oﬀered in Appendix 1.7.1 for interested readers.
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1.4 Database
We begin this section by providing some facts on Cameroon, which we believe are
relevant in understanding the background of the study. The main part of this sec-
tion (Subsection 1.4.2) is devoted to the core of the snowball sampling methodology
used for the online survey. We explicit the sampling design and show, under sim-
plifying assumptions, how to estimate the population proportions by correcting for
non-response and bias in the survey sampling design. Finally, in Section 1.4.3, we
discuss the descriptive statistics drawn from the dataset.
1.4.1 Snapshot of Cameroon
Cameroon6 has an estimated population of 19.5 million in 2009, relatively young: an
estimated 40.9% are under 15. After a severe recession period from 1985 to 2000, due
to the fall in price of raw material exports, the nominal GDP returned to a steady
growth from 2001, with an annual rate around 3% from 2004 to 2009 . However, 30%
of the population lives with less than 2$ per day in 2007. The educational system
in Cameroon is a mixture of British and French precedents. The typical curriculum
consists of 6 years in primary school and 7 years in secondary school. Access to
university is conditional on passing the state exam, “Baccalaure´at”, named after the
equivalent French exam. The enrollment in ﬁrst year primary school is estimated at
88.3% in 2008, with a noticeable diﬀerence between male (94.3%) and female (82.3%).
However, transition and survival rate are fairly low, with 16% of the total of enrolled
being repeaters in the same year. Progression to secondary school is 44.4%. The Bac-
6The data presented in this section are compounded from diﬀerent reports released by: (1) inter-
national organizations, principally the 2009 Report of the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) on the national proﬁle of migration in Cameroon, the database of the UNESCO Institute for
statistics, accessible online, and the World Development Indicators as released by the World Bank
in 2011 and (2) the National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) of Cameroon and the Cameroonian
Ministry of Education.
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calaure´at exam concerns close to 50,000 candidates each year. The success rate went
up from 40 % to 50-55% during the past 5 years increasing the pressure on univer-
sities which receive relatively scarce allowances for investment in new infrastructures
(see Makosso, 2006). The number of migrants with Cameroonian citizenship was less
than 1% of the population. They tend to be long term migrants. In stark contrast,
migration of skilled individuals is of relatively high magnitude. The ratio of skilled
migrant to the population of skilled non-migrant is 17.2% (Docquier and Marfouk
(2006)). Brain drain is, for this reason, a serious concern for the Cameroonian State.
In line with the migrating trend of highly educated, the ratio of Cameroonian stu-
dents enrolled in a foreign country to the total number of Cameroonian students was
estimated at 14.5% in 2006. On a ﬁnal note, in the database collected by Docquier
and Marfouk, Cameroon ranks 25th, among countries with a population higher than 4
millions, in term of rate of migration of skilled individual to OECD in 2000 (11 other
sub-Saharan African countries are part of the list of the 30 highest rates). Beine,
Docquier, and Rapoport (2008) ﬁnds evidence of a detrimental Brain Drain eﬀect in
Cameroon. According to their measure, the country looses 0.1% of its skilled force
relative to the situation of closed economy.
1.4.2 Sampling methodology and corrected estimators
For the purpose of the study, a survey has been conducted on the population of
Cameroonian, aged 18 or more, having completed secondary school by obtaining the
Baccalaure´at. A novelty of our dataset is that it comprises information on both
migrants and non-migrants.
Sampling Design
To reach both populations (migrant and non-migrant), we used a snowball sampling
procedure through an online platform. The initial sample consisted of 22 individuals
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(called “seeds”) contacted by the researcher. The seeds where chosen on the base
of geographical (country of residence) and demographical (gender, age) to include,
as much as possible, all the components of the population. Each seed were asked to
answer a questionnaire and to invite as much friends as possible from the population
of interest. The invitee would receive an electronic mail from his host with the detail
of the survey, and a unique link to access the online questionnaire. If he/she accepted
to participate, he/she was required to complete the questionnaire and invite as much
friends as possible in the population of interest. Recruitment is said to occur in waves
and stops when invitees fail to complete the survey or invite other friends. The wave
at which i is invited is the number of recruiters that separates him from the initial
sample. Participation in the study was restricted to a prior invitation and each invitee
received a unique token which enabled us to retrace the paths of invitation. More
information on the survey implementation is available in Appendix 1.7.3.
Estimators
We give here an idea of the methodology to correct for biases induced by non-random
sampling and non-response of invitees. The mathematical proofs and the modiﬁcation
suggested to the combinatorial bootstrap procedure advised in HMQ are relegated in
Appendix 1.7.2.
Because of the particularities of sampling procedure, Horvitz-Thompson estima-
tors are used as unbiased estimators of the true population mean. To use these
estimators, we need to compute the inclusion probability for individuals in the sam-
ple. Call qki, the conditional probability for individual i to be invited to the survey,
knowing that the survey reached wave k. Suppose that we are at wave k. The set
of people invited during the previous wave, are now the set of recruiters. Call this
set the active set and denote it ak. Proposition 4 in Section 1.7.2, shows that under
some simplifying assumptions, qki can be decomposed into two main terms :
• The probability that an invitee i agrees to participate in the study, conditional
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on being invited. Under the assumption that non-response occurs at random, we
estimate this probability through the ratio of response when the survey reaches
wave k.
• And the probability that individual i is invited by a recruiter in the active set.
To estimate this second term, we need (1) to know the probability that i knows a
recruiter in the active set. To do so, we ﬁt a model of graph, the model of Erdos-
Reny`i, to our sample network, in order to estimate the probability that two
individuals know each other. We further need to know (2) the probability for a
recruiter j ∈ ak to invite i, given that the two individuals share a relationship.
Under the assumption that j chooses his/her invitees at random among his
friends, this probability is given by the ratio of the number of invitees to the
number of connections of j in the population, j’s degree.
1.4.3 Descriptive statistics
The dataset consists in 402 individuals, see Tables 1.3 to 1.4. We discuss some
facts on the dataset and sometimes compare characteristics of migrants and other
respondants, when diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant.
Both populations are similar with regards to their age and marital status. Mi-
grants however, appear to obtain their secondary school degree one year earlier than
the others, suggesting higher number of repeaters among the non-migrants. Re-
spondents are predominantly male. OECD countries (especially France and North
America) and african countries are the favorite destinations of migrants in our sam-
ple. The survey seems to capture too few migrants to Germany compared to existing
data, even after applying our correction. We however capture a sizable proportion
of migrant returning to Cameroon after their studies. 19% of respondants who once
migrated are now residing in Cameroon. Concerning the education, more than 40%
have completed their studies. We estimate that close to a quarter of students have
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acquired a Master Degree or an equivalent. The most popular ﬁelds of study are
Social sciences, science and engineering. We estimate that at least 42% leave before
obtaining any tertiary degree in Cameroon, and more than a third pursue at least 4
years of study abroad.
Regarding the ﬁnancement, while Parents are the primary source of ﬁnancing
studies in Cameroon, foreign studies expenses appear to be more often shared by
members of the family or left to the charge of the migrant. Parents of OECD-migrants
seem to diﬀer from the others in education and their ownership of car. More than
half the respondents declare an helper to the process of migration. This helper is in
the majority of cases a male, with a university degree, with close link to the family
(uncle/aunt, brother/sister) and/or lives abroad.
Hereafter, we will refer to OECD countries of two types, those with high fees
(US, UK, Canada, Australia and Ireland) and those with low fees. The countries are
classiﬁed according to the average tuition required for students from Cameroon, as
collected by the author from oﬃcial documents produced by the consulates of OECD
countries. As for the time span of the survey, “High tuitions” range from $8,000
US to $30,000 US in addition of all living costs. Countries with low tuitions, such
as Germany and France, require from $0 US to $2000 US each year. Australia and
Ireland, which are high tuition countries, do not appear in our sample.
1.5 Empirical results
We present ﬁrst the results for the preestimation of the family capital. We then turn
in Subsection 1.5.2 to the results of our inference procedure for the discrete choice
model of student migration investment.
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1.5.1 First-step estimation
As detailed in Section 1.3.4, we run a probit regression to retrieve a 95 % conﬁdence
interval on the proportion of capital that a family needs to borrow in order to meet
the liquidity constraint. The dependent variable is only discretely observed. In the
questionnaire, respondents identify who is, will be or would have been responsible
for the diﬀerent costs in the event of a migration. These costs are divided in living
costs, tuition costs and travel costs. The possible payers are the candidate himself,
the parents, a deﬁnite helper, the government or a scholarship, or a mix of all these
options. If individuals are paying, the respondents is further asked whether the costs
are paid through savings, regular income, borrowing from an individual or from an
institution, a mix of the previous options or from other means. We will consider that
the budget constraint is binding, if one of the payer provides the funds through the
means of a loan, or if a non-migrant expects the government to pay the fees for the
migration.
For a ﬁrst regression, including the whole sample, results are counter-intuitive,
as the capital of the family is unrelated to its physical capital (ownership of a car
or a house) and negatively correlated to the parents education. This suggests that
non-migrants diﬀer signiﬁcantly from migrants in their evaluation of the costs. As
they do not have full information on migration costs, non-migrants appear to provide
unreliable estimates of the ability of the family to meet the costs of the migration. We
therefore only use the subsample of 132 migrants to the OECD. Results are displayed
in Table 1.1 for several speciﬁcations.
The results show that obtention of a scholarship signiﬁcantly decreases the liquid-
ity constraints (Scholarships available for students in Cameroon are mainly on the
basis of merit and not on the basis of need). Number of cars owned by the family (the
parents and helper when present) as well as maximal family education are also good
predictors of the family capital. This latter result concords with the ﬁndings of Na-
tional Institute of Statistics of Cameroon, in their survey on Cameroonian Household
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in 2006.
What do we learn about the helper? Interestingly, once we have controlled for the
physical capital and the education of a helper, that he/she resides in the country of
migration does not appear as a signiﬁcant source of capital for the family. Our data
do not support the idea that a migrant will hold signiﬁcant implicit capital from the
location of a low-educated helper with low capital in the host country. The measure
of the support provided even decreases in absolute value when we control for the
number of siblings abroad.
1.5.2 Inference on parameters of the structural model of In-
vestment
We conduct inference on the model described in section 1.2 with two levels of educa-
tion: Ed = 1 if the individual has at least a Masters Degree, Ed = 0 otherwise.
Model speciﬁcation
We use the following speciﬁcation of the return of individual i for choosing alternative
j, j ∈ {0, 1} in eq. (1.2.2)
π˜0 = 0
π˜1 = μ+ α.Edi +Xi.β
′
+ r0.σu.min
(
ˆ¯V1(Li), 0
)
where:
• ˆ¯V (Li) denotes the estimate of the proportion of the investment that a family
needs to borrow. We use Speciﬁcation 2 in Table 1.1.
• Xi are the characteristics of individuals which might inﬂuence the success of
the migration.
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Table 1.1: Probit regression of the Proportion of capital that a family must borrow,
conditional on emigration to OECD countries.
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4
Intercept -0.564** 1.187*** 1.225*** 1.313***
(0.326) (0.415) (0.432) (0.444)
Grant -1.112*** -1.927 *** -2.024*** -2.050***
(0.410 ) (0.517 ) (0.515) (0.487 )
OECD High Tuition 0.934** 0.849** 0.745** 0.226
(0.396) (0.370) (0.363) (0.394)
Family characteristics
Maximum parent education -0.370 *** -0.312 ** -0.291 **
(0.132) (0.137) (0.142)
Number of cars owned -0.481 ** -0.440 ** -0.417 **
(0.202) (0.194) (0.172)
Helper in Migration Country -0.469 -0.165
(0.355) (0.350)
OCDE high × Nbr children abroad 0.364
(0.291)
OCDE low × Nbr children abroad -0.259**
(0.139)
log likelihood -34.983 -27.340 -26.798 -25.338
AIC 75.966 64.679 65.596 66.676
Number of obs. = 132.
Estimation is made for a normal standard error term.
Standard deviation are in parentheses.
(***) signiﬁcant at 1%. (**) signiﬁcant at 5%. (*) signiﬁcant at 10%.
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• Again, ε is assumed to have a logistic distribution with normalized variance
(equal to 1).
In this speciﬁcation, α measures the additional return from holding a Master degree
in a foreign country. The characteristics of the individuals that will be of interest are
the Gender (with parameter βG), the primogeniture (βprim), the country of residence
of the helper (βresid) and the success of the child in secondary education (βqual). To
measure the latter, we construct a dummy variable which is one if the candidate
to migration has succeeded the Baccalaure´at with honors. We interact this dummy
variable with another variable relative to the age at which the candidate passed the
Baccalaure´at. This variable is zero if the individual was older than the median person,
and equal to the diﬀerence of age if younger7. A positive coeﬃcient suggest positive
selection of the migrant. Regarding enrollment in ﬁrst year primary school, families
in Cameroon exhibit a strong preference for male children over female children. It is
of much interest to understand whether this preference survives through the process
of student migration. The literature on migration of high skilled individuals suggests
that such gender gap may not exist (see survey from Docquier and Rapoport (2009)).
Related to the fact that helpers are most commonly brothers of the candidate, we
expect ﬁrstborn children to suﬀer from a lack of support. A complementary explana-
tion might be provided by the literature on elderly parents care. Firstborn children
are often chosen to provide care for elderly parents and distance deters the readiness
of the child to provide such care (see for example Engers and Stern (2002), Rainer
and Siedler (2009)). Since student migration might ultimately result in permanent
migration, family members (mostly parents) might be reluctant to send the eldest
child abroad. Residence of the helper in the migration country was found not to add
to the capital of the family once we control for the education and physical capital
7The educational system displays a high rate of repeaters at every level. According to UNESCO
statistics, around 20% in primary school and 14% in each year of Secondary school. Younger students
are then expected to have ﬁnished primary and secondary school without repeating a class, and to
be better than the average.
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of the helper. We explore whether it inﬂuences in alternative ways the return of
migration. We think here of some non-pecuniary return of having a relative living in
the same country. The literature on economic migration acknowledges the existence
of psychological cost that may arise from separation from one’s native that might be
reduced by the presence of a previous migrant in the host country (Bauer, Epstein,
and Gang (2000), Mahmood and Scho¨mann (2003)). We will also explore whether
the fact that parents have a past experience of migration (βexp) inﬂuences the mi-
gration probability. A number of studies (for example BLV) use variables related to
the past experience of migration of parents as exclusion restriction in the equation of
migration8.
Signiﬁcance of the individual parameters is evaluated by checking whether the
hyperplanes deﬁned by θi = 0 - where θi is a component of θ - intersect the 90%
conﬁdence region. We report the range for each parameters in Table 1.2.
Discussion of results
An important result is that the diﬀerential in the return from holding a Masters degree
has a strong positive eﬀect on incentive to study abroad (α > 0). To give and idea
of the magnitude of α, we can interpret the variation of the odd ratio deﬁned as the
probability to migrate relative to the probability not to migrate. Our ﬁnding implies
that, controlling for other covariates, the odds of migration will at least double when
individual choose to study at least to Master Degree. Although families exhibit a
clear preference for studies in Cameroon rather than abroad (μ < 0), their disutility
is entirely compensated by the return from holding a foreign Master degree.
Our measure of the success of the child during secondary school appears posi-
tively correlated with the chances of migration. We reject βqual < 0, which means
that the best students are more likely to migrate. This suggests a positive selection
8We also used in an alternative speciﬁcation the past experience of student migration of the
parent. This variable does not appear to be signiﬁcant.
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Table 1.2: Parameter ranges
Min Max
Master in foreign Country (α) 0.88 3.61
Cst. (μ) -0.38 -0.13
Female (βG) -0.90 0.10
Primogeniture (βprim) -0.70 -0.29
Academic results (βqual) 0 2.41
Migration experience (βexp) -0.50 0.25
Residence of helper (βresid) -0.41 0.04
r0σu is not reported since uninformative.
of migrants. An interesting result is that the ﬁrstborn child is less likely to migrate
than his younger siblings. Indeed, his/her odds of migration are 25 % smaller. This
result is not surprising as a third of the helper reported are (older) brothers or sisters.
Investigation of chain migration within families might be of great interest. We ﬁnd
no overwhelming evidence that the male students are favored by the family in the
migration process, (we cannot rule out βG = 0), a result in line with the main ﬁndings
in the previous literature on migration. Nevertheless, the conﬁdence region shows a
tilt toward negative values of this parameter. Our data are not compatible with mod-
els were strong preference is given to migration of female students. When we study
instead a dummy variable for the presence of the helper in the migration country (not
reported), the range of βresid, includes 0 (and is almost symmetric around this value).
In the same line, when we consider instead residence of the helper in Cameroon, we
cannot rule out βresid = 0, and models where there exists a positive eﬀect from having
an helper residing in Cameroon are almost always rejected. Whether the helper is
from diaspora or living in Cameroon, does not seem to be a signiﬁcant variable for
the ﬁnal outcome. The role of the helper seems then to be limited to provision of
(explicit or implicit) capital to the migration process. To reconcile this result with the
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ﬁndings of the literature about the network eﬀect of the diaspora, we must conlude
that the lessening of psychological costs is then not related to a sole individual but to
a larger network that the migrant can build. Finally, the past migration experience
of the parents does not appear as a signiﬁcant determinant of the migration of the
child, a ﬁnding warranting caution in the use of this variable as exclusion restriction.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper presented a framework to analyze the determinants of the choice of mi-
gration from a microeconomic perspective. We do so while overcoming the main
obstacles to a rigorous study, namely: the lack of data about population of migrants
and non-migrants and the technical diﬃculty raised by the endogeneity of the educa-
tional attainment in our discrete-choice model. We deal with the ﬁrst of these issues
using a novel chain-referral sampling procedure, run through an online platform. The
procedure allowed to overcome the geographical challenge posed by the type of pop-
ulation of interest. We proposed population mean estimators that correct for biases
induced by non-response and non-random sampling. In practice, strong assumptions
on recruitment behaviors are needed to retrieve the inclusion probabilities of sampled
individuals. We also need to ﬁt a random graph model to represent the relation pat-
tern between individuals in the population. The choices made in this paper were for
computational reason.
We propose an empirical structural decision model which reﬂects the importance
of both the return of the investment and the budget constraint in agent choices. An
important contribution of this paper is the appeal to recent results in the literature
about incomplete, partially identiﬁed models to circumvent the problem of endogene-
ity. In doing so, we relax the point identiﬁcation condition for the parameters of
our structural model of investment in student migration. We conduct inference using
sharp bounds and retrieve conﬁdence regions which appear quite informative. An-
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other contribution of the paper is the novel two-steps inference methodology that
takes into account censored or incompletely observed variables and considerably re-
duce the computational burden.
From our sample, we ﬁnd that a higher educational level and better results during
secondary education of the candidate increase signiﬁcantly the returns to migration.
We ﬁnd also that male students are not favored by the family in the migration pro-
cess and the ﬁrstborn child is less likely to migrate than his younger siblings. Our
interpretation is that they suﬀer from lack support from an elder brother/sister. Our
survey data are actually quite informative about the helper who appears to be in
the majority of the cases a male relative of the parent and the child, with tertiary
education. When present, he inﬂuences primarily the budget constraint of the family.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Mathematical treatment Inference procedure
Derivation of the sharp bounds
Suppose that we observe Y ∈ Y , Ed ∈ E and W ∈ W . The random vectors Y,Ed,W
and ε are deﬁned on a common probability space (Ω,F ,P). With the notation of
section 1.3.1, we provide now a characterization of ΘI . To state the characterization,
we deﬁne additional objects.
Deﬁne:
G (ε|W ; θ) ≡ {(y, e) : y = 1{π˜ (e,W ; θ) ≥ ε}}
as a correspondance from R to Y ×E which, for given values of the exogenous regres-
sors, associates to each ε a duple (y, e) predicted by the model, for given values of
W . The following example provides an insight of the type of object represented by
the multi-valued mapping G.
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Example 1 (Correspondence G with three level of school attainment) Suppose
Ed is a discrete variable which takes the ordered values {0, 1, 2}. Suppose further that
r(0) < r(1) < r(2) which amounts to a positive return of additional years of schooling.
The multi-valued mapping G can then be written in the following form:
G : ε ∈ [−∞; π˜ (0; θ)] ⇒ {(1, 0) ; (1, 1) ; (1, 2)} (1.7.1)
ε ∈ [π˜ (0; θ) ; π˜ (1; θ)] ⇒ {(0, 0) ; (1, 1) ; (1, 2)} (1.7.2)
ε ∈ [π˜ (1; θ) ; π˜ (2; θ)] ⇒ {(0, 0) ; (0, 1) ; (1, 2)} (1.7.3)
ε ∈ [π˜ (2; θ) ; +∞] ⇒ {(0, 0) ; (0, 1) ; (0, 2)} (1.7.4)
Note that ε > r (2) (resp. ε < r (0)) implies that migration is never (resp. always)
proﬁtable to the family.
From GH, we draw the characterization of the identiﬁed set that we take to be our
deﬁnition of the identiﬁed set:
Deﬁnition 1 (Characterization of the identiﬁed set.) A parameter value θ be-
longs to the identiﬁed set, if and only if there exists a probability distribution p deﬁned
on (Ω,F ,P) with marginal F 0Ed,Y |W and Fε|W,θ, such that :
Ep (1 {(Y,Ed) ∈ G (ε; θ)} |W = w ) = 1, w a.e. (1.7.5)
This deﬁnition is not operational since inference on parameters induces ﬁnding a
possibly inﬁnite dimensional probability distribution. We can write an alternative
characterization, more useful in practice. It summarizes the problem to one of check-
ing a ﬁnite set of inequalities which involves compact sets on the real line. We deﬁne
the following object:
T (y, e |W ; θ ) ≡ {ε : (y, e) ∈ G (ε |W ; θ)}
a subset of E . For Ed = e and for a given θ and W , T (y, e |W ; θ ) gives all the values
of ε that deliver the value y of Y .
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Proposition 1 (Alternative characterization of the identiﬁed set, Theorem 1 CRS)
Let K (R) be the set of closed set of R.
ΘI = {θ ∈ Θ : P0 (T (Y,Ed |W ; θ) ⊆ S |W = w ) ≤ Pε (S |W = w ; θ) ,
w a.e. ∀S ∈ K (R)} (1.7.6)
Theorem 2 in CRS shows that it is enough to check the inequalities for the sets S
which are connected and for union of sets on the support of T (Y,Ed; θ). Continued
example shows the kind of inequalities involved.
Example 1 continued Let S be the subset of K (R) which collects all the rele-
vant compact set S, i.e., which are connected and union of sets on the support of
T (Y,Ed; θ).
S = {[−∞; π˜ (0; θ)] ; [−∞; π˜ (1; θ)] ; [−∞; π˜ (2; θ)] ;
[π˜ (0; θ) ; +∞] ; [π˜ (1; θ) ; +∞] ; [π˜ (2; θ) ; +∞]}
For each element S ∈ S, we test
P0 (T (Y,Ed; θ) ⊆ S) ≤ Pε (S; θ)
For example, when S = [−∞; π˜ (0; θ)], the inequality becomes:
P (Y = 1, Ed = 0) ≤ Fε (π˜ (0; θ))
Conﬁdence Region
We proposed a method to compute the object of interest ΘI in the limit case, where
the true distribution of dependent variables P (y, e|w, z), (y, e) ∈ Y ×E , is known. Of
most interest, is the problem of inference on ΘI based on a sample of observations
((Y1, Ed1,W1), . . . , (Yn, Edn,Wn)) from an ergodic sequence. We seek coverage of the
identiﬁed set with prescribed probability 1− α, for some α ∈ [0, 1].
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Deﬁnition 2 (Conﬁdence region) A conﬁdence region of asymptotic level 1 − α
for the identiﬁed set is deﬁned as a region Θn satisfying
lim inf
n
P(ΘI ⊆ Θn) ≥ 1− α.
In HMQ, the authors proposed a computationally feasible procedure which is based
on the idea of dilation of the inequality and makes use of the resampling bootstrap.
We give here a sketch of the idea. We are interested in coverage of the set of values
of the parameter θ such that
P0 (T (Y,Ed; θ) ⊆ S |w ) ≤ Pε (S|w; θ) , (1.7.7)
for all values of w, and all subset S of K(R). Pε is determined from the model, but P0
is unknown. However, if we can construct lower probabilities from the sample of ob-
servations, i.e. random functions P n(S|w, z) that are dominated by the probabilities
P0(S|w, z) for all values of w, and all subsets S of K (R), then in particular,
P n (T (Y,Ed |W ; θ) ⊆ S |w ) ≤ P0 (T (Y,Ed |W ; θ) ⊆ S |w )
for each w, and each subsets S of K (R) (Remark that the dominated functions are
constructed independently of the parameter θ). Hence any θ satisfying (1.7.7) for
each w, and each subset S of K (R), also satisﬁes
P n (T (Y,Ed |W ; θ) ⊆ S |w ) ≤ Pε (S|w; θ)
for all values of w, and all subset S of K(R). It remains to control the level of
conﬁdence of the covering region, which is achieved by requiring that P n dominate
P0 with probability asymptotically no less than the desired conﬁdence level. The
fundamental feature of the procedure is that it dissociates search in the parameter
space from the statistical procedure necessary to control the conﬁdence level. The
lower “probabilities” P n can be determined independently of θ in a procedure that
is performed once and for all using only sample information. Hence the following
theorem, similar to Theorem 1 in HMQ.
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Assumption 2 Let the random functions S 
→ P n(S|w), S ∈ K(R), satisfy
lim inf
n
P
(
max
1≤j≤n
max
S∈K(R)
[P n(S|Wj)− P (S|Wj)] ≤ 0
)
≥ 1− α.
Theorem 2 (Conﬁdence region) Under Assumption 2, the region
Θn(P n) =
{
θ ∈ Θ : max
1≤j≤n
max
S∈K(R)
P n (T (Y,Ed |Wj ; θ) ⊆ S |Wj )− Pε (S|Wj; θ) ≤ 0
}
is a conﬁdence region of asymptotic level 1− α for ΘI .
Note that because of the limited size of our dataset, we use a logit approximation
to the joint distribution of Y and Ed given the observable covariates. Hence, the
bootstrap procedure in HMQ remains valid even in presence of continuous covariates
because of the parametric assumption.
Incomplete observation of Educational attainment
Deﬁne J to be a correspondence that maps Y × E into Y × E × E and associates to
the duple (Y,Ed), the triple
(
Y,Ed,Ed
)
. By the composition theorem (Theorem 1,
Galichon and Henry (2006a)), the identiﬁed set can now be characterized the following
way:
Proposition 2 (The identiﬁed set with incomplete observation of Ed) A pa-
rameter value θ belongs to the identiﬁed set, if and only if there exists a probability
distribution p deﬁned on (Ω,F ,P) with marginal F 0Ed,Y |W and Fε|W ;θ, such that :
Ep
(
1
{(
Y,Ed,Ed
) ∈ J ◦G (ε |W = w ; θ)}) = 1, w a.e. (1.7.8)
Replacing our previous deﬁnition of the identiﬁed set (1.7.5) in Deﬁnition 1 by (1.7.8),
we can construct a conﬁdence region as advised in section 1.7.1
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First-step estimation of V
Suppose there exists an interval [v; v] such that:
P (V ∈ [v; v]) = 1− αv (1.7.9)
Note now that π˜ ≥ ε if and only if r ≥ ε − r0.v1{v < 0}. Deﬁne ε˜ such that
ε˜ = ε − r0.v1{v < 0}. We have that ε˜ ∈ [ε− r0v1{v < 0}; ε− r0v1{v < 0}] w.p.
1− αv.Deﬁne ﬁnally:
K : (ε˜ |(v1{v < 0}, v1{v < 0})) 
→ [ε˜+ r0v1{v < 0}; ε˜+ r0v1{v < 0}]
We have that: P (ε ∈ K (ε˜ |(v1{v < 0}, v1{v < 0}))) = 1 − αv. Applying again the
composition theorem cited above, we can characterize the identiﬁed set as follow:
Proposition 3 (The identiﬁed set with incomplete observation of Ed and
preestimation of V) A parameter value θ belongs to the identiﬁed set, if and only
if there exists a probability distribution p deﬁned on (Ω,F ,P) with marginal F 0Ed,Y |W
and Fε|W ;θ, such that :
Ep
(
1
{(
Y,Ed,Ed
) ∈ J ◦G ◦K (ε˜ |W = w ; θ)}) = 1− αv, w a.e. (1.7.10)
1.7.2 Sampling Methodology: Correction for biases induced
by non random sampling and non-response
A natural problem impedes the use of traditional techniques for simple random sam-
pling with a chain-referral sample. Because of the combined eﬀect of peer recruitment
and non-response, people reached by the survey might be diﬀerent from those absent
in the survey. Our approach to this problem is to assume enough structure on both the
network and the recruitment behavior, so that characteristics of invitees are indepen-
dent of characteristics of their host. Then, we can recover the selection probabilities
of each individual in the sample. We then use an Horvitz-Thompson estimator to
correct for selection biases and compute proportions in the population. First, we
introduce some notation.
39
Notations
We suppose that the population of interest is a undirected9 graph E , given by a set
of nodes N with label {1, 2, . . . , N} and values w = (w1, . . . ,wN) where wi = (yi, xi)
and an N ×N matrix L indicating relationships or links between nodes. An element
Lij of L is one if there is a link from node i to node j and zero otherwise. We assume
that Lii = 0. Lij determines the graph structure of population but will be observed
only partially, even for the sampled units. We denote Di =
∑
j
Lij, i’s degree, i.e. the
number of people i is linked to in the population. A subset s is a subset of vertices
and edges from the population. s =
(
s(1), s(2)
)
, where s(1) are nodes, on which wi is
observed and s(2) are pairs of nodes, for which the value of the link Lij is observed.
Sampling design
Start from the initial sample d0, selected with probability π0. Each unit is asked
to complete a questionnaire and refer as many individuals as possible. The variable
wi and Di are revealed by the respondent and also Lij if j is invited by i. We will
note Iij = 1 if i invites j, and 0 if not. The researcher then send invitation to all
the invitees of i. Each new respondent is asked to complete the same task: ﬁll out
a questionnaire and refer as many friends as possible. Recruitment occurs in waves
and stops when invitees fail to complete the survey or invite other friends. The wave
at which i is invited is the number of recruiters that separates him from the initial
sample.
Assumptions
We detail here two sets of assumptions, the ﬁrst set on the graph, which is assumed
to be a realization of a stochastic process and the second set on the recruitment
9This hypothesis seems quite reasonable since invitation is restricted to friends. It amounts to
say if individual i invites j, then j could have also invited i.
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behavior, which is assume to exhibit independence with respect to our variable of
interest.
Assumption 3 (Network) We assume the following about the graph E:
1. The graph E is the realization of a stochastic process G(N, p) (Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
model), indexed by a parameter (N, p), where p is the probability that there
exists an edge between any vertex i and vertex j.
2. The size of the graph N is known.
3. The graph is almost surely connected, i.e. ∃ ε > 0 such that
(
p >
(1 + ε) logN
N
)
.
4. A respondent reports accurately his/her degree.
Assumption 4 (Recruitment behavior) We assume the following about recruit-
ment behavior of each person in the population of interest:
1. An host i invites at random an observed proportion of its network, Vi.
2. Non-response is random (“missing-at-random” data).
The latter assumption together with the assumed stochastic model for the graph,
ensures that we have independence between the characteristics of hosts and invitees.
This assumption are not innocuous, but are the relatively standard in the literature on
chain-referral sampling (see for example Heckathorn (1997) for a thorough discussion).
In practice, we checked that the correlation between respectively the migration status,
the educational attainment and degree of invitee and host is low.
We now turn to the computation of the inclusion probability of each individual.
We will actually be interested in the probability of inclusion of an individual, con-
ditional on the sampling process having reached wave k. The interested reader is
strongly encouraged to read Thompson (2006) for a motivation and detailed exposi-
tion of the estimator.
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Conditional inclusion probability
We introduce some more notations borrowed from Thompson (2006). Suppose that
we have reached the kth wave. And deﬁne:
• S, the sample resulting from the procedure,
• sk, the sample selected at step k,
• sck, the current sample, i.e.
sck =
k−1⋃
j=0
sj
• ak, the current active set as subset of the current set consisting of individual
making invitation.
• qki, the probability that i is selected at step k.
At step k ≥ 1, we are interested in qki, the probability that i ∈ sk, conditional on
observation of ak. We will denote Iik = 1 if i is invited as opposed to Iik = 0, if i is
not invited. In addition, Iijk = 1 will be the special case where i is invited by j. The
event {i ∈ sk} happens if (1) i is invited, Iik = 1, and (2) and {i answers}. We can
then write:
qki = P ({i answers} |Iik = 1, ak )× P (Iik = 1 |ak ) (1.7.11)
We treat separately each of the two terms in the right-hand side of the equation.
P ({i answers} |Iik = 1, ak ) is the probability of response of unit i given that he
has been invited by a member of the active set. By Assumption 4, this is independent
of our variable of interest10. In practice, the response changed with time, decreasing
10If the response behavior is independent of the population characteristics and of the identity of the
recruiter, the response rate in the sample can be used as an unbiased estimator. If it depends solely
on characteristics of the recruiter, the empirical response rate conditional on recruiters characteristics
provides a consistent estimate. The more challenging case is when non-response diﬀers from one
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sharply for the last few waves. We will then use the fraction of invitees answering the
questionnaire at wave k, pak , as a proxy for this conditional response probability.
P (Iik = 1 |ak ) is the probability that an individual would be invited given obser-
vation of the active set. By Assumption 4, i is chosen by j ∈ ak with probability Vj
if Lij = 1. We have then:
P (Iijk = 1 |ak ) = P (Lij = 1 |ak ) .Vj = p.Vj (1.7.12)
where the second equality comes from Assumption 3.
Proposition 4 (Conditional inclusion probability) Under Assumption 3 and 4,
the conditional probability of inclusion of individual i at wave k is
qki(p) = pak ×
(
1−
∏
j∈ak
(1− p.Vj)
)
(1.7.13)
Proposition 4 gives us an exact analytic expression for the conditional probability of
inclusion.
Estimator of population proportions
If one is interested in a characteristic y of the population, Thompson advises the use
of the following estimator:
y¯ =
1
N(K + 1)
(
n0∑
i=1
yi0
πi0
+
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈sck
yi
qki(p)
)
(1.7.14)
and provides variance estimators. See section 4.6 and 5 in Thompson (2006).
group to another. In the case of sampling a network of migrant and non-migrant students, migrants
might enjoy an easier access to Internet which makes them more willing to complete a 15 minutes
questionnaire than non-migrants. In such case, assuming a similar non-response rate for migrants
and non-migrants will overestimate the proportion of non-migrant participating. Comparing our
estimates to existing institutional data, we do not detect such pattern
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In (1.7.13), p is unknown. We appeal one more time to Assumption 3 which gives
us an expression for p. Since the distribution of degrees in an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph is
a Poisson distribution with parameter Np, we have for Di, the degree of individual
i, E(Di) = Np. We obtain then a consistent estimator of p by solving for pˆ, the
following moment condition:
Npˆ =
1
N(K + 1
(
n0∑
i=1
Di0
πi0
+
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈sck
Di
qki(pˆ)
)
(1.7.15)
To account for this sequential two-step estimation, one can use the bootstrap to
retrieve variance estimators 11. The next subsection show however how we use a
bootstrap procedure to account for this additional uncertainty.
How does this aﬀect our inference procedure?
We introduce weights for the individual in the sample. We further need to account for
the fact that these weights are estimated from the degree observed. Finally, because
of the relatively small sample size, we approximate the conditional joint distribution
of migration and education by a parametric (logistic) distribution, P ((Y,Ed)|W ; ρ).
Recall that we observe for each individual (Yi, Edi,Wi, Di), we show here how to
modify the inference procedure recommended by HMQ :
• Compute pˆ as in equation (1.7.15), and a normalized weight for each individual
i, deﬁned by
ωˆi =
ηi∑
i∈S
ηi
where
ηi =
1
N(K + 1)
(
n0∑
j=1
1{i = j}
πi0
+
K∑
k=1
∑
j∈sck
1{i = j}
qki(pˆ)
)
(1.7.16)
11see Rao and Wu (1988) for a methodology for resampling bootstrap procedure when the sample
observations are drawn with diﬀerent weights. Since the descriptive statistics are merely for indica-
tive purpose, we abstract from the ﬁrst-step estimation and assume that the weights are accurately
estimated. See results in Appendix 1.7.3
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• Estimate the parameter ρ, characterizing the logistic distribution, by minimizing
the weighted (by ωˆ) objective function. Let ρˆ be the solution to this minimiza-
tion.
• For each bootstrap replication b = 1, . . . , B:
– draw n realizations of D∗ from a Poisson distribution with parameter Npˆ,
and n replications of (Y b, Edb) from the conditional logistic pdf P (.|W ; ρ).
– Compute pb as in (1.7.15), where D is replaced by Db, and ωb accordingly.
– Estimate the parameter characterizing the logistic distribution, by mini-
mizing the weighted (by ωb) objective function. Let ρb be the solution to
this minimization.
– Use the empirical process P
(
.|W ; ρb)−P (.|W ; ρˆ) in the procedure advised
by HMQ to retrieve the generalized (1− α) of interest.
1.7.3 Additional information on the Survey and the dataset
The survey has been conducted from March 27, 2011 to May 8, 2011 under the
title “Migration des jeunes Camerounais apre`s le baacalaure´at” (Migration of young
Cameroonians after high-School). The online platform is accessible at the address:
www.migration-cameroun.com. The population of interest was Cameroonian aged 18
or more, having completed secondary school by obtaining the “Baccalaure´at”. Our
dataset comprises information on both migrants and non-migrants. The deﬁnition
used for the questionnaire is the following: A migrant is an individual who has studied
for more than 6 months in a foreign country. We retain as migrants in the calculation,
only those having acquired one year or more of education in a foreign country.
We applied the methodology presented in section 1.4.2. Participants were com-
pensated by being registered each week to a lottery with four prizes of equal value
($50 CAD). After 6 weeks, 418 respondents (1710 individuals have been invited to the
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survey) provided information about (i) their education, (ii) their migration historic
or plans, and the way migration is or would be ﬁnanced; (iii) socio-economic charac-
teristics of their parents and siblings and, ﬁnally, (iv) socio-economic characteristics
of a member of the large family who could be designated as a helper in a (potential
or eﬀective) migration process. 16 individuals are excluded for the dataset because
after we detected severe inconsistency in their answers. Table 1.3 presents the usual
average statistics computed on the remaining sample. Because of the particularities
of sampling procedure, Horvitz-Thompson estimators are used as unbiased estimators
of the true population mean. Details of this adjustments and the estimators are pre-
sented in 1.4.2 and Appendix 1.7.2. The results of these adjustments are presented
in Table 1.4 below. Note that we use, for the future parametric estimations in sec-
tion 1.5.1, Weighted Maximum Likelihood Estimators (see for reference Cameron and
Trivedi (2005), p.479).
For the inference procedure, we exclude from the analysis 44 individuals who
obtained their Baccalaure´at degree outside a reference period, namely before 1996
and after 2006. The main reason for the lower bound is that the Purchasing Parity
Power has signiﬁcantly changed in the previous period, due to a 50 percent devaluation
of the Cameroonian currency in January 1995. Observations in this period are too
few to allow for an eﬃcient analysis. The upper bound excludes individuals for which
we are unable to observe whether they have migrated or will migrate before achieving
the minimum number of years to get a master degree. We further exclude 22 units
who are currently attempting migration, for we cannot observe the outcome of this
attempt.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics
Non Mig. Mig. Pop.
Population 176 226 402
Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d.
Female 0.38 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.50
Age 27.90 4.13 27.34 5.10 27.58 4.70
Age at Bac 19.31 2.12 18.70 1.75 18.97 1.94
Married 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39
Residence Country
Cameroon 0.89 0.32 0.19 0.39 0.50 0.50
Africa 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.36 0.09 0.29
France 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.39 0.11 0.31
Germany 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20
North America 0.06 0.23 0.26 0.44 0.17 0.38
Other OECD 0.02 0.13 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.27
Other 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13
Educational Attainment at the time of the survey
Univ 0 - Baccalaure´at 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.42 0.20 0.40
Univ 1 - Bachelor 0.65 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.49 0.50
Univ 2 - Master 0.14 0.34 0.35 0.48 0.25 0.44
Univ 3 - Doctorate 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.26 0.05 0.23
Completed study 0.49 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.50
Field of study
Medical sciences 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.29
Economics 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
Science and Engineering 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48
Continued on next page
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Table 1.3 – Continued from previous page
Non Mig. Mig. Pop.
Population 176 226 402
Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d.
Migration Country2
Africa 0.02 0.13 0.31 0.46 0.18 0.39
France 0.10 0.30 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.38
Germany 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.22
North America 0.41 0.49 0.15 0.36 0.27 0.44
Other OECD 0.11 0.32 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.36
Other 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.15
Education attained at time of departure
Univ 0 - Baccalaureat - - 0.48 0.50 - -
Univ 1 - Bachelor - - 0.23 0.42 - -
Univ 2 - Master - - 0.29 0.45 - -
Univ 3 - Doctorate - - 0.00 0.07 - -
Number of years of study in a foreign country
0 - - 0.12 0.33 - -
1 - - 0.16 0.37 - -
2 - - 0.17 0.38 - -
3 - - 0.18 0.39 - -
4 and more - - 0.36 0.48 - -
Paying for education in foreign country3
Self 0.24 0.43 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.38
Father and/or mother 0.16 0.37 0.34 0.47 0.26 0.44
Helper 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22
Shared 0.20 0.40 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.43
Grant 0.31 0.46 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.43
Continued on next page
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Table 1.3 – Continued from previous page
Non Mig. Mig. Pop.
Population 176 226 402
Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d.
Paying for education in Cameroon4
Self 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
Father and/or mother 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.58 0.49
Helper 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
Shared 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
Grant 0.22 0.41 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36
Mother
Absent Mother 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35
Level of Education
Primary 0.47 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49
Secondary 0.28 0.45 0.35 0.48 0.31 0.46
Tertiary (Univ 0 and 1) 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42
Tertiary (Univ 2 and 3) 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27
Have lived in foreign country 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
Father
Absent Father 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40
Level of Education
Primary 0.39 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47
Secondary 0.19 0.40 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.37
Tertiary (Univ 0 and 1) 0.22 0.41 0.25 0.44 0.24 0.43
Tertiary (Univ 2 and 3) 0.20 0.40 0.31 0.47 0.27 0.44
Have lived in foreign country 0.14 0.35 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41
Continued on next page
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Non Mig. Mig. Pop.
Population 176 226 402
Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d.
Family Capital
Owns a car 0.37 0.48 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.50
Owns a house 0.64 0.48 0.70 0.46 0.67 0.47
Owns a Field 0.50 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.55 0.50
Helper5
Declare and Helper 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53
Female 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.47 0.30 0.46
is a brother/sister 0.41 0.49 0.31 0.47 0.35 0.48
is an oncle/aunt 0.33 0.47 0.40 0.49 0.37 0.48
other link 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.46 0.28 0.45
Level of education
Primary 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Secondary 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Tertiary (Univ 0 and 1) 0.45 0.50 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48
Tertiary (Univ 2 and 3) 0.42 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.52 0.50
Have lived in foreign country 0.66 0.48 0.56 0.50 0.60 0.49
Lives in the migration country 0.40 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.50
Owns a car 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.43 0.50
Owns a house 0.33 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.39 0.49
Owns a Field 0.26 0.44 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46
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1These statistics are computed without re-weighting and represent the average and standard
errors of the sample.
2For non-migrant, the country where they will attempt migration or would choose to migrate if
they were given the opportunity to do so.
3For non-migrant, the way a temptative migration would be ﬁnanced.
4Some individuals in the population did not study at all at the tertiary level in Cameroon.
5Statistics on the helper characteristics are computed conditional to the declaration of an helper.
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Table 1.4: Weighted Descriptive Statistics for variables used in the study
Non Mig. Mig. Pop.
Population 176 226 402
Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d.
Female 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50
Age 25.86 3.97 24.59 4.16 25.23 4.12
Age at Bac 18.87 1.58 17.95 1.77 18.41 1.74
Educational Attainment at the time of the survey
Univ 0 - Baccalaureat 0.24 0.42 0.41 0.49 0.32 0.47
Univ 1 - Bachelor 0.56 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.44 0.50
Univ 2 - Master or more 0.20 0.42 0.27 0.48 0.24 0.46
Migration Country2
Africa 0.15 0.35 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42
France 0.05 0.21 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.30
Germany 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.14
North America 0.33 0.47 0.06 0.24 0.20 0.40
Other OECD 0.06 0.23 0.40 0.49 0.23 0.42
Other 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18
Paying for education in foreign country3
Self 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29
Father and/or mother 0.06 0.24 0.34 0.47 0.20 0.40
Helper 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17
Shared 0.23 0.42 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.44
Grant 0.56 0.50 0.25 0.43 0.40 0.49
Continued on next page
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Table 1.4 – Continued from previous page
Non Mig. Mig. Pop.
Population 176 226 402
Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d.
Mother
Absent Mother 0.19 0.39 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.35
Level of Education
Primary 0.48 0.50 0.29 0.46 0.38 0.49
Secondary 0.31 0.46 0.14 0.34 0.22 0.42
Tertiary (Univ 0 and 1) 0.20 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.35 0.48
Tertiary (Univ 2 and 3) 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.20
Father
Absent Father 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.39
Level of Education
Primary 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46
Secondary 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28
Tertiary (Univ 0 and 1) 0.22 0.42 0.14 0.34 0.18 0.38
Tertiary (Univ 2 and 3) 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.42 0.49
Family Capital
Owns a car 0.46 0.50 0.76 0.43 0.61 0.49
Helper4
Declare and Helper 0.51 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.56 0.50
Female 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.34
is a brother/sister/oncle/aunt 0.89 0.31 0.76 0.43 0.82 0.39
Level of education
Primary 0.30 0.46 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.35
Secondary 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17
Tertiary (Univ 0 and 1) 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.50
Continued on next page
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Table 1.4 – Continued from previous page
Non Mig. Mig. Pop.
Population 176 226 402
Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d.
Tertiary (Univ 2 and 3) 0.19 0.39 0.56 0.50 0.39 0.49
Lives in the migration country 0.21 0.41 0.73 0.45 0.49 0.50
Owns a car 0.17 0.38 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.43
1These statistics are computed with re-weighting and represent estimates of the average and
standard errors of the population. See Appendix 1.7.2 for details.
2For non-migrant, the country where they will attempt migration or would choose to migrate if
they were given the opportunity to do so.
3For non-migrant, the way a student migration would be ﬁnanced.
4Statistics on the helper characteristics are computed conditional to the declaration of an helper.
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1.7.4 Intent to return
We complement our study with a logistic regression to explain the “intent to return”
to Cameroon of the respondents who have completed their study abroad12. The pro-
portion of returning migrants measures the extent to which outsourcing the tertiary
education could be a successful strategy for a developing country. Citing Docquier
in his discussion of Rosenzweig (2008):“The outsourcing of tertiary education partly
reduces the ﬁscal burden supported by the country of origin. Nevertheless, migrants
who stay permanently in the host country impose an important ﬁscal cost on their
country of origin.” Although, a potentially important source of beneﬁcial brain cir-
culation, few empirical studies attempt this exercise because of lack of data.
The dependent variable is measured by the answer to the question: “Do you intend
to settle in Cameroon?”. The option were “yes”, “no”, “not sure”. When the answer
is “not sure”, we recode as “no” for individual who are still living outside Cameroon
and “yes” for those who have already returned. The underlying assumption is that
uncertainty about the establishment decision means that the individual will stay in
the place where he lives. We analyze the eﬀect of additional education, migration
to OECD country, number of years of study, family capital and number of siblings
living abroad. The results are reported in Table 1.5. In this analysis, the baseline
category are students who have completed their schooling with a bachelor degree in
a non-OECD country and with less than two years of study. Migrating to an OECD
country has a signiﬁcant strong negative eﬀect on the intent to return. Estimates
suggest that studying in the US, Canada or the UK, decreases by almost 90 percent
the odds ratio of return relative to stay. The decrease for low tuition OECD countries
is of the order of 70 percent. Once we control for the number of year of study and
the capital of the family, the education does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the intent
of return. If anything, an individual with a higher degree express more willingness
12A probit regression returns similar log likelihood. We use the logistic speciﬁcation to analyze
the odds ratio
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to return to Cameroon. One additional sibling living abroad makes an individual 50
percent more likely to return, while an increase of one percent of the capital of the
family, results in a one percent increase in the odds of returning.
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Table 1.5: Logit regression of the intent to return.
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
B exp(B) B exp(B) B exp(B)
Intercept -0.66 0.52 -0.43 0.65 0.25 1.29
(0.72) (0.95) (0.98)
Education
PhD 1.28* 3.60 1.15 3.17 1.08 2.93
(0.79) (1.13) (1.10)
Master 2.16*** 8.65 1.72* 5.60 1.29 3.62
(0.64) (1.00) (0.96)
Destination Country
OECD High -2.01*** 0.13 -2.25*** 0.11 -2.19*** 0.11
(0.56) (0.62) (0.63)
OECD low -0.66 0.52 -1.41*** 0.24 -1.29*** 0.28
0.46 0.41 0.41
Other controls
More than one year of study 0.17 1.19 -0.81* 0.45
(0.48) (0.45)
Nbr Children Abroad 0.31** 1.36 0.39** 1.48
(0.16) (0.16)
Family capital 0.55** 1.74 0.73*** 2.07
(0.27) (0.25)
Number of obs. = 84.
Estimation is made for standardized logistic distribution.
Individuals included have migrated and completed their studies abroad.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
(***) signiﬁcant at 1%. (**) signiﬁcant at 5%. (*) signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Chapter 2
Strategic interactions in student
migration decisions
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Abstract
The involvement of several economic agents in the process of international migration
of students has been acknowledged by the literature, yet not studied with micro-level
data. This paper analyzes the incentives for strategic agents to participate in the
student migration investment decision, with a focus on the organization of the family
unit. We model the migration decision as the result of a participation game between
“extended” family members. We use sharp bounds for partially identiﬁed parameters
of discrete games in complete information to conduct inference on the preference
parameters. Our data are drawn from a survey speciﬁcally tailored for this study on
Cameroonian students, migrants and non-migrants. The results suggest the beneﬁt
of this investment are equally shared within the family. Participation of parents to
the migration process is driven to some extent by a concern for the child’s interest,
while helpers’ participation is submitted to a set of social norms, namely kinship and
gender obligations.
2.1 Introduction
The empirical and theoretical literature on student mobility suggests that students
originating from developing countries are very likely to rely on the help of several
members of their family, their community and of the diaspora during their migration.
For example, the importance of the family unit is underlined by Boyd (1989). A
survey conducted by Institute of International Education (IE) in 2006 reveals that
the primary source of funding is “personal and family” for about 64 percent of for-
eign students. Additional support from a preexisting social network of migrants in
the destination country has also recently been documented (Beine, Noel, and Ragot
(2012), Perkins and Neumayer (2011)). However important, very little is actually
known about the characteristics and incentives of these helpers. Indeed, covering
travel and living expenses of a student in a foreign country, which might have higher
per capita income, entails signiﬁcant cost. Two competing explanations could be
provided: either the investment generates for the investors economic and/or social
beneﬁts, or they are altruistic individuals (or “caring individuals” to use the terminol-
ogy employed in Chiappori (1992)) who derive some beneﬁt from the student utility.
The objective of this paper is precisely to understand the incentives to participate in
the migration investment of those agents who provide the most signiﬁcant help.
We study a social interaction model describing the decision made by a group of
individuals that we call the extended family, to invest in the education of a student in
a foreign country. Our deﬁnition of the family unit includes three types of individuals,
the parents, a child and a potential helper, who should be seen by the reader as a
representative of a community to which the child belong. In addition to the incentives
of investors, we investigate how this extended family unit organize itself to share proﬁt
and discourage free riding-behavior. We are precisely interested in the following
questions: How does the family share the returns of investment? How does the
private beneﬁts compare with the shared return? Do family members exhibit some
altruism? What kind of social obligations are at play? Among other results, we
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ﬁnd some evidence for altruism of the parents. We can also identify some social
norms: egalitarianism in proﬁt sharing, kinship and gender obligations inﬂuencing
participation decisions.
Our structural model describes a participation game between family members.
Within the family unit, parents and a representative of the extended family are seen
as potential investors in the student migration and education. However, each of them
have incentives not to participate in this costly decision process, as family members
can enjoy private beneﬁts generated by the investment independently of their par-
ticipation decision. But failure to participate in the decision implies that the absent
member cannot inﬂuence the investment decision of participants. Given individual
payoﬀ, the model predicts possibly multiple Nash Equilibrium (NE) for a partic-
ipation game that take place between family members. Here arises an important
challenge. The actual outcome (as observed by the researcher) should be interpreted
as resulting from a selection mechanism on these multiple equilibria. However, this
selection mechanism remains unobserved, while diﬀerent equilibrium selection mech-
anisms could be reasonably invoked in our framework. Players might systematically
choose the equilibrium maximizing total family’s utility. They might, on the other
hand, prefer an equilibrium involving the largest number of players to all others. Fur-
ther, parents might systematically play the equilibrium that ensure migration. Or
the selection mechanism mechanism could be a mixture of all the precedents. Having
little guidance on this question in the context of student migration investment, we
choose to make no assumption on the equilibrium selection mechanism. There is a
cost associated to this choice: set identiﬁcation rather than point identiﬁcation for
our structural parameters of family members’ preferences. Building on recent con-
tributions made by Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) and Galichon and
Henry (2011) (BMM-GH, hereafter), we derive sharps bounds for our structural pa-
rameters. We conduct inference in the context of our model, following the proposal
in Section 1.3.
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In addition to the related literature already cited in the previous chapter, this
work is speciﬁcally related to the literature about family negotiations and migration
networks. Since the seminal work of Becker (1973), numerous contributions have been
made to address the criticisms regarding the shortcomings of the common-preferences
models. This alternative strand of literature aims at explicitly taking into account
the individualistic element of the household decision process (see for example Manser
and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Lundberg and Pollak (1994)). Our
model is closely linked to the one postulated in Engers and Stern (2002). The authors
study a bargaining game for longterm care for elderly parents.
Although closely linked, the scope of interest diﬀers between our paper and the
current literature on migration network (for example Beine, Docquier, and O¨zden
(2011)). The latter mainly refers to social ties between migrants and other migrants
of similar origin within the destination country (Here the stock of migrants or ratio of
migrants to the population is often used as proxy, see Dreher and Poutvaara (2011)).
Our emphasis is on the parents and an agent that is reported by the student as
potential signiﬁcant contributor to the migration investment. There is therefore an
overlapping of both populations of interest; however, none includes the other.
In section 2.2, we propose a participation game between family members to model
the interactions during the decision process. Section 2.3 is devoted to the inference
procedure. We derive sharp bounds on structural parameters. We brieﬂy present
in section 2.4 relevant summary statistics from the survey and the speciﬁcation for
our inference in section 2.5. Finally, we gather the results of the inference on the
structural model and conclude with their discussion in Section 2.6.
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2.2 A structural Model of Private Investment in
Student Migration in a non-cooperative frame-
work
We have argued that the family, as a whole, faces the issue of allowing a child of
the family to study (often at university level) in a more developed country. Indeed,
due to higher costs of living and potentially higher tuitions in foreign countries, the
budget constraint plays an important role in international student migration. Family
resources matter. According to data released by the Institute of International Edu-
cation (IE) in 2006, the primary source of funding is “personal and family” for about
64 percent of foreign students. Our survey data show that close to three quarters of
migrant rely on themselves or on family capital to ﬁnance their study abroad. It is
also of interest to note that for a family, having a close connection in the diaspora
enables her to send abroad more relatives in the future (Banerjee (1983)). Therefore,
we ﬁnd plausible to assume that this decision is taken at a family level.
Again, our deﬁnition of family encompasses more than the strict nuclear family
(parents and children). We allow, as it is common in many developing countries,
for a representative individual, outside of the nuclear family (often belonging to the
extended family) to be part of the decision process. Boundaries of family are diﬀerent
from one culture to another. In several developing countries, the child is said to “be-
long to the whole community”, understand village, extended family, etc. A related
phenomenon is child fosterage (transfer or exchange of children among family) in
Subsaharian-Africa (see for example Isiugo-Abanihe (1985)). To study individual in-
centives for participation in the sending of the student, we allow for a non-cooperative
framework. This entails that agents maximizes their individual utility. Each fam-
ily member observes the outcomes associated with all possible participation proﬁle.
He/she makes the decision to participate in order to maximize their utility in Nash
Equilibrium (NE).
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Before we proceed, note that student migration holds two additional characteris-
tics1. First, the decision of migration results from an arbitrage between the schooling
and employment opportunities available in the origin country and in the host coun-
try. The family will simultaneously choose an education level when deciding or not
to ﬁnance a potential migration. Therefore, the decision is about an education and
migration investment. Second, the amount of capital that the family can invest in
the process is key to the decision process. Each additional participant contributes to
increase the capital available for the investment. In the following, we shall distinguish
participants from non-participants. We model interactions among agents using the
following assumptions:
• An agent might be subject to a cost in case of non-participation which should
be understood as some form of retaliation available for the participants against
the non-participants. This cost reﬂects the existence of social and cultural
obligations among family members.
• By participating in the decision process, the agent also endures a sunk-cost,
whatever the outcome of the process. The reader should think of time spent
in meetings, costs for information search, opportunity costs from loosing or
delaying other existing investment opportunities, etc. These costs might be
shared among participants, but do not aﬀect non-participants.
• Successful investment ensures some direct returns to the family (ﬁnancial such as
remittances, higher salary for the child, or social such as beneﬁt from extending
the family network in the diaspora, etc.). These returns are divided among the
participants.
• Successful investment also generates some private beneﬁts for each family mem-
ber, who receives some return proportional to the return on the investment.
Together with the cost of participation, these “externalities” provide incentives
1For a thorough discussion of both points, see 1.2
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for free-riding behavior, as some family members could, for example, enjoy the
beneﬁts of a close connection in the diaspora but avoid participation costs.
• As we are concerned with a measure of altruism of the family members, we
consider that parents and helper might account for the child’s utility function
in their own utility function (see for example Li, Rosenzweig, and Zhang (2010)).
They “care” for the utility of the child. However, if the utility of the child is
proportional to the size of the proﬁt generated by the investment, we will be
unable to distinguish altruism from “externalities” described above. We need
to assume that an investment which generates a positive proﬁt for the family,
also generates some positive private beneﬁt for the child. The magnitude of this
private beneﬁt will be independent of the expected return on investment. In
the case of migration for example, the student can enjoy additional beneﬁt by
entering the marriage market of the host country.
With respect to these features, we describe the diﬀerent players, the available strate-
gies, their valuations and pay-oﬀ in the following subsections. Note that we will model
the decision process as a family meeting as in Engers and Stern (2002).
2.2.1 The players and strategies
We allow for three types of players. Parents, children and a representative individual
for the extended family.
• The Child (indexed by 0) enters university and is candidate to migration. He
has a set of characteristics X which will partially determine the beneﬁts of the
migration. To simplify, we consider that a candidate is de facto participating
in the process.
• The parent or parents are treated together as one individual and referred to by
the index 1. The parent decides whether or not to attend the meeting.
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• As discussed previously, a representative individual of the community has the
opportunity of attending the family meeting. She faces the same choice as the
parent. We index her by the subscript 2.
2.2.2 Timing of the game
At the beginning of the period, each family member is informed that an educa-
tion/migration investment opportunity exists, and that a meeting will take place to
decide if this investment is proﬁtable for the family. Each potential participant ob-
serves the child characteristics, the capital that will be available to invest for each
possible set of participants, and the expected return on investment for all possi-
ble set of participants and all possible decisions taken during the meeting. Finally,
each player can observe the size of the private beneﬁts expected, the beneﬁt sharing
rule and the diﬀerent costs associated to his/her attendance decision. Given this
knowledge, parents and representative of the extended family decide simultaneously
whether to attend or not (we will model the participation decision of family members
as the result of a Nash Equilibrium in a strategic game). Then, the meeting takes
place among the participants. They decide if they should undertake the investment,
given the characteristics of the participants. Two decisions are taken by the atten-
dants: they choose simultaneously the migration option and the education level that
maximize the expected return of the participants. When they expect a negative net
return, the participants decide collectively not to invest. Thus, no return (and no
externality) is generated. On the other hand, if positive net returns are expected,
the family agrees to share them among the participants according to a predetermined
sharing rule, while the non-participants will only enjoy some private beneﬁts. What-
ever their choice of investment is, the participants incur a sunk-cost of attending the
meeting.
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2.2.3 Players’ valuation and payoﬀ
We introduce here some notation.
Participation decision. Regarding the participation game, we will denote by P a
decision to attend the meeting, and by N a decision not to attend. Let Ai be the
attendance decision of player i ∈ {1, 2} and (A1, A2) the pair of participation decision
made by the players. The pair (Ai, A−i) denotes the attendance decision of player i,
when the decision of the other player is A−i.
Beneﬁt and beneﬁt sharing rule. Denote π the expected proﬁt of the investment.
αi(Ai, A−i) will be the share of the beneﬁt for individual i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, with
∑
αi = 1.
Note that αi(N,A−i) = 0, i.e., if i decides not to participate, he/she receives no direct
compensation. This expected proﬁt will depend on the observable characteristics of
the candidates and the capital gathered by the participants (which also depend on
their observed characteristics).
Costs. By participating, i incurs the non-refundable cost ci(P,A−i), while non-
participation induces for i the costs ci(N,A−i). Note that these costs depend on
the participation of other family members. We expect for example, the sunk-cost of
participation to be divided between players if both attend, while a player would be
alone to bear the cost in case he/she is the only participant. Since non-participation
cost are interpreted as retaliation from the other player, it may be that they diﬀer
for player i depending on the participation of player j.
Private (indirect) beneﬁts. In addition, let βiπ˜ be the private, non-transferable
return of individual i once investment is chosen by the participants. This will be the
“indirect beneﬁt” of member i. Finally, we allow for the possibility that a family
member derives some indirect utility from the fact that the participant choose to
invest, whatever is the expected return. Let γi be this additional utility that we
interpret as a measure of altruism in the case of parents and helper. We expect for
example altruistic parents to be concerned by an eﬀective investment in the child as
well as by the size of its return.
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Suppose that i takes the participation of the other family member as given, A−i.
π˜(N,A−i) is the net proﬁt of the family resulting from the investment choice in the
absence of i. π˜(P,A−i) is, analogously, the net proﬁt when i attends the meeting. By
attending, i gets net payoﬀ:
w
P,A−i
i ≡ ((αi + βi)π˜(P,A−i) + γi) .1{π˜(P,A−i)>0} − ci(P,A−i)
And by not attending:
w
N,A−i
i ≡ (βi.π˜(N,A−i) + γi) .1{π˜(N,A−i)>0} − ci(N,A−i)
The second term in the payoﬀ is a random beneﬁt from participation, ψi which is
0 for family members who decide not to participate and distributed according to an
absolutely continuous distribution ν(.|θ), for each family member who participates.
This variable summarizes the factors inﬂuencing the participation decision that are
unobservable to the researcher, mainly the history of relationships within the fam-
ily. All members observe the realizations of ψ, whereas the analyst only knows its
distribution. The Payoﬀ matrix can then be written as in the following matrix:
Player 2 (Helper)
Player 1 (Parent) N P
N wNN1 , w
NN
2 w
NP
1 , ψ2 + w
NP
2
P ψ1 + w
PN
1 , w
PN
2 ψ1 + w
PP
1 , ψ2 + w
PP
2
Example 2 Suppose a family for which the investment in education/migration will
yield the following net proﬁt for the family:
π˜ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
πPP if both 1 and 2 participate,
πNP if only one player, 1 or 2, participates,
πNN otherwise.
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To simplify, πNN < 0. The cost of the meeting is c ≥ 0 and will be split equally among
participants and the child. The returns on the investment are also split equally among
participants and the child. There is no cost associated to a choice not to attend the
meeting, but the non-participant will enjoy an externality equivalent to β times the
total of the generated return. We will restrict β ∈ [0; 1) and γ1 = γ2 = 0. Let ψ
be the unobservable shocks with cumulative distribution Fψ. The payoﬀ matrix of the
family, given unobservable shocks of participation (ψ1, ψ2) is:
Player 2 (Helper)
Player 1 (Parent) N P
N 0, 0 βπNP , ψ2 + (
1
2
+ β)πNP − c2
P ψ1 + (
1
2
+ β)πPN − c2 , βπNP ψ1 + (13 + β)πPN − c3 ,
ψ2 + (
1
3
+ β)πPN − c3
Here the result “no investment is made” occurs when the child receives no sup-
port from the family, i.e, if (N,N) is the NE (neither the parent, nor the Helper
participates in the decision process).
The payoﬀ matrix leads to the following Nash Equilibria in pure strategies:
- (N,N) ⇔ ψ1 ≤ wNN1 − wPN1 and ψ2 ≤ wNN2 − wNP2
- (P, P ) ⇔ ψ1 ≥ wNP1 − wPP1 and ψ2 ≥ wPN2 − wPP2
- (N,P ) ⇔ ψ1 ≤ wNP1 − wPP1 and ψ2 ≥ wNN2 − wNP2
- (P,N) ⇔ ψ1 ≥ wNN1 − wPN1 and ψ2 ≤ wPN2 − wPP2
We can deﬁne an equilibrium correspondence ψ ⇒ G(ψ|x; θ), which associate to ev-
ery value of the latent variable a set of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Note
that G is a correspondence and not a one-to-one mapping, since multiple Nash
equilibrium can be predicted. This feature is the fundamental reason that justi-
ﬁes the inference methodology used in this paper. More on this in the next section.
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This correspondence depends on the rankings of the terms wri − wsi , i ∈ {1, 2} and
r, s ∈ {NN,NP, PN, PP}. Although we will restrict ourselves to pure strategy NE,
it can also be shown that there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies
as follows. A mixed proﬁle (η1P + (1− η1)N ; η2P + (1− η2N)) is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if
η1 =
ψ2 −
(
wNN2 − wNP2
)
(wPN2 − wPP2 )− (wNN2 − wNP2 )
and η2 =
ψ1 −
(
wNN1 − wPN1
)
(wNP1 − wPP1 )− (wNN1 − wPN1 )
,
the denominators are non zero and
min
{
wNN1 − wPN1 ;wNP1 − wPP1
}
< ψ1 < max
{
wNN1 − wPN1 ;wNP1 − wPP1
}
min
{
wNN2 − wNP2 ;wPN2 − wPP
}
< ψ2 < max
{
wNN2 − wNP2 ;wPN2 − wPP2
}
The equilibrium correspondence can therefore be extended to account for these mixed
strategies (as in Chapter 3).
Example 2 continued The NE for the game describe earlier are characterized by:
- (N,N) ⇔ ψ1 ≤ c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP and ψ2 ≤ c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP
- (P, P ) ⇔ ψ1 ≥ c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP and ψ2 ≥ c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP
- (N,P ) ⇔ ψ1 ≤ c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP and ψ2 ≥ c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP
- (P,N) ⇔ ψ1 ≥ c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP and ψ2 ≤ c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP
In particular, (NP,PN) is a (multiple) NE in pure strategy
for ψ ∈ [ c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP ;
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP
]2
and
ηi =
(
ψ(1−i) − c2 + (12 + β)πNP
)
(βπNP − c/6) + (13 + β)πPP − (12 + β)πNP
characterizes the NE in mixed strategy under the above existence conditions.
2.3 Inference procedure
In this section, we are interested in the construction of a conﬁdence region for the
structural parameters of the non-cooperative investment model described above. In
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particular, in example 2, we would wish to conduct inference on β, c and the pa-
rameters of the distribution of ψ. However, as evidenced by the example, multiple
equilibria can easily arise as predictions of the model. But in the data, we always
observe a single outcome. Unless we are willing to make further assumption on the
equilibrium selection mechanism, identiﬁcation of the structural parameter is not
guaranteed. Berry and Tamer (2006) and Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes
(2007) give an account of the various way this identiﬁcation problem was approached
in the literature. Identiﬁcation of structural parameters is usually achieved through
equilibrium reﬁnements, shape restrictions, informational assumption or the speciﬁ-
cation of equilibrium selection mechanism. An alternative approach is to characterize
a set of compatible parameters rather than a point. An idea explored by Andrews,
Berry, and Jia (2003) in the context of oligopoly entry is to base inference purely on
the identiﬁed features of the models with multiple equilibria, which are sets of val-
ues rather than a single value of the structural parameter vector. Without imposing
further assumption on strategic games of interaction with discrete set of strategies,
BMM-GH provide sharp bounds to characterize the set of all parameters, the iden-
tiﬁed set, for which there is a selection mechanism such that the observed outcomes
are compatible with the predicted equilibrium. All parameters in this set are obser-
vationally equivalent. In the following, we ﬁrst present those bounds in the context
of example 2. We refer the reader to GH for mathematical proofs. Inference in this
context is conducted following the proposal of in Section 1.3. Then, in section 2.3.2,
we address the issue that the return of the investment is not observed in the data,
although we observe determinants of this return.
2.3.1 Sharp bounds
We use the sharp bounds provided by GH to conduct inference on the structural
parameters of the model described in section 2.2. A rigorous characterization of the
identiﬁed set can be found in their Theorem 2. Here, we use our running example to
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give a ﬂavor of the type of bounds we derive.
Example 2 continued Consider only the NE in pure strategy and the case where
β > c/12. We will denote θ the vector which collect the parameters of interest. The
set of (possibly multiple) NE predicted by the model consists of
(N,N) , (N,P ) , (P,N) , (P, P ) and ({(P,N) ; (N,P )})
. The sharp bounds induced by Theorem 2 of GH give:
P (N,N) ≤ Fψ
(
ψ1 <
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP , ψ2 <
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP
)
≡ L ((N,N) ; θ)
P (N,P ) ≤ Fψ
(
ψ1 <
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP , ψ2 >
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP
)
≡ L ((N,P ) ; θ)
P (P,N) ≤ Fψ
(
ψ1 >
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP , ψ2 <
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP ,
)
≡ L ((P,N) ; θ) (2.3.1)
P (P, P ) ≤ Fψ
(
ψ1 >
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP , ψ2 >
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP
)
≡ L ((P, P ) ; θ)
P (P,N) + P (N,P ) ≤ 1− Fψ
(
ψ1 <
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP , ψ2 <
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP
)
− Fψ
(
ψ1 >
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP , ψ2 >
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP
)
≡ L (({(P,N) ; (N,P )}) ; θ)
The terms in the left-hand side are derived from the observable outcome of the game.
Note that they do not include the parameter θ. The terms in the right-hand side are
derived from the cumulative distribution of the latent variable ψ. These inequalities
can be understood, heuristically, in a multiple equilibria framework. They mean
that, if a model is compatible with the data, the probability that we observe a given
outcome, cannot be greater than the probability that the model predicts at least one of
the (possibly multiple) equilibria where this outcome is part of. For example, (N,P )
can only be observed if ψ1 <
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP and ψ2 >
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP . But
the latter is true for: ψ ∈ [ c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP ;
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP
]2
, in which case
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the model predicted also that (P,N) is possible outcome. In other words, we cannot
observe (N,P ) more often than the model predicted (N,P ) as a single equilibrium
or as part of the multiple equilibrium ({(P,N) ; (N,P )}).
ΘI is deﬁned as the set of parameters for which the above inequalities are true.
These bounds which can easily be derived as necessary conditions, are also suﬃcient,
hence the term “sharp” bounds.
2.3.2 Incomplete observation of the return of migration
We assumed in section 2.3.1 that π˜ the expected beneﬁt of the investment, was
observable for a given family. However, this information is absent from the dataset.
We use the same idea as in in Section 1.3, where the capital of the family is missing
to tackle this problem. Suppose that we can bound π˜ with a given probability, so
that there exit an interval
[
π˜; π˜
]
which containing π˜ with a given probability. Once
this interval constructed, the problem collapses to a problem where the covariates are
deﬁned by an interval rather than a point. By appealing to the composition theorem
from Galichon and Henry (2006a) (Theorem 1), we can redeﬁne our identiﬁed set
accordingly and propose a valid conﬁdence region, following the same procedure. We
illustrate in example 2 how the bounds are changed.
Example 2 continued Suppose now that the investment in migration will yield the
following net proﬁt for the family:
π˜ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
πPP if both 1 and 2 participate,
πNP if only one player, 1 or 2, participates,
πNN otherwise.
To simplify, πNN < 0. However, we are unable to observe π˜, but we know that with
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a given probability (1− απ):
π˜ ∈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[πPP ; πPP ] if both 1 and 2 participate,
[πNP ; πNP ] if only one player, 1 or 2, participates,
πNN < 0 otherwise.
The central terms in equations (2.3.1) will become:
(i) Fψ
(
ψ1 <
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP , ψ2 <
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP
)
(ii) Fψ
(
ψ1 <
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP , ψ2 >
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP
)
(iii) Fψ
(
ψ1 >
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP , ψ2 <
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP
)
(iv) Fψ
(
ψ1 > βπNP +
c−πPP
3
, ψ2 >
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP
)
(v) 1− Fψ
(
ψ1 <
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP , ψ2 <
c
2
− (1
2
+ β)πNP
)
−Fψ
(
ψ1 > βπNP +
c−πPP
3
, ψ2 >
c
3
− (1
3
+ β)πPP + βπNP
)
A parameter θ will belong to our conﬁdence region if it satisﬁes the transformed
inequality with probability (1− απ).
The challenge now is to construct such an interval. Section 2.5.1 details the
procedure.
2.4 Data
For the purpose of the study, a survey has been conducted on the population of
Cameroonian, aged 18 or more, having completed secondary school by obtaining the
“Baccalaure´at”. The data show that the family is greatly involved in ﬁnancing the
costs of studies (local or foreign). In more than half of the cases, these expenses are
borne (or expected to be) by the family. There is however a stark contrast between
investments in local and foreign studies when it comes to the identity of the payers.
The costs of studies in Cameroon are shared in only 5% of families while for education
abroad, they are shared between family members in 40% of the cases. It is therefore
of great interest to understand how families organize to realize this investment.
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We deﬁne here the concept of participation in the migration decision. During the
survey, individuals where asked if they were migrants, if they had ever attempted
migration or had never attempted migration. In each of the cases, they were asked to
identify the person who would (or did) pay for the expenses related to the migration.
They were also asked to identify (if applicable) a helper who could (or did) help in the
process of migration, either with ﬁnancial or material assistance. We estimate that
56% of the respondants have a potential helper. We therefore distinguish families with
a helper from families without a helper. A helper or a parent is said to participate to
the migration process if he pays (alone or with other people) the expenses related to
the migration.
We will only consider families where at least one of the parents (father or mother)
is present. Within 139 families without helper, parents participate in 52.52% of
the cases. When both parent and helper are present (174 families), we observe the
outcomes: no participation (N,N) in 24.71% of families, participation of parent alone
(P,N) in 26.44% of families, participation of the helper alone (N,P ) in only 8.62%
of observations, and both participation (P, P ) in 40.23% of observations. Table 2.1
summarizes the main characteristics of the helper. The “typical” helper is a male, an
uncle or a brother who have a university degree. We refer the reader to Section 1.7 for
a thorough discussion of the dataset and estimators of averages in the population.
2.5 Speciﬁcation
2.5.1 Speciﬁcation for the First-step estimation of the return
to migration
We propose to use an ordered probit on the joint decision of education and migration
to preestimate the return on investment. We assume two types of education (Masters,
for those whose expected education is higher or equivalent to a Masters degree, No
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of the helper in proportions of the population of migrants,
non-migrants, and of the total population.
Helper Non-Mig. Mig. Total
Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d. Aver. s.d.
Declare and Helper 0.51 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.56 0.50
Female 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.34
is a brother/sister/oncle/aunt 0.89 0.31 0.76 0.43 0.82 0.39
Level of education
Primary 0.30 0.46 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.35
Secondary 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17
Tertiary (Univ 0 and 1) 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.50
Tertiary (Univ 2 and 3) 0.19 0.39 0.56 0.50 0.39 0.49
Lives in the migration country 0.21 0.41 0.73 0.45 0.49 0.50
Owns a car 0.17 0.38 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.43
Number of observations = 174.
These statistics are computed with re-weighting and represent estimates of the
average and standard errors of the population. See Appendix 1.7.2 for details.
Masters otherwise) and the outcome migration or non-migration. Under the joint
assumption of positive return of schooling and migration, we use the following or-
dering of alternatives: (1) non-migration without a Masters, (2) non-migration with
a Masters, (3) migration without a Masters, (4) migration with a Masters, the ﬁrst
option being the reference option. We then construct bounds on this return using
the corresponding conﬁdence regions. The ordering of the alternatives is reasonable
given the assumption of a positive return on education, that is however smaller in
the origin country than the return of migration. Reports from institutional data (as
in Njike Njikam, Lontchi Tchoﬀo, and Fotzeu Mwaﬀo (2005)) show that the country
of interest in this study, Cameroon, exhibits such characteristics.
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Note that this pre-estimation step is up-to a scale parameter that we treat as a
nuisance parameter. To avoid unnecessary complication, we will use the mormaliza-
tion that the variance of the unobservable private costs of participation is the same
as the variance of the decision shifter aﬀecting the choice of migration and education.
As the latter variance will be normalized to one in the following, this choice leads
to interpret the magnitude of preferences’ parameters as the reponse of the utility of
agents to a variation of the covariates equivalent to one unit of standard deviation
of the return of investment. This assumption is not completely innocuous; it can
be easily shown that this nuisance parameter aﬀects the magnitude of the parame-
ters of interest α and β, however not their sign. Caution is therefore warranted in
interpreting the magnitude of β1 and β2 in Table 2.2.
The explanatory variables for our probit estimation include the characteristics
of the child (age at which the child passed the state exam “Baccalaure´at” and the
results at this exam, the presence of a scholarship, whether the migration country
has high tuition) and characteristics of the family (the maximum education in the
family, the presence of a helper in the migration country, Numbers of cars owned
by the family). This variables where found to explain the return on migration and
education in Section 1.5. Once the regression is performed, we obtain prediction of
the return of migration in absence (or in presence) of an individual, by changing
accordingly the value of the covariates. We then construct conﬁdence interval of the
beneﬁt π˜ for each attendance proﬁle.
2.5.2 Speciﬁcation of the players’ utlity functions
Recall that our parameters of interest are:
• αi, the share of the proﬁt received by the player i. In the following, we will
explore diﬀerent sharing rules: (1) a ”single-preference” sharing rule where all
proﬁts go to the child, (2) an egalitarian sharing rule where the proﬁt are equally
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divided among the players, (3) a ”fair” sharing rule where the proﬁts are divided
according to the shapley value.
• βi ∈ [0; 1], the proportion of the return that individual i receives as indirect
beneﬁts of the investment.
• γi measures a utility enjoyed by individual i from the fact that the family
realize a successful investment and independant of the size of this return. We
wil interpret this parameter as a measure of altruism.
• ci, is the cost of attendance, net of retaliation costs. We will study how this
cost varies with characteristics of the player. We postulate:
c1 = c01 (Cost for parents)
c2 = c02 + cFFAM + cDDIA+ cGGENDER (Cost for helper)
where FAM , DIA and GENDER are dummy variables which equals one re-
spectively when the individual is an oncle/aunt or a brother/sister, when the
individual lives outside Cameroon (i.e. in the diaspora), when the individual is
a female.
• We assume that ψi, the unobserved beneﬁts of participation of player i, has a
logit distribution, with mean zero and variance σ2ψ = 1.
We discuss our results in the next section.
2.6 Results and discussion
We are ﬁrst interested in the sharing of proﬁts. Our dataset readily rejects the single-
preference and the fair sharing rule. The conﬁdence region is non empty only for
the egalitarian sharing rule. This suggests the type of social norms that govern the
decision process. Regardless of the amount each individual invests in the migration,
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the common returns seem to be split in equal proportion among all members of the
family participating in the decision.
For an egalitarian sharing rule, we construct a conﬁdence region under the mor-
malization that the variance of the unobservable private costs of participation is the
same as the variance of the decision shifter aﬀecting the choice of migration and
education. We fail to reject the hypothesis that the helper derives no additional
utility from the realization of the migration project (γ2 = 0). We then construct a
constrained conﬁdence region under this additional restriction. The ranges of the re-
maining parameters of interest are displayed in Table 2.2. With regard to the utility
Table 2.2: Range of preference parameters
Min Max
Parent β1 0.78 1.00
γ1 0.50 5.00
c01 0.86 1.15
Helper β2 0.00 1.00
γ2 0.00 0.00
c02 0.12 3.06
cF -2.52 -0.58
cG -3.50 -0.67
cD -0.40 5.00
Results are displayed for σ = 1,γ2 = 0
and an egalitarian sharing rule
function of the parents, the table shows that β1 is relatively close to 1. The private
utility for the parent appears to be quite high and to dominate the share of return
that he receives while participating in decision process. Furthermore, unlike for the
helper, this concern for the familial return appears to be related also to the realization
of the investment (π˜ > 0), and not only to the size of the return, suggesting some
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degree of altruism. Indeed, γ1 can be quite large, even when the size of the return
remains modest, to the point where this additional utility can compensate for the
costs of attendance.
With regard to the utility function of the helpers, the data are uninformative
on the size of the private beneﬁt enjoyed by the helper. In particular, it remains
unclear whether the parent can exclude free-riders from any proﬁt. However, we
can identify the sign and bound the magnitude of the participation costs. As is
the case for parents, these constant costs are signiﬁcantly positive for helpers, a
fact that discourages participation to the decision process. However, this disutility
can be compensated for, when the helper is a “close family member”, understand
brother/sister of the child or brother/sister of the parent. We interpret this eﬀect as
kinship obligation. Indeed, the negative sign of cF implies that the retaliation costs
that a family member suﬀers in case of non-participation are higher than his/her
cost of attendance. Similar interpretations can be made for the parameter cG: the
retaliation costs in case of non-participation to the decision process will be higher
for a male representative of the extended family than for a female. In other words,
social norms are more stringent for males than for females when it comes to providing
help in the migration process. Finally, we cannot reject the hypothesis H0 : cD = 0,
however, the conﬁdence region shows a tilt toward positive values of the parameter,
suggesting models with higher cost of participation for helpers in the diaspora. Two
(possibly complementary) interpretations are available: (1) it may be that the means
of retaliation are geographically limited and become less eﬀective for individuals living
abroad, (2) or that the logistic cost of participation are relatively higher for those not
residing in the origin country.
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2.7 Conclusion
To sum up, the extended family involved in the migration process should not be
viewed as an homogeneous entity where individuals maximize the sole familial interest,
nor should it be viewed as a compound of egoistic individuals. The results suggest
that participation to the migration process is driven to some extent by a concern for
the familial interest, while family interaction and helpers participation are submitted
to a set of social norms.
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Chapter 3
Combinatorial bootstrap inference
in partially identiﬁed incomplete
structural models
with Marc Henry and Maurice Queyranne.
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Abstract
We propose a computationally feasible inference method in ﬁnite games of complete
information. Galichon and Henry (2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari
(2011) show that such models are equivalent to a collection of moment inequalities
that increases exponentially with the number of discrete outcomes. We propose an
equivalent characterization based on classical combinatorial optimization methods
that alleviates this computational burden and allows the construction of conﬁdence
regions with an eﬃcient combinatorial bootstrap procedure that runs in linear com-
puting time. The method can also be applied to the empirical analysis of cooperative
and noncooperative games, instrumental variable models of discrete choice and re-
vealed preference analysis. We propose an application to the determinants of long
term elderly care choices.
3.1 Introduction
With the conjoined advent of powerful computing capabilities and rich data sets, the
empirical evaluation of complex structural models with equilibrium data is becoming
prevalent, particularly in the analysis of social networks and industrial organization.
However, in such models, multiple equilibria are the norm rather than the exception.
Though multiplicity of equilibria and identiﬁability of the model’s structural parame-
ters are conceptually distinct, the former often leads to a failure of the latter, thereby
invalidating traditional inference methods. This is generally remedied by imposing
additional assumptions to achieve identiﬁcation, such as imposing an equilibrium se-
lection mechanism or a reﬁnement of the equilibrium concept. Manski (1993) and
Jovanovic (1989) were among the ﬁrst to advocate a new inference approach that
dispenses with identiﬁcation assumptions and delivers conﬁdence regions for partially
identiﬁed structural parameters. A large literature has developed on the general prob-
lem of inference on partially identiﬁed parameters deﬁned as minimizers of objective
functions or more speciﬁcally as solutions to moment inequality restrictions, following
the seminal work of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007).
In structural estimation using equilibrium conditions, the partial identiﬁcation
approach was initially applied, as in Haile and Tamer (2003), to achieve simple and
robust inference from implications of the model in the form of a small number of
moment inequalities. This partial identiﬁcation approach was applied to inference
in games by Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2003), Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2004),
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Jia (2008) among others. However, this approach brings
only part of the empirical content of the model to bear on the estimation, resulting
in unnecessary loss of informativeness. In models with multiple equilibria and no ad-
ditional prior information, nothing is known of the equilibrium selection mechanism.
If a particular equilibrium selection mechanism is posited, the model likelihood can
be derived and inference based on it. Jovanovic (1989) characterizes compatibility of
an economic structure with the true data generating process as the existence of some
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(unknown) equilibrium selection mechanism, for which the likelihood is equal to the
true data generating mechanism. Berry and Tamer (2006) deﬁne the identiﬁed set
as the collection of structural parameter values for which the structure is compatible
with the data generating mechanism in the sense of Jovanovic (1989). This deﬁnition
of the identiﬁed set is not directly conducive to inference, as it involves an inﬁnite
dimensional (nuisance) parameter (the equilibrium selection mechanism). However,
in the case of ﬁnite non cooperative games of complete information, Galichon and
Henry (2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) show equivalence of
the Jovanovic (1989) deﬁnition with a system of inequalities. Hence, they show that
the empirical content of such models is characterized by a ﬁnite collection of moment
inequalities.
A large literature has developed on inference in moment inequality models since
the seminal contribution of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007). We discuss and
review it in Section 3.4. However, a major challenge in the framework of this paper
is that the number of inequalities characterizing the empirical content of the model
grows exponentially with the number of equilibrium strategy proﬁles. Hence the
combinatorial optimization approach that we propose in this paper is to the best of
our knowledge the only computationally feasible inference procedure for empirically
relevant incomplete economic structures. The growing literature on “inference with
many moment inequalities” addresses theoretical issues relating to the case, where
the number of inequalities grows with sample size and does not alleviate the compu-
tational burden mentioned here. This problem of exponential complexity goes a long
way towards explaining the dearth of empirical studies using partial identiﬁcation in
such models. However, abandoning this partial identiﬁcation approach would mean
abandoning robust inference not only in non cooperative games of perfect information
but also in large classes of models that share exactly the same feature, and fall into the
framework of this paper. They include cooperative games, such as matching games
and network formation games, revealed preference analysis of spacial preferences and
matching markets and instrumental variable models of discrete choice.
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The objective of this paper is to propose a combinatorial solution to this prob-
lem, where the number of inequality restrictions grows exponentially with the number
of strategy proﬁles or discrete outcomes. Ekeland, Galichon, and Henry (2010) have
shown that generic partial identiﬁcation problems can be formulated as optimal trans-
portation problems. Developing ideas in Galichon and Henry (2011), we exploit the
special structure of discrete choice problems and show that correct speciﬁcation can
be formulated as a problem of maximizing ﬂow through a network, and that the
identiﬁed set can be obtained from the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem. The dual prob-
lems of maximizing ﬂow through a network and ﬁnding a minimum capacity cut are
classics in combinatorial optimization and operations research, with applications in
many areas such as traﬃc, communications, routing and scheduling; see, for example
Schrijver (2004) for the theory and history, and Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993)
for numerous applications. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst application of the Max-
Flow Min-Cut Theorem to statistical inference for equilibrium models. We apply this
powerful combinatorial method to the problem of constructing conﬁdence regions for
structural parameters. We construct a functional quantile for the bootstrap process
using a linear computing time algorithm and replace the unknown empirical process
by this quantile in the system of moment inequalities to obtain the least relaxation of
the moment inequalities, hence maximum informativeness, while controlling the con-
ﬁdence level of the covering region. Since the procedure involves bootstrapping the
empirical process only, it does not suﬀer from the problems of bootstrap validity in
partially identiﬁed models described in Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) and
Bugni (2010). We illustrate and assess our procedure on a very simple full information
game with 2 players and 3 strategies, easily derived equilibria and yet a large number
of inequalities to characterize its empirical content (namely 127). We simulate the
game under a variety of parameter values and assumptions on the data generating
process and with explanatory variables. Finally, we illustrate the approach, the pro-
cedure and the interpretation of results on an application to the determinants of long
term elderly care choices of American families.
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In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We present a uniﬁed approach to inference in incomplete structural models.
2. We provide a simpliﬁed and insightful new proof for a characterization of the
identiﬁed set.
3. We present a computationally eﬃcient, combinatorial procedure that allows fea-
sible inference in empirically relevant incomplete structural models. We demon-
strate its practical eﬃciency in extensive simulations of a simple game.
4. We apply this methodology to an empirical example and demonstrate the type
of econometric analysis and insights that it allows.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the general frame-
work and the object of study. Section 3.3 derives the characterization of the identiﬁed
set with the Min-Cut Max-Flow Theorem. Section 3.4 describes the combinatorial
procedure to eﬃciently construct the conﬁdence region. Section 3.5 contains the simu-
lation evidence and Section 3.6 the empirical application. The last section concludes.
Proofs are collected in an appendix.
3.2 Analytical framework
3.2.1 Model speciﬁcation
We consider the following model speciﬁcation.
Y ∈ G(X, ε; θ), (3.2.1)
where Y is an observable outcome variable, which takes values in a ﬁnite set Y =
{y1, . . . , yK}, X is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables with domain X , ε
is a vector of unobservable heterogeneity variables with domain Ξ ⊂ Rl and θ ∈
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Θ ⊂ Rd is a vector of unknown parameters. Finally, G : (X, ε) ⇒ G(X, ε; θ) is a
multi-valued mapping. The random elements X, Y and ε are deﬁned on a common
probability space (Ω,F ,P). The sample consists in n observational units i = 1, . . . , n,
which are independent and identical in distribution. To each unit i is attached a
vector (Yi, Xi, εi), only the ﬁrst two elements of which shall be observed. For each
potential outcome y ∈ Y , we denote by P (y|X) the conditional probability P(Y =
y|X). If Z is a subset of Y , P (Z|X) will denote ∑y∈Z P (y|X). It is important to
emphasize here the fact that P (.|X) denotes the true outcome data generating process,
which is unknown, but can be estimated from the data. It is not a function of the
structural parameter vector and cannot be construed as the likelihood from the model.
The vector of unobservable variables ε in the economic structure has conditional
cumulative distribution function F (ε|X; θ) for some known function F parameterized
by θ (the same notation is used for the parameters of the model correspondence and
for the parameters of the error distribution to indicate that they may have common
components). The economic structure is summarized by the multi-valued mapping
G. A special case of speciﬁcation (3.2.1) arises when G is a function, in which case
model (3.2.1) is a nonlinear non separable single equation discrete choice model as
in Chesher (2010). Here, however, we entertain the possibility of G having multiple
values arising from multiple equilibria, data censoring or endogeneity. G is entirely
given by the economic structural model, up to an unknown parameter vector θ.
The analytical framework, concepts and procedures proposed throughout the pa-
per will be illustrated and discussed with the following simple example.
Example 3 (Partnership game) Our example is a simple non cooperative full in-
formation game of complementarities.
• Strategies: There are two players, who simultaneously decide, whether to
invest strongly (strategy H), weakly (strategy L) or not at all (strategy O) in a
partnership.
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• Payoffs: Players pay a cost c ≥ 0 (respectively 2c) for a weak (respectively
strong) investment. Beneﬁts that accrue to players depend on the overall level
of investment in the partnership and explanatory variables Ji, i = 1, 2, where
Ji = 1 if player i is female, and zero otherwise. The beneﬁts for player i are
3c(1 + βJi) in case both players invest strongly, 2c(1 + βJi) in case one player
invests weakly and the other strongly and c(1 + βJi) in case both players invest
weakly. Finally player i also experiences an idiosyncratic random participation
payoﬀ εi, i = 1, 2 with a density with respect to Lebesgue measure. The payoﬀ
matrix for the game is given in the following Table.
Table 3.1: Payoﬀ matrix for the partnership game.
Player 1:
Player 2 :
H L O
H 3c(1 + βJi)− 2c+ ε1 2c(1 + βJi)− 2c+ ε1 −2c+ ε1
3c(1 + βJi)− 2c+ ε2 2c(1 + βJi)− c+ ε2 0
L 2c(1 + βJi)− c+ ε1 c(1 + βJi)− c+ ε1 −c+ ε1
2c(1 + βJi)− 2c+ ε2 c(1 + βJi)− c+ ε2 0
O 0 0 0
−2c+ ε2 −c+ ε2 0
In each cell, the top expression is player 1’s payoﬀ and the bottom term is player 2’s
payoﬀ.
• Equilibrium concept: We assume that outcomes are Nash equilibria in pure
strategies. Other equilibrium concepts could be entertained, in particular with
mixed strategies, as will be discussed in Section 3.4.1 and illustrated in the
empirical application.
The strategies, payoﬀs and equilibrium concept together deﬁne the economic structure.
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Y is an observed equilibrium strategy proﬁle. J = (J1, J2) is also observed by the an-
alyst. The idiosyncratic participation beneﬁt ε = (ε1, ε2) is not, but it is common
knowledge to the players. The structural parameter vector is θ = (c, β). The equilib-
rium correspondence, i.e., the set of equilibria for each value of ε, J and θ, can be
easily derived, and deﬁnes the multi-valued mapping G in model speciﬁcation (3.2.1),
which is represented in the (ε1, ε2) space in Figure 3.1 for the case β = 0. Since we
assume that ε has absolutely continuous distribution with respect to Lebesgue measure,
we do not include zero probability predictions, such as {OO,OL} when ε2 = c and
ε1 < −c for instance.
ε2
{OO}
{HH,OO}
{HH,LH,OO}
{HH,HL,OO}
{LO}
{HH,LH,OL}{OL}
{HH,HL,LH,
LL,OO}
{HH,HL,LO}
{HH,HL,LH,LL}
c
0
−c
ε1−c c
Figure 3.1: Representation of the equilibrium correspondence G(J, ε; θ) in the (ε1, ε2)
space, when β = 0.
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3.2.2 Object of inference
Model (3.2.1) has the fundamental feature that G is multi-valued (because of multiple
equilibria in the example above for instance). For a given value of (X, ε, θ), the model
predicts a set of possible outcomes G(X, ε; θ). Only one of them, namely Y , is actu-
ally realized, but the economic structure is silent about how that particular Y was
selected among G(X, ε; θ). In other words, the economic structure holds no informa-
tion about the equilibrium selection mechanism. If the true (unknown) equilibrium
selection mechanism is denoted π0(y|ε,X), which is a probability on G(X, ε; θ), then
the likelihood of observation y can be written
L(θ|y,X) =
∫
Ξ
π0(y|ε,X)dF (ε|X; θ),
and the true parameter θ0 satisﬁes
P (y|X) =
∫
Ξ
π0(y|ε,X)dF (ε|X; θ0), X-a.s., for all y. (3.2.2)
Jovanovic (1989) points out that the incomplete model (incomplete because the equi-
librium selection is not modeled) is compatible with the true data generating process
P (.|X) if and only if there exists a (generally non unique) equilibrium selection mech-
anism π0 such that (3.2.2) holds. The identiﬁed set is then deﬁned as the set ΘI of
parameter values θ such that model (3.2.1) is compatible in the sense of Jovanovic
(1989).
Deﬁnition 3 (Identiﬁed set) The identiﬁed set ΘI is the set of parameter values
θ ∈ Θ such that there exists a probability kernel π(.|ε,X) with support G(X, ε; θ) for
which (3.2.2) holds.
The identiﬁed set is empty if no value of the parameter can rationalize the data
generating process, in which case the structural model is misspeciﬁed. The identiﬁed
set is a singleton in case of point identiﬁcation, which occurs if G happens to be
single valued under the true parameter values (in case c = β = 0 in Example 3)
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or in very special cases under large support assumptions on X, as in Tamer (2003).
The identiﬁed set is totally uninformative, i.e., ΘI = Θ, in case the model has no
empirical content (if for instance G(X, ε; θ0) contains all selected outcome values for
almost all ε at the true value θ0).
3.2.3 Applications of the framework
Speciﬁcation (3.2.1), hence the inference procedure presented in this paper, has a wide
range of applications. Some of the most compelling ones are the empirical analysis of
games, instrumental variable models of discrete choice with endogeneity and revealed
preference analysis.
• Empirical analysis of games: As illustrated in Example 3, Model (3.2.1)
applies to the empirical analysis of noncooperative games of perfect informa-
tion (normal form games). They include the classic entry game of Bresnahan
and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992) as well as the social interaction game of
Soetevent and Kooreman (2007). Noncooperative games of private information
make for a less compelling application of this framework as point identiﬁcation
conditions are more easily derived and justiﬁed than in their perfect information
counterparts (see for instance Aradillas-Lopez (2010) and Bajari, Hahn, Hong,
and Ridder (2011) for a discussion). Finally, some cooperative games can be
analyzed and estimated within the present framework, in particular matching
and social network formation games, where the equilibrium correspondence is
characterized by pairwise stability. Uetake and Watanabe (2011) present an
empirical analysis of entry by merger, where the present inference procedure
can be applied.
• Discrete choice models with endogeneity: Chesher, Rosen, and Smolin-
ski (2011) show that instrumental variable models of discrete choice fall under
model (3.2.1) and they use Theorem 1 of Galichon and Henry (2011) or equiv-
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alently Theorem 3.2 of Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) to charac-
terize the identiﬁed set. The present work complements Chesher, Rosen, and
Smolinski (2011) in proposing the ﬁrst feasible inference procedure for such
models.
• Revealed preference analysis: Henry and Mouriﬁe´ (2011) apply the in-
ference procedure proposed here to analyze voting behaviour from a revealed
preference standpoint. The same approach can be applied to revealed preference
testing in matching markets as in Echenique, Lee, Shum, and Yenmez (2011)
or the revealed preference approach to games taken in Pakes, Porter, Ho, and
Ishii (2004).
3.3 Operational characterization of the identiﬁed
set
As noted in Berry and Tamer (2006), Deﬁnition 3 is not an operational deﬁnition of
the identiﬁed set, as it includes the equilibrium selection mechanism as an inﬁnite di-
mensional parameter. Galichon and Henry (2006b,2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov,
and Molinari (2011) show a characterization of the identiﬁed set with a ﬁnite collec-
tion of moment inequalities. In this section, we give an equivalent characterization of
the identiﬁed set, whose proof is much simpler and relies on the Min-Cut Max-Flow
Theorem, which brings classical eﬃcient combinatorial optimization methods to bear
on the problem. This will prove crucial for the feasibility of the inference procedure
in realistic and relevant empirical examples.
First, we set out the main heuristic for the operational characterization of the
identiﬁed set. Model speciﬁcation (3.2.1) is a discrete choice model, hence the set Y
of outcomes is ﬁnite and the correspondence G takes only a ﬁnite number of values,
which we label U = {u1, . . . , uJ}. Each u is a set (possibly singleton) of outcomes in
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Y . Because the model is incomplete, it does not predict the probabilities of individual
outcomes in Y , but it predicts the probability of each combination of equilibria listed
in U . We denote these probabilities Q(u|X; θ) as they depend on the structural
parameter value.
Deﬁnition 4 (Predicted probabilities) For each u ∈ U , we deﬁne Q(u|X; θ) :=
P(G(X, ε; θ) = u|X, θ). If V is a subset of U , we write Q(V |X; θ) =∑u∈V Q(u|X; θ).
In most applications, it will be diﬃcult to obtain closed forms for Q(u|X; θ).
However, ε can be randomly generated. Given a sample (εr)r=1,...,R of simulated
values, Q(u|X; θ) can be approximated by∑Rr=1 1{u = G(X, εr; θ)}/R. Bajari, Hong,
and Ryan (2010) propose an importance sampling procedure that greatly reduces the
computational burden of this stage of the inference. The simulation procedure is now
standard and cannot be avoided if one wishes, as we do here, to exhaust the empirical
content of the structural model.
Example 3 continued: In the partnership example with β = 0, the model predicts
the following values for the equilibrium correspondence: U = { {OL}, {LH,OL,HH},
{HH,LH,OO}, {OO}, {HH,OO}, {HH,LL,HL,LH}, {HH,LL,OO,HL,LH},
{HH,OO,HL}, {HH,HL,LO}, {LO}}. The set Y of equilibrium strategy proﬁles
(that may be observed) is {HH, HL, LH, LL, LO, OL, OO} with 7 elements,
while the set of predicted collections of equilibria (possible values of the equilib-
rium correspondence) U has 10 elements. The predicted probabilities can be com-
puted in the following way. For instance, Q({OL}|c) = P(ε1 ≤ −c and ε2 ≤ c) and
Q({HH,LH,OL}|c) = P(−c ≤ ε1 ≤ 0 and ε2 ≤ c) and the remaining 8 probabilities
are determined similarly from Figure 3.1.
The model structure imposes a set of restrictions on the relation between the
predicted probabilities of equilibrium combinations and the true probabilities of out-
comes. For instance, the predicted probability Q({HH,LH,OL}|X; θ) in the above
example cannot be larger than the sum P (HH)+P (LH)+P (OL) of probabilities of
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occurrence of each individual equilibrium in u, since Y is either HH, LH or OL, when
u = {HH,LH,OL} is predicted. More generally, since P and Q are the marginals of
the joint distribution of (Y, U) given X, we must have for all u ∈ U :
Q(u|X; θ) =
∑
y∈u
P(Y = y and U = u|X; θ) ≤
∑
y∈u
P(Y = y|X; θ) =
∑
y∈u
P (y|X).(3.3.1)
Note that Q(u|X; θ) may be strictly smaller than ∑y∈u P (y|X) when some outcome
y ∈ u also belongs to other combinations u′ that may arise under diﬀerent values of ε,
as its (marginal) probability P (y|X) must then be split between Q(u|X; θ) and the
probabilities Q(u′|X; θ) of such other combinations u′ ∈ U containing y. However,
inequalities (3.3.1) do not exhaust the information in the structure. They may all be
satisﬁed and yet the structure may be incompatible with the data generating process
as the following example shows. Hence more inequalities will be needed as derived
below.
Example 3 continued: In the partnership example with β = 0, suppose that the
true equilibrium selection mechanism is such that Q({OL}|θ) = P (OL) > 0 and
Q({HH,LH,OL}|θ) = P (HH)+P (LH)+P (OL). ThenQ({OL}∪{HH,LH,OL}|θ) =
Q({OL}|θ) +Q({HH,LH,OL}|θ) > P (HH) + P (LH) + P (OL) so that θ /∈ ΘI .
Extending this observation, consider a subset V ⊆ U and deﬁne
V ∪ := {y ∈ Y : y ∈ u for some u ∈ V } =
⋃
u∈V
u.
Then we must have
Q(V |X; θ) =
∑
u∈V
∑
y∈u
P(Y = y and U = u|X; θ)
=
∑
y∈V ∪
∑
u∈V :y∈u
P(Y = y and U = u|X; θ)
≤
∑
y∈V ∪
∑
u∈U
P(Y = y and U = u|X; θ)
=
∑
y∈V ∪
P (y|X)
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where the inequality is again due to the fact that some y ∈ V ∪ may also belong to
some u′ ∈ V . Since this inequality holds for every V ⊆ U , we must have
max
V⊆U
(∑
u∈V
Q(u|X; θ)−
∑
y∈V ∪
P (y|X)
)
≤ 0.
This inequality must also hold for every realization x of X in the domain X of the
explanatory variables, implying that every θ in the identiﬁed set ΘI must satisfy
sup
x⊆X
max
V⊆U
(∑
u∈V
Q(u|x; θ)−
∑
y∈V ∪
P (y|x)
)
≤ 0.
So far, we have shown implications of the model. It is far more diﬃcult to show
that these implication actually exhaust all the empirical content of the model, i.e.,
that they involve no loss of information and constitute sharp bounds. In Theorem 3
below, we will show this with an appeal to the classical Max-FlowMin-Cut Theorem of
combinatorial optimization, providing our characterization (3.3.2) of the identiﬁed set.
We thereby provide, for the case of a ﬁnite set of possible outcomes, a new and simpler
proof of the characterization of the identiﬁed set with a ﬁnite collection of inequalities,
without the complicated apparatus of the theory of random sets. This allows us to
emphasize the combinatorial optimization formulation of our inference problem, which
is key to its tractable solution in empirically relevant instances. Theorem 3 below also
provides an alternative characterization (3.3.3) of the identiﬁed set from the “dual”
perspective of outcome subsets Z ⊆ Y , in addition to the preceding characterization
(3.3.2) based on combination subsets V ⊆ U , with the notation
Z∩ := {u ∈ U : u ⊆ Z} and Z−1 := {u ∈ U : u ∩ Z = ∅}.
This alternative characterization may be useful in situations where the number of
possible outcomes is much smaller than the number of possible combinations (as is
the case in Example 3, where the number of equilibrium outcomes (cardinality of
Y) is 7, so the corresponding number of inequalities to be checked is 27 − 1 = 127,
whereas the number of predicted equilibrium combinations (cardinality of U) is 10, so
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the corresponding number of inequalities to check would be 210 − 1 = 1023). Finally,
it is also equivalent to the characterization of the identiﬁed set derived in Galichon
and Henry (2006b), which we give in (3.3.4) in our notation.
Theorem 3 The identiﬁed set is
ΘI =
{
θ ∈ Θ : sup
x∈X
max
V⊆U
(
Q(V |x; θ)− P (V ∪|x)
)
≤ 0
}
(3.3.2)
=
{
θ ∈ Θ : sup
x∈X
max
Z⊆Y
(
Q(Z∩|x; θ)− P (Z|x; θ)
)
≤ 0
}
(3.3.3)
=
{
θ ∈ Θ : sup
x∈X
max
Z⊆Y
(
P (Z|x; θ)−Q(Z−1|x; θ)
)
≤ 0
}
. (3.3.4)
Theorem 3 gives three characterizations of the identiﬁed set ΘI , sometimes called
sharp identiﬁed region in the literature. ΘI contains all the values of the parameter
such that (3.2.1) holds and only such values. Moreover, all elements of ΘI are ob-
servationally equivalent. Hence no value of the parameter vector θ contained in ΘI
can be rejected on the basis of the information available to the analyst. Thus, ΘI
completely characterizes the empirical content of the model.
Example 3 continued: To illustrate the computation of the identiﬁed set, consider
the case, where it is known that β = 0. Assume that the true parameter value is
c0 = 1/4 and the idiosyncratic shocks are independent and uniformly distributed over
[−1/2, 1/2]. Suppose further that the true data generating process is equal to the
distribution implied by a uniform equilibrium selection rule, whereby all equilibrium
strategy proﬁles within the equilibrium correspondence are selected with equal prob-
ability. For example, when ε1 ≥ c0 = 1/4 and −1/4 = −c0 ≤ ε2 ≤ 0, each strategy
proﬁle within the equilibrium correspondence {HH,HL,LO} is equally likely. The
probability distribution of the true data generating process in this case is deﬁned by
P (HH) = 167/960, P (OO) = 191/480, P (OL) = P (LO) = 1/12, P (LL) = 19/320
and P (HL) = P (LH) = 97/960. The identiﬁed set is derived as the set of val-
ues of c such that the 27 − 1 = 127 inequalities of the form P (Z) ≥ Q(Z∩|c), all
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Z ⊆ {HH,HL,LH,LL, LO,OL,OO}, are satisﬁed. For instance, one of those in-
equalities is 59/320 = P (LO or HL) ≥ Q({LO}|c) = (1/2 − c)2 if c ≤ 1/2 and zero
otherwise. The identiﬁed set can be computed using a Min-Cut Max-Flow algorithm,
which yields [1/2−1/√12, 1/3]  [0.2113, 0.3333] where the lower bound of the inter-
val happens to be the smallest value of c > 0 for which the inequality in (3.3.3) with
Z = {LO,OL} is satisﬁed, and the upper bound happens to be the largest value for
which that with Z = {HH,HL,LH,LL,OO} is satisﬁed.
As illustrated in Example 3, even in simple examples, where the equilibria are very
easy to compute, the exponential size of the characterization of the identiﬁed set is a
severe computational burden that is best approached with combinatorial optimization
techniques, as developed in the next section.
3.4 Conﬁdence region
3.4.1 Objective
We now turn to the problem of inference on ΘI based on a sample of observations
((Y1, X1), . . ., (Yn, Xn)). We seek coverage of the identiﬁed set with prescribed prob-
ability 1 − α, for some α ∈ (0, 1). It would be tempting to appeal to the large
literature on inference in moment inequality models. This includes several proposals
for the construction of conﬁdence regions covering each point in the identiﬁed set,
which are generally preferred on account of the fact that they may be more informa-
tive (although this may sometimes be misleading as pointed out in Henry and Onatski
(2012)). Such proposals include Section 5 of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007),
Romano and Shaikh (2008), Rosen (2008), Galichon and Henry (2009) and Andrews
and Soares (2010) among others. All of the above propose to construct conﬁdence
regions by inverting speciﬁcation tests. Hence, the conﬁdence region is constructed
through a search in the parameter space, with a computationally demanding testing
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procedure at each parameter value visited in the search. This becomes computation-
ally infeasible for realistic parameter vector dimensions. With a reasonably precise
grid search and 5 parameters (for example), the number of points to be visited is in
the tens of billions. If the identiﬁed set is known to be convex, the search can be
conducted from a central point with a dichotomy in polar coordinates, yet it remains
computationally impractical to conduct a statistical procedure for each point in the
search.
Hence, each parameter value in the search must be accepted or rejected based on
a deterministic criterion. This means the signiﬁcance of the conﬁdence region must
be controlled independently of the parameter value. This will automatically produce
a conﬁdence region that covers the identiﬁed set. Proposals for the construction of
conﬁdence regions covering the identiﬁed set include Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer
(2007), Romano and Shaikh (2010), Galichon and Henry (2006a) and Bugni (2010)
among others. These can be applied to realistic models deﬁned by a small number of
moment inequality restrictions. However, a major challenge in the framework of this
paper is that the number of inequalities characterizing the empirical content of the
model in Theorem 3 grows exponentially with the cardinality of Y , which in the case
of games is the number of equilibrium strategy proﬁles (in the very simple partner-
ship game of Example 3, the number of inequalities is 127). Hence the combinatorial
optimization approach that we propose in this paper is to the best of our knowl-
edge the only computationally feasible inference procedure for empirically relevant
economic structures deﬁned by ﬁnite games and other models of discrete choice with
endogeneity.
Deﬁnition 5 (Conﬁdence region) A conﬁdence region of asymptotic level 1 − α
for the identiﬁed set ΘI is deﬁned as a sequence of regions Θn, n ∈ N, satisfying
lim infn P(ΘI ⊆ Θn) ≥ 1− α.
We seek coverage of the set of values of the parameter θ such that Q(V |x, θ) ≤
P (V ∪|x) for all values of x and all subset V of U . Q is determined from the model,
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but P is unknown. However, if we can construct random functions P n(A|x) that
dominate the probabilities P (A|x) for all values of x and all subsets A of Y with high
probability, then in particular, P n(V
∪|x) ≥ P (V ∪|x) for each x and each subset V of
U . Hence any θ satisfying Q(V |x, θ) ≤ P (V ∪|x) for all values of x and all subsets V of
U also satisﬁes Q(V |x, θ) ≤ P n(V ∪|x) for all values of x and all subsets V of U . There
remains to control the level of conﬁdence of the covering region, which is achieved
by requiring that P n dominate P with probability asymptotically no less than the
desired conﬁdence level. Equivalently, when working from characterization (3.3.4),
we impose the same requirement for dominated functions P n. Hence the following
assumption.
Assumption 5 Let the random functions A 
→ P n(A|x), A ⊆ Y, satisfy
lim inf
n
P
(
sup
x∈X
max
A⊆Y
[
P (A|x)− P n(A|x)
] ≤ 0) ≥ 1− α. (3.4.1)
Suppose now a value θ0 of the parameter vector belongs to the identiﬁed set ΘI .
Then, by Theorem 3, for all x and V ⊆ U , Q(V |x; θ0) ≤ P (V ∪|x), so that with
probability tending to no less than 1− α, Q(V |x; θ0) ≤ P n(V ∪|x), hence Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 (Conﬁdence region) Under Assumption 5, the sets
ΘI(P n) =
{
θ ∈ Θ : sup
x∈X
max
V⊆U
(Q(V |x; θ)− P n(V ∪|x)) ≤ 0
}
(3.4.2)
deﬁne a conﬁdence region of asymptotic level 1−α for ΘI (according to Deﬁnition 5).
Theorem 4 has the fundamental feature that it dissociates search in the parameter
space (or even possibly search over a class of models) from the statistical procedure
necessary to control the conﬁdence level. The upper probabilities P n can be deter-
mined independently of θ in a procedure that is performed once and for all using only
sample information, i.e. fully nonparametrically. Once the upper probabilities are de-
termined, probabilities Q over predicted sets of outcomes are computed for particular
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chosen speciﬁcations of the structure and values of the parameter, and such speciﬁ-
cations and values are tested with inequalities deﬁning Θn(P n). This dissociation of
the statistical procedure to control conﬁdence level from the search in the parameter
space is crucial to the computational feasibility of the proposed inference procedure
in realistic examples (i.e. sample sizes in the thousands, two-digit dimension of the
parameter space and two-digit cardinality of the set of observed outcomes, as in the
application to teen behavior in Soetevent and Kooreman (2007), or to entry in the
airline market in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)). The latter consider only equilibria
in pure strategies, as we have until now. If equilibria in mixed strategies are also
considered, as in Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and in the family bargaining ap-
plication below, we can appeal to results in Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari
(2011) and Galichon and Henry (2011). In particular, Galichon and Henry (2011)
show that if the game has a Shapley regular core (which is the case in the family bar-
gaining application, by Lemma 2 of Galichon and Henry (2011)), then the identiﬁed
set is characterized by (3.3.3) of Theorem 3 with the caveat that the set function
Z 
→ Q(Z∩|x) is replaced by
L(Z|x) =
∫
min
σ∈G(ε|X;θ)
σ(Z)dν(ε), (3.4.3)
where G(ε|X; θ) is now a set of mixed strategies, i.e. a set of probabilities on the set
of outcomes, as opposed to a subset of the set of outcomes. Hence the methodology
is be easily adapted, as in the application of Section 3.6.
3.4.2 Control of conﬁdence level
We now turn to the determination of random functions satisfying Assumption 5. First,
for each y ∈ Y , let Pˆn(y|x) be the empirical analog (or more generally a nonparametric
estimator) of P (y|x) and Pˆn(A|x) =
∑
y∈A Pˆn(y|x) for each A ⊆ Y . A simple way of
achieving (3.4.1) is by considering the random variable
Mn := sup
x∈X
max
A⊆Y
[P (A|x)− Pˆn(A|x)].
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Denoting by cαn the (1−α)-quantile of the distribution of Mn, we have P(Mn ≤ cαn) =
1− α by construction, hence
P
(
sup
x∈X
max
A⊆Y
[P (A|x)− Pˆn(A|x)− cαn] ≤ 0
)
≥ 1− α, (3.4.4)
and the desired result with P (A|x) = Pˆn(A|x) + cαn. However, by construction,
cαn is independent of A and x, so that the region obtained by plugging P (A|x) =
Pˆn(A|x)+cαn into (3.4.2) of Theorem 4 will be unnecessarily conservative. We propose,
instead, to replace cαn by a function βn(A|x) of A and x, which we interpret as a
functional quantile of the distribution of the random function P (A|x) − Pˆn(A|x).
Analogously to (3.4.4), we require it to satisfy
P
(
sup
x∈X
max
A⊆Y
[P (A|x)− Pˆn(A|x)− βn(A|x)] ≤ 0
)
≥ 1− α. (3.4.5)
We ﬁrst give a heuristic description of our proposed functional quantile before pre-
cisely spelling out the bootstrap procedure involved in approximating it. If X is
ﬁnite, the random matrix P (A|x) − Pˆn(A|x), with A ⊆ Y and x ∈ X has a ﬁ-
nite population of possible realizations, at most one for each possible sample draw.
These realizations can be ordered according to the maximum entry in the matrix
maxx∈X maxA⊆Y [P (A|x)− Pˆn(A|x)]. Now take all realizations that never exceed the
(1 − α)-quantile cαn of maxx∈X maxA⊆Y [P (A|x) − Pˆn(A|x)] and deﬁne P n(A|x) =
Pˆn(A|x) + βn(A|x), where βn(A|x) is the pointwise maximum over all realizations
that never exceed cαn. This guarantees that the resulting conﬁdence region obtained
in (3.4.2) of Theorem 4 with P n(A|x) = Pˆn(A|x) + βn(A|x) will be valid and will be
contained in the region obtained with P n(A|x) = Pˆn(A|x) + cαn (hence more informa-
tive than the latter). In case the conditioning variables are ﬁnitely supported, it is
well known (see Singh (1981) and Bickel and Freedman (1981)) that the nonparamet-
ric bootstrap version of cαn is a valid approximation, which in turns guarantees the
validity of the bootstrap procedure described below. In case X has continuous com-
ponents, Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2009) derive the asymptotic distribution of
the supremum (over X ) of the conditional empirical process, but nothing is known of
its nonparametric bootstrap approximation.
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Deﬁnition 6 (Nonparametric Bootstrap) Let P∗n denote probability statements
relative to the bootstrap distribution and conditional on the original sample
((Y1, X1), . . . , (Yn, Xn)). A bootstrap sample takes the form ((Y
∗
1 , X1), . . . , (Y
∗
n , Xn)),
where the explanatory variable is not resampled and for each i, Y ∗i is drawn from
distribution Pˆn(.|Xi). Let ((Y b1 , X1), . . . , (Y bn , Xn)), b = 1, . . . , B be a sequence of
B bootstrapped samples. Denote by Pˆ ∗n(.|.) the bootstrap version (i.e., constructed
identically from a bootstrap sample) of Pˆn(.|.) and Pˆ bn, b = 1, . . . , B its values taken
on the B realized bootstrap samples. Finally, for each A ⊆ Y and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, denote
ζ∗n(A|Xj) =
∑
y∈A[Pˆn(y|Xj)− Pˆ ∗n(y|Xj)] and deﬁne ζbn(A|Xj) analogously.
In the bootstrap version of the problem, we are seeking functions βn satisfying
P
∗
n
(
max
1≤j≤n
max
A⊆Y
[Pˆn(A|Xj)− Pˆ ∗n(A|Xj)− βn(A|Xj)] ≤ 0
)
≥ 1− α ∗ -a.s.
If there was a total order on the space of realizations of ζ∗n, we could choose βn
as the quantile of level 1 − α of the distribution of ζ∗n. However, the ζ∗n(·, Xj)’s are
random functions deﬁned on 2Y×{X1, . . . , Xn}, hence there is no such total order. We
propose to determine βn from a subset of B(1−α) bootstrap realizations determined
as follows (where x is the largest integer below x).
Step 1: Draw bootstrap samples ((Y b1 , X1), . . . , (Y
b
n , Xn)), for b = 1, . . . , B.
Step 2: For each b ≤ B, j ≤ n and A ⊆ Y , compute ζbn(A|Xj) = Pˆn(A|Xj) −
Pˆ bn(A|Xj).
Step 3: Discard at most a proportion α of the bootstrap indices, and compute
βn(A|Xj) as the maximum over the remaining bootstrap realizations ζbn(A|Xj).
Discarding at most Bα among the bootstrap realizations guarantees the control of
the level of conﬁdence, and we wish to choose the set D ⊆ {1, . . . , B} of discarded
indices so as to make βn as small as possible, to maximize informativeness of the
resulting conﬁdence region. Again, if there was a total order, we would be similarly
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discarding the Bα largest realizations of ζbn, eﬀectively choosing βn as the quantile
of the distribution of ζbn, b = 1 . . . , B. Instead, we discard all realizations of the
matrix ζbn(A|Xj) that have at least one entry that strictly exceeds the (1−α)-quantile
of wb = max1≤j≤nmaxA⊆Y ζbn(A|Xj). Hence, we choose D solving the optimization
problem
min
{
max
b/∈D
wb : D ⊆ {1, . . . , B}, |D| ≤ Bα
}
. (3.4.6)
The procedure is explained graphically in Figure 3.2.
ζkn
YA
βn
∅
ζdn
Figure 3.2: Stylized representation of the determination of the functional quantile βn
in a case without explanatory variables.
The subsets A of Y are represented on the horizontal axis, ranging from ∅ to Y. ζdn is one of two discarded realization
of the empirical process (dotted lines), whereas ζkn is one of three realizations that are not discarded (solid lines). βn
is the pointwise maximum over the realizations that were not discarded (thick line).
Problem (3.4.6) can be solved by the following Bootstrap Realization Selection
(BRS) algorithm:
BRS Step 1: For each b ≤ B, set w′b = max1≤j≤n
∑
y∈Y max{0, Pˆn(y|Xj) −
Pˆ bn(y|Xj)}.
BRS Step 2: Let D be the set of indices b of the Bα largest w′b.
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Proposition 5 The BRS algorithm determines an optimal solution to problem (3.4.6)
in O(nB|Y|) time.
Remark 1 Problem (3.6) may have alternate optimum solutions. As observed by a
referee, this may arise when the sample size n is small, since Pˆn(y|Xj) and Pˆ bn(y|Xj)
are multiples of 1/n and thus distinct wb’s are more likely to have the same value
when the sample size n is small. In case of ties, any optimum solution D to Problem
(3.6) may be used to discard bootstrap realizations and determine functions βn. If
one desires a speciﬁc tie-breaking rule, e.g., for robustness or reproducibility, then
we suggest the following lexicographic selection rule as a reﬁnement to BRS Step 2:
let wb be the vector with components wbj =
∑
y∈Y max{0, Pˆn(y|Xj) − Pˆ bn(y|Xj)} for
j = 1, . . . , n; and let [w]b be the vector wb with its components sorted in nonincreasing
order, i.e., with [w]b1 = wb ≥ [w]b2 ≥ · · · ≥ [w]bn = minj wbj; then discard the Bα
bootstrap realizations b with the lexicographically largest vector [w]b. In other words,
we reﬁne problem (3.6) as lexmin
{
lexmax b 	∈D[w]b : D ⊆ {1, . . . , B}, |D| ≤ Bα
}
where
lexmin and lexmax denote the minimum and maximum relative to the lexicographic
total order of vectors with n components. This rule aims at simultaneously minimizing
all the values β(A|Xj) without going through extensive additional computations.
In problem (3.4.6), we chose to minimize the maximum, over all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and A ⊆ Y , of the non-discarded bootstrap realizations ζbn(A|Xj). Other objectives
are possible, for example the L1 objective
∑
b/∈D wb. The main justiﬁcation for the L
∞
norm objective maxd/∈D wb in (3.4.6) is that it leads to a problem solvable in linear
time. In contrast, the problem with an L1 objective is computationally diﬃcult,
namely NP-hard in the strong sense, as shown in the next result.
Proposition 6 Minimization of
{∑
b/∈D wb : |D| ≤ Bα, D ⊆ {1, . . . , B}
}
is NP-
hard in the strong sense.
This result implies that unless P = NP , there exists no algorithm for this problem
that runs in polynomial time. This is a severe computational drawback relative to
105
the linear-time algorithm achieved with with BRS.
3.4.3 Search in the parameter space
Once the functional quantile has been computed, there remains to search in the pa-
rameter space for the values of θ that satisfy (3.4.2). As shown in the Lemma 1, the
function to be optimized in characterization (3.3.2) of the identiﬁed set is supermod-
ular.
Deﬁnition 7 (Supermodular function) A set function ρ : A 
→ ρ(A) ∈ R is
called supermodular (resp. submodular) if for all pairs of sets (A,B), ρ(A ∪ B) +
ρ(A ∩ B) ≥ (resp. ≤) ρ(A) + ρ(B).
Lemma 1 The function V 
→ P (V ∪|x) is submodular for all x ∈ X .
In the computation of Θn(P n), it may be desirable to require P n(V
∪|x) to also be
submodular as a function of V ⊆ U , so that the function to be maximized in (3.4.2)
can be maximized using submodular optimization techniques. This can be achieved
by adding the following additional linear constraints (see Schrijver (2004)): ∀u = v ∈
U , ∀V ⊆ U\{u, v}, j = 1, . . . , n,
P n([V ∪ {u} ∪ {v}]∪|Xj)− P n([V ∪ {u}]∪|Xj) (3.4.7)
−P n([V ∪ {v}]∪|Xj) + P n([V ]∪|Xj) ≤ 0.
The problem of checking whether θ is in the conﬁdence regions can then be solved
in polynomial time. Moreover, since submodular optimization has far ranging appli-
cations in all areas of operations research, many extremely eﬃcient algorithms and
implementations are readily available.
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3.5 Simulation based on Example 3
We now illustrate and assess the performance of our procedure on the game described
in Example 3. Throughout the experiment, we assume that (ε1, ε2) is uniformly dis-
tributed on [−1/2, 1/2]2 and J = (J1, J2) is a vector of independent Bernoulli(1/2)
random variables. True values for the parameters are indicated with a 0 subscript.
We consider the following true parameter speciﬁcations: (β0, c0) = (0, 0) (point iden-
tiﬁed case) and (β0, c0) = (0, 1/4) (which corresponds in some sense to the greatest
possible indeterminacy). For the true data generating process, we consider two dis-
tinct equilibrium selection rules (which, like the true parameter values, are of course
supposed unknown in the inference procedure). The ﬁrst rule speciﬁes that in case
of multiplicity, all equilibrium strategy proﬁles in the equilibrium correspondence are
selected with equal probability: we call this case “uniform selection”. The second
selection rule speciﬁes that in case of multiplicity, the equilibrium with largest aggre-
gate investment is selected; suppose for instance that the equilibrium correspondence
takes the value {HH,HL,LO}, then equilibrium strategy proﬁle HH is realized: we
call this case “maximal selection”. In the case of maximal selection with c0 = 0.25,
β0 = 0 is assumed known a priori by the analyst performing inference (to avoid an
unbounded identiﬁed set in the simulations). In the remaining 3 cases, β0 is unknown
a priori. The experiment is run as follows. We calculate in each of the 4 cases above
the distribution of the true data generating process. With the latter, we compute the
identiﬁed set. In the point identiﬁed case, the identiﬁed set is equal to the true value.
In the case c0 = 0.25, with β = 0 known a priori and maximal selection, the identiﬁed
set is [0.2113, 0.3333] as explained in the example at the end of Section 3.3. In case
(c0 = 0.25, β0 = 0) with uniform selection, the identiﬁed set projects to [0, 0.375]
on the c coordinate and to [0, 0.320] on the β coordinate. We then simulate 5000
samples of sizes n = 100, n = 500 and n = 1000 from this distribution and construct
conﬁdence regions for the identiﬁed set using lower probabilities P n (based on char-
acterization 3.3.4), which turned out to have better coverage properties. We use 999
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bootstrap replications for the ﬁrst two sample sizes, and 399 bootstrap replications for
n = 1000. We consider conﬁdence levels 90%, 95% and 99%. Coverage probabilities
of the true value and of the identiﬁed set by the conﬁdence region, as computed from
the 5000 samples, are displayed in Table 3.2 for the data generating process obtained
with maximal selection and Table 3.3 for the data generating process obtained with
uniform selection. Alongside coverage of the identiﬁed set and of the true value, we
report the eﬀective level at which Condition (3.4.5) is satisﬁed to directly assess the
bootstrap functional quantile approximation. Monte Carlo coverage of the identiﬁed
set is close to the theoretical level in the case of maximal selection and tends to be
very high in case of uniform selection. In cases of maximal and uniform selection
alike, coverage of Condition (3.4.5) is almost identical to point coverage in the point
identiﬁed case (c0 = 0), but lower in the set identiﬁed case (c0 = 0.25). Overall the
procedure over rejects in all but 13 out of a possible 90 cases. Improvements with
sample size occur only in 21 cases (out of a possible 60). These improvements tend to
occur when going from n = 500 to n = 1000 and given the nonparametric procedure,
there are doubt as to the accuracy of the procedure for n = 100. Finally, the coverage
of the true value (as opposed to the whole identiﬁed set) is only marginally greater
than the coverage of the whole identiﬁed set.
3.6 Application to long term elderly care decisions
We estimate the determinants of long term care option choices for elderly parents
in American families. The model we use closely follows the one proposed by Engers
and Stern (2002) who present these choices as the result of a non family participation
game. The family members decide simultaneously whether to participate in a family
reunion where the care option maximizing the participants’ utility is chosen. Proﬁts
are then split among these participants according to some beneﬁt-sharing rule. The
data consists of a sample of 1, 212 elderly Americans with two children drawn from
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Table 3.2: Coverage probabilities of (α0, β0) and of the identiﬁed set by the conﬁdence
region.
(α0, β0) n Level Point Coverage Set Coverage Condition (3.4.5)
(0, 0) 100 0.99 - 0.9826 0.9792
0.95 - 0.9574 0.9564
0.90 - 0.9324 0.9392
500 0.99 - 0.9894 0.9894
0.95 - 0.9770 0.9760
0.90 - 0.9592 0.9584
1000 0.99 - 0.9714 0.9712
0.95 - 0.9564 0.9554
0.90 - 0.9362 0.9352
(0.5, 0) 100 0.99 0.9364 0.9364 0.9286
0.95 0.9356 0.9354 0.9122
0.90 0.9232 0.9220 0.8830
500 0.99 0.9906 0.9902 0.9656
0.95 0.9810 0.9804 0.9518
0.90 0.9640 0.9632 0.9330
1000 0.99 0.9878 0.9870 0.9772
0.95 0.9746 0.9730 0.9532
0.90 0.9594 0.9570 0.9210
As computed from 5000 samples.
The last column shows the level at which Condition (3.4.5) is satisﬁed.
Case, where the data generating process obtained with maximal selection.
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Table 3.3: Coverage probabilities of (α0, β0) and of the identiﬁed set by the conﬁdence
region.
(α0, β0) n Level Point Coverage Set Coverage Condition (3.4.5)
(0, 0) 100 0.99 - 0.9872 0.9846
0.95 - 0.9784 0.9746
0.90 - 0.9680 0.9652
500 0.99 - 0.9950 0.9944
0.95 - 0.9886 0.9872
0.90 - 0.9814 0.9794
1000 0.99 - 0.9790 0.9738
0.95 - 0.9706 0.9640
0.90 - 0.9628 0.9548
(0.5, 0) 100 0.99 0.9998 0.9986 0.9850
0.95 0.9998 0.9984 0.9792
0.90 0.9998 0.9978 0.9704
500 0.99 1.0000 0.9996 0.9850
0.95 1.0000 0.9974 0.9664
0.90 1.0000 0.9980 0.9382
1000 0.99 1.0000 0.9964 0.9792
0.95 1.0000 0.9956 0.9694
0.90 1.0000 0.9938 0.9578
As computed from 5000 samples.
The last column shows the level at which condition (3.4.5) is satisﬁed.
Case where the data generating process is obtained with uniform selection.
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the National Long Term Care Survey, sponsored by the National Institute of Aging
and conducted by the Duke University Center for Demographic Studies under Grant
number U01-AG007198, Duke (1999). Elderly people were interviewed in 1984 about
their living and care arrangements. The survey questions include gender and age
of the children, the distance between homes of the elderly parent and each of the
children, the disability status of the elderly parent (where disability is referred to as
problems with “Activities of Daily Living or Instrumental Activities of Daily Living
(ADL)”) and the number of days per week each of the children devotes to the care of
the elderly parent. The dependent variable is the care provision for the parent. The
parent is asked to list children (either at home or away from home) and how much
each provides help. If only one child is listed as providing signiﬁcant help, that child is
designated the primary care giver. If more than one child is listed, the one providing
the most time is designated the primary care giver. If the elderly parent lives in a
nursing home, then the nursing home is the primary care giver. If no child is listed and
the parent does not live in a nursing home, then the parent is designated as “living
alone”. Table 3.4 presents the list of variables used in the analysis. They include
parent characteristics, characteristics of the children and the care option chosen. A
more detailed discussion and summary statistics and additional results can be found
in the supplementary material.
3.6.1 The game
The observable choice of care option is modeled as in Engers and Stern (2002) as the
outcome of a family bargaining game. We index family members as follows. Parent:
0, Firstborn child: 1 and Second born child: 2. The payoﬀ to family member i,
i = 0, 1, 2, is the sum of three terms. The ﬁrst term Vij is the value to parent 0 and
to child i of care option j, where j ∈ 1, 2 means child j becomes the primary care
giver, j = 0 means the parent remains self-reliant and j = 3, the parent is moved to
a nursing home. The matrix V = (Vij)ij is known to both children and the parent.
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Table 3.4: List of variables.
Variables Equal to 1 if: Percentage of sample
Care Option
Living with child 1 26.81
Living with child 2 6.75
Living in nursing home 19.92
Living home alone 46.54
Parent Variables
DA Highly disabled 33.81
DM Living with the spouse 40.36
Children Variables
DD Living with parent 11.55
DD1 Distance from parent: 31 min and more 49.45
DS Female 49.26
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We suppose it takes the form
Vij = γij +Wβij + Zjψij
where W indicates the characteristics of the parents (DA and DM), and Zj indicates
the characteristics of care option j (DS, DD1 and DD2) and X = (W,Z). θ =
(γij, βij, ψij)
′ is unknown to the analyst and the object of inference.
Example 4 Consider the following family, in which the matrix where given value of
X and θ result in V that takes the form:
V =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 −1
0 4 −1 1
0 −1 4 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Rows indicate family member i = 0, 1, 2, and columns represents care giving options
j = 0, 1, 2, 3, in that order. In this example, the parent is indiﬀerent between all the
care options, except the one where she has to move to the Nursing home. Each child
prefers to be the primary care giver to any other care option, followed by the parent
living in a nursing home, living at home and being taken care of by the other child,
in that order.
The second term in the payoﬀ results from the family bargaining process as follows.
We assume that it is always in the interest of the parent to attend the family reunion.
However, child i (i = 1, 2) can refrain from participating in the meeting. By choosing
not to participate, a member of the family agrees on whatever is decided but can
neither assume the role of primary care giver, nor can he be involved in any side
payment. Both children simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in the
long term care decision. Suppose M is the set of children who participate. The
option chosen is option j ∈ M∪{0, 3} which maximizes the participants’s total utility∑
i∈M Vij. It is assumed that participants abide by the decision and that beneﬁts are
then shared equally among parent and children participating in the decision through
113
a monetary transfer si, which is the second term in the children’s payoﬀ. The third
term i in the payoﬀ is a random beneﬁt from participation, which is 0 for children
who decide not to participate and distributed according to absolutely continuous
distribution ν(.|θ) for each child who participates. All children observe the realizations
of , whereas the analyst only knows its distribution. The Payoﬀ matrix is given in
Table 3.5, where overall beneﬁt shares wIJi , i = 1, 2, I, J = N,P are deﬁned and
derived in the supplementary appendix. Multiple Nash equilibria in pure and mixed
strategies are also derived in the appendix. Each equilibrium action proﬁle results
in a (almost surely) unique care option choice, hence for each participation shock ,
we can derive G(|X; θ) as the set of probability measures on the set of care options
{0, 1, 2, 3} induced by mixed strategy proﬁles, which are probabilities on the set of
participation proﬁles {NN,NP, PN, PP}.
Table 3.5: Payoﬀs for the family participation game.
Child 2
Child 1 N P
N wNN1 , w
NN
2 w
NP
1 , ε2 + w
NP
2
P ε1 + w
PN
1 , w
PN
2 ε1 + w
PP , ε2 + w
PP
3.6.2 Speciﬁcation
We provide estimates for the following utility speciﬁcation (an alternative with altru-
istic utility speciﬁcation was estimated and results are reported in the supplementary
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material).
V (X; θ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
β00
+βmDM
+βahDA
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎝ α
+ψsDS1
⎞
⎠ ψsDS2 0
⎛
⎝ βmDM
+βahDA
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
β11
+ψ1DD1
+βacDA
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ 0 0
⎛
⎝ βmDM
+βahDA
⎞
⎠ 0
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
β11
+ψ1DD2
+βacDA
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Recall that the columns indicate the options, in the following order {0, 1, 2, 3}, and
the rows represent each member of the family, in the following order Parent, Child 1,
Child 2. For example, the value the ﬁrst born child (family member 1) living less than
30 minutes away from the parent’s home attaches to the fact that she takes care of a
non disabled, non-married parent is measured by β11, whereas for a disabled parent,
it is β11 + βac.
3.6.3 Estimation methodology
The methodology proposed in the paper allows the construction of the identiﬁed set
based on the hypothetical knowledge of the true distribution of the data. As described
in Section 3.4, we account for sampling uncertainty and control the level of conﬁdence
by constructing set functions A 
→ P (A|X), which dominate P (A|X) (uniformly over
A ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3} and X) with probability 1 − α (the chosen level of conﬁdence, here
0.95). We implement the method detailed in Section 3.4 (except that the pairs or cases
bootstrap was used instead of the nonparametric bootstrap advocated above) with a
number of bootstrap replications B = 2500. Second, we obtain the model likelihood
by simulating the valuation matrix and computing the Equilibrium correspondence
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from the payoﬀ matrix, for given values of X and θ. The procedure is as follow. For
a given X and θ,
• We generate and store R draws of ε from the distribution νθ. Here, R = 5000
and νθ is normally distributed with mean μ and variance σ
2
ε , where (μ, σ
2
ε)
belong to the parameter θ.
• For each value εr, we compute the valuation matrix V (X, εr, θ) and the corre-
sponding payoﬀ matrix.
• Then, we determine the equilibrium correspondence G (X, ε; θ) from the ana-
lytical results derived in the preceding section. The Gambit software provides
an alternative for computing numerically the set NE for more complex games.
• The last step of the simulation is to compute an estimator of the model like-
lihood L deﬁned in (3.4.3) as follows: Lˆ (A |X; θ ) = 1
R
R∑
r=1
min{σ (A) : σ ∈
G(X, εr; θ)}.
Having constructed those two elements, the identiﬁed set comprises all values of θ
such that for all observed values of the explanatory variables, the minimum over
A ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3} of the function P (A|X; θ) − Lˆ(A|X; θ) is non negative, as explained
in Section 3.4. We construct an n-dimensional grid to conduct the search over the pa-
rameter space. Each value of the parameter can be tested in a fraction of a second on
a standard laptop, and a region of small dimensionality (1 to 4) can be constructed in
a few hours, again on a standard laptop without parallel processing. However, estima-
tion time grows exponentially with the number of parameters induced by the model.
In our case, each speciﬁcation involves a 12-dimensional parameter space. Parallel
processing becomes therefore necessary. We use an Open-MP procedure for parallel
processing, which is perfectly suited to the method we propose. The computation re-
sources have been provided by the Re´seau Que´be´cois de Calcul de Haute Performance
(RQCHP). All computation where made under the system “Cottos” which provides
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up to 128 computation nodes (1024 CPU cores) equipped with two Intel Xeon E5462
quad-core processors at 3 GHz. Under 1 node, approximately 107 parameters points
can be tested in 24 hours.
3.6.4 Results
We perform the estimation under diﬀerent values of the mean and variance of the error
term. To alleviate the computational burden, we ﬁrst test the signiﬁcance of some of
the individual parameters by checking whether the hyper planes deﬁned by θi = 0 -
where θi is a component of θ - intersect the 95% conﬁdence region. We fail to reject
the Null Hypothesis if the estimation procedure returns a non-empty set. We then
obtain a constrained conﬁdence region for the remaining parameters. For each value
of mean and variance of the error term, we ﬁnd a non empty intersection between the
conﬁdence region and the hyperplane deﬁned by β11 = 0. This means we fail to reject
(at the 5% level) the null hypothesis that there is no additional constant disutility
for a child to take care of an elderly parent. Since, this hypothesis is not rejected,
we obtain a constrained conﬁdence region for the remaining parameters. We then
obtain conﬁdence regions for diﬀerent values of β11 and discuss the latter’s eﬀect on
the regions. We note that the Null hypothesis H0 : β00 = 0 is always rejected. Hence,
when we control for all other eﬀects, parents are not indiﬀerent between the ﬁrst two
options. They show a clear preference in favor of living in their own home (option
called “living alone”) instead of living in a nursing home (β00 is always positive).
The results we present are then for given values of β00. We provide an insight of
how diﬀerent values of this parameter change the results. We report the range for
each parameters in Table 3.6. Note that the identiﬁed set is not a compact set. In
particular, βac, βah, βm and ψ are allowed to diverge to −∞. Results are generally
consistent with expectations and previous results on the subject. Namely:
1. The existence of several problems with the parent’s functional ability is a key
determinant of the decision to enter a nursing home. βah and βac are both
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Table 3.6: Parameters Range for estimation of Speciﬁcation 1 at β11 = 0, βac = −βm
and for diﬀerent values of the error terms and of β00.
Parameters Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
β00 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1
β11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
βah −∞ -3.57 −∞ -3.57 −∞ -2.86 −∞ -2.14
βac = −βm −∞ -2.86 −∞ -2.86 −∞ -3.57 −∞ -3.57
α 0.00 8.00 0.00 8.00 1.00 5.00 0.00 4.00
ψs 0.00 5.00 0.00 4.00 1.00 4.00 0.00 2.00
ψd −∞ -2.86 −∞ -2.14 −∞ -1.43 −∞ -3.57
μ -1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 0 0
σε 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
σ2u 1 1 1 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
pξ 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
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negative and can both be (very) large. The negative sign of βah captures the
fact that a parent’s disability increases the value of care provided by the family
or a specialized institution. In addition, βac < 0 means that the disability
entails a utility cost for the child if he is chosen as primary care giver.
2. Parameter βm associated with the parent living with a spouse is positive and
large. This implies that married parents are more likely to remain self-reliant.
In families where the parent is disabled, the eﬀect of living with the spouse
compensates the disutility of disability and preserves the incentive for parents
to live at home.
3. While we cannot rule out parents being indiﬀerent to the gender or birth order
of their primary care giver, estimation shows a tilt of the conﬁdence interval
toward positive values for both parameters, with a possible positive and large
magnitude of the parameter α. In case μ = −1 and σ2u = 0.25, the data reveal
that parents exhibit a preference for an older and for a female care giver.
4. Children living more than 30 minutes from the parents are less likely to provide
care than those living closer to the parents. Distance has a (possibly strong)
disutility eﬀect on children’s incentives to participate in the care decision.
The shape of the conﬁdence region also conveys a considerable amount of information.
Figure 3.3 shows two dimensional dimensional projections and cuts of the conﬁdence
region for column 2 of Table 3.6, i.e με = 0, σ
2
ε = 1, σ
2
u = 1. Of great interest is the
projection of the identiﬁed set in the plan βah, βm. Figure 3.3(a) reveals an almost
linear relation between the two parameters of the type βah = −βm. The estimation
rejects models for which the absolute value of the two parameters are signiﬁcatively
diﬀerent. The data suggest therefore that the disutility induced by the disability
of the parent can be entirely compensated by the presence of a spouse in the same
household. Notice the triangular shape of the region plotted in Figure 3.3(b) which
entails that simultaneous large values of ψs and α are rejected. This ﬁnding means
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that only one of the eﬀects (gender or birth order) can be large, not both. In other
words, ﬁrstborn daughter are not the only possible care givers. Note also that both
eﬀects can be very small, though not jointly insigniﬁcant. We observe similar types
of constraints for the pairs (α, βah), (α, βac), (α, ψd), (ψs, βac), (ψs, ψd) as large values
of parameters α or ψs are only permitted when the other parameters are jointly large
(see Figure 3.3(c) to 3.3(f)). For example, we obtain a constrained conﬁdence region
at βac = −3.5. The ranges for the two parameters, α and ψs, are tighter, as α ∈ [1, 2]
and ψ ∈ [0, 1]. Figure 3.4 shows the eﬀect of the variation of parameter β11 on ψs and
α. Recall that β11 represents a ﬁxed cost or beneﬁt for the child chosen as care giver.
We observe negative relations between β11 and ψs, and β11 and α. Negative values of
ψs and α are only admissible for positive values of β11. Hence a model where parents
exhibit no favoritism for a daughter and/or a ﬁrstborn, or favoritism for a son and/or
a second born, will be consistent with our data if and only if there exist a strictly
positive constant beneﬁt for a child to be caregiver.
3.7 Conclusion
We have considered the problem of statistical inference in incomplete partially iden-
tiﬁed structural models, such as models of discrete choice with interactions and other
forms of endogeneity. A characterization of the identiﬁed set for structural parame-
ters was given, with an appeal to a classical theorem in combinatorial optimization,
the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem, thereby emphasizing the optimization formulation
of the problem of inference in such models. Finally, we have shown how to apply com-
binatorial optimization methods within a bootstrap procedure in order to compute
informative conﬁdence regions very eﬃciently, hence feasibly in empirically relevant
applications. An application of the methodology was carried out on a family bargain-
ing example and it was shown that most ﬁndings in the literature on the determinants
of long term elderly care by American families were supported in this more robust
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framework, where the eﬀects of interaction are accounted for. This procedure applies
to very general classes of models and its eﬃciency and coverage properties could no
doubt be improved, when tailored to more speciﬁc applications. In particular, the ap-
plication to matching games and revealed preference testing of stability in matching
still poses considerable challenges. Other perspectives for further work include the
application of Max-Flow Min-Cut algorithms to the detection of redundant inequal-
ities at the identiﬁcation stage, to improve the performance at the inference stage,
possibly by appealing to other existing procedures if the number of non redundant
inequalities is small enough.
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Proofs of results in the main text
Proof 1 (Proof of Theorem 3) By Proposition 1 of Galichon and Henry (2011), a
value θ of the parameter vector belongs to ΘI if and only if P(Y ∈ G(X, ε; θ)) = 1, X-
a.s. (which we drop from the notation from this point on). Hence if there exists a pair
(Y, U) of random vectors on Y ×U such that Y has probability mass P (y|X), y ∈ Y,
U has probability mass Q(u|X; θ), u ∈ U , and P(Y ∈ U |X) = 1. This is equivalent to
the existence of non negative weights πuy , (y, u) ∈ Y×U , such that
∑
u∈U π
u
y = P (y|X),∑
y∈Y π
u
y = Q(u|X), and πuy = 0 when y /∈ u. The latter is equivalent to the following
programming problem with auxiliary variables ay, y ∈ Y and au, u ∈ U having zero
as a solution. The programming problem is the following: min(
∑
y∈Y ay +
∑
u∈U a
u)
subject to the constraints
∑
u∈U π
u
y + ay ≤ P (y|X),
∑
y∈Y π
u
y + a
u ≤ Q(u|X; θ), ay,
au, πuy ≥ 0, and πuy = 0 when y /∈ u. Since
∑
y∈Y ay +
∑
u∈U a
u ≤ ∑y∈Y P (y|X) +∑
u∈U Q(u|X; θ)−2
∑
y∈Y
∑
u∈U π
u
y = 2−2
∑
y∈Y
∑
u∈U π
u
y , the latter is also equivalent
to max
∑
y∈Y
∑
u∈U π
u
y ≥ 1 subject to the constraints
∑
u∈U π
u
y ≤ P (y|X),
∑
y∈Y π
u
y ≤
Q(u|X), πuy ≥ 0 and πuy = 0 when y /∈ u. This is called a maximum ﬂow problem,
i.e. the problem of maximizing quantity ﬂowing through a network under capacity
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constraints. A network is a collection of nodes, including a source S and a sink T ,
and directed edges between the nodes. For instance, (N1, N2) is an edge leading from
node N1 to node N2. Here the network involved in the maximum ﬂow problem is
comprised of a source S, K nodes corresponding to the K elements of Y, J nodes
corresponding to the J elements of U and a sink T . The source S is connected to
each of the nodes y1, . . . , yk in Y. A node y ∈ Y is connected to a node u ∈ U if
and only if y ∈ u. All nodes u1, . . . , uJ in U are connected to the sink T . To each
edge is attached a capacity, which is the maximum amount that can ﬂow through it.
Capacity is constrained to P (y|X) between S and node y. Capacity is unconstrained
(i.e. inﬁnite) between node y and node u such that y ∈ u. The capacity of edges
between a node u and the sink T is constrained to Q(u|X; θ).
We have shown that θ ∈ ΘI if and only if the maximum ﬂow in the network
described above is equal to 1. We now appeal to a classical result in combinatorial
optimization called the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem, see for instance Theorem 10.3
page 150 of Schrijver (2004). A cut through a network is partition of the nodes into
two sets separating the source from the sink. The capacity of a cut is deﬁned as the
sum of the capacities of edges in the network that cross the cut from the source side
to the sink side. Let a cut be deﬁned by the set V of elements of U and the set Z of
elements of Y on the sink side of the cut. Since the capacity of an edge from y to
u such that y ∈ u is inﬁnite, the cut deﬁned by V and Z has ﬁnite capacity if and
only if y ∈ u and u ∈ V jointly imply y ∈ Z. Such a cut has capacity C(Z, V ) =∑
y∈Z P (y|X)+
∑
u∈U\V Q(u|X; θ) =
∑
y∈Z P (y|X)+1−
∑
u∈V Q(u|X; θ). A cut has
minimum capacity if no node can be moved between the source side of the cut and the
sink side of the cut without increasing capacity, hence if y /∈ u and u ∈ V jointly imply
y /∈ Z, hence if Z = V ∪ = ⋃{u : u ∈ V }. Therefore, the capacity of a minimum cut
is C(V ∪, V ) =
∑
y∈V ∪ P (y|X) + 1 −
∑
u∈V Q(u|X; θ) = P (V ∪|X) + 1 − Q(V |X; θ).
By the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem, the capacity of any minimum cut is equal to the
maximum ﬂow through the network, hence θ ∈ ΘI if and only if for all subset V of U ,
P (V ∪|X) + 1−Q(V |X; θ) ≥ 1, i.e. Q(V |X; θ) ≤ P (V ∪|X), and the result follows.
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Proof 2 (Proof of Lemma 1) Take an x ∈ X . Take any u ∈ U and V ⊆ U\{u}.
We have P ([V ∪ {u}]∪|x) − P (V ∪|x) = ∑y∈⋃v∈V ∪{u} v P (y|x) −∑y∈⋃v∈V v P (y|x) =∑
y∈u\V ∪ P (y|x) = P (u\V ∪|x), which is non-increasing in V , hence the result.
Proof 3 (Proof of Theorem 4) Given a value θ ∈ ΘI , by Theorem 3, we have
supx∈X maxV⊆U(Q(V |x; θ)−P (V ∪|x)) ≤ 0. Under Assumption 5, supx∈X maxV⊆U(P (V ∪|x))−
P n(V
∪|x)) ≤ 0, with limiting probability larger than 1−α. Hence, with probability at
least 1− α, supx∈X maxV⊆U(Q(V |x; θ)− P n(V ∪|x)) ≤ 0, and thus θ ∈ ΘI(P n).
Proof 4 (Proof of Proposition 5) We ﬁrst justify the BRS Step 1 by showing that
wb = w
′
b for all b. Indeed observe that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and A ⊆ Y, we have
ζbn(A|Xj) =
∑
y∈A
Pˆn(y|Xj)−
∑
y∈A
Pˆ bn(y|Xj) =
∑
y∈A
[Pˆn(y|Xj)− Pˆ bn(y|Xj)]
and thus maxA⊆Y ζbn(A|Xj) is attained by selecting all the elements y ∈ Y with
Pˆn(y|Xj) − Pˆ bn(y|Xj) > 0. It follows that w′b = max1≤j≤nmaxA⊆Y [
∑
y∈Y Pˆn(y|Xj) −∑
y∈A Pˆ
b
n(y|Xj)] and therefore wb = w′b. To justify BRS Step 2, let wopt denote the
optimum objective value of problem (3.4.6). If D fails to include any b such that
wb > w
opt then maxb/∈D wb > wopt, therefore an optimal D must include all b such
that wb > w
opt. On the other hand, if D is any optimal subset and some b′ ∈ D
satisﬁes wb′ ≤ wopt then discarding b′ from D yields a feasible subset D\{b′} (since
|D\{b′}| < |D| ≤ d) such that maxb∈D\{b′}wb ≤ maxb∈D wb hence D\{b′} is an al-
ternate optimal solution. Therefore an optimal D consists of all indices b such that
wb > w
opt. Concerning the running time, BRS Step 1 requires O(nB|Y|) time, and
BRS Step 2 requires O(B) time using a linear time selection (or median-ﬁnding)
algorithm (see Blum, Floyd, Pratt, Rivest, and Tarjan (1973)).
Proof 5 (Proof of Proposition 6) The problem corresponds to the following de-
cision problem: given an n × m matrix H, an integer k and a target value t, can
one ﬁnd a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that |S| ≥ k and ∑mi=1maxj∈S Hij ≤ t? De-
note (H, k, t) an instance of the latter problem. Consider the well-known NP-hard
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decision problem CLIQUE (see for instance section 4.8 page 43 of Schrijver (2004)):
given a graph G = (V,E) and an integer q satisfying 2 ≤ q ≤ |V |, does there exist
a subset Q ⊆ V such that |Q| ≥ q and for all i, j ∈ V , ij ∈ E (i.e. Q is a clique).
To any instance (G, q) of the problem CLIQUE, we associate an instance (H, k, t)
of our decision problem, where lines of H corresponds to vertices of G (elements of
V ), columns of H corresponds to edges in G (elements of E) and Hij = 1 if ver-
tex i belongs to edge j, and 0 otherwise. For any subset S ⊆ E of edges in G, we
have for all i ∈ E, maxj∈S Hij = 1 if i belongs to at least one element of S, and 0
otherwise. Hence,
∑
i∈E maxj∈S Hij is the number of vertices that belong to at least
one edge in S. Deﬁne k = q(q − 1)/2 and t = q. Then, a set S of k edges involves
at least (hence exactly) q vertices if and only if S is the set of edges of a CLIQUE.
Hence the answer to the decision problem (H, k, t) thus deﬁned is YES if and only
if G contains a CLIQUE with q vertices. Since CLIQUE is NP-complete, it follows
that our decision problem is NP-hard. Since k = O(|V |2) and t = O(|V |), the input
size (in unitary notation) of such instances of our problem is polynomially bounded
by the input size (in unitary or binary notation) Ω(|V |) of the corresponding instance
of CLIQUE. Hence our decision problem is NP-hard in the strong sense.
124
−7 −6.5 −6 −5.5 −5 −4.5 −4 −3.5 −3 −2.5 −22
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
βah
β m
(a) (βah, βm) region
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
α
ψ s
(b) (α,ψs) region
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9−10
−9
−8
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
α
β ac
(c) (α, βac) region
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9−10
−9
−8
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
α
ψ d
(d) (α,ψd) region
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6−10
−9
−8
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
ψs
β ac
(e) (ψs, βac) region
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6−10
−9
−8
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
ψs
ψ d
(f) (ψs, ψd) region
Figure 3.3: Two dimensional representations of the conﬁdence region at β00 = 3,
β11 = 0, μ = 0, σε = 1, σu = 1, pξ = 0.1
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Figure 3.4: Parameter β11 in relation with other parameters: β00 = 3, μ = 0, σε = 1,
σu = 1, pξ = 0.1
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Conclusion ge´ne´rale
Cette the`se s’inte´resse a` deux aspects importants de la migration des e´tudiants in-
ternationaux : les de´terminants de la probabilite´ de migration et l’organisation de la
famille aﬁn de couvrir les frais de la migration.
Le Chapitre 1 pre´sente un cadre de travail pour analyser avec une perspective mi-
croe´conomique les de´terminants du choix de migration e´tudiante. Nous y arrivons en
surmontant les diﬃculte´s pre´sentes jusqu’a` pre´sent dans la litte´rature, notamment :
l’absence de donne´es microe´conomiques comprennant une population d’e´tudiants mi-
grants et non-migrants, et les proble`me d’identiﬁcation des parame`tres structurels
induit par l’engone´ite´ du niveau ﬁnal d’e´ducation dans notre mode`le a` choix discret.
Pour re´soudre la premie`re de ses diﬃculte´s, nous avons recours a` un sondage de type
boule de neige, qui utilise une plateforme internet. La proce´dure propose´e permet de
surmonter le de´ﬁ de la dispersion ge´ographique des unite´s au sein de la population
d’inte´reˆt. Nous proposons un estimateur de la moyenne de la population qui permet
de corriger les biais lie´s a` la non-re´ponse et a` la selection des re´pondants. En pratique,
des hypothe`ses fortes sont ne´cessaires pour calculer les probabilite´s d’inclusion des in-
dividus e´chantillonne´s. Nous devons aussi estimer un mode`le de graphe ale´atoire pour
repre´senter les liens entre les individus de la population d’inte´reˆt. Les choix dans ce
chapitre ont e´te´ faits pour des raisons computationnelles.
Par ailleurs, nous proposons une mode`le structurel de de´cision d’investissement
dans la migration e´tudiante. Ce mode`le reﬂe`te a` la fois le rendement de l’investis-
sement et la contrainte budge´taire qui y est attache´e. Une importante contribu-
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tion de cette e´tude est l’usage des re´cents re´sultats de la litte´rature au sujet des
mode`les incomplets et partiellement identiﬁe´s pour contourner le proble`me d’en-
doge´ne´ite´ cite´ plus-haut. Ce faisant, nous relaxons la condition d’identiﬁcation ponc-
tuelle des parame`tres de notre mode`le. Nous eﬀectuons l’infe´rence en utilisant des
ine´galite´s de moments et calculons des intervalles de conﬁance relativement infor-
matifs. Une contribution supple´mentaire de notre e´tude est le de´veloppement d’une
proce´dure d’infe´rence qui prend en compte les donne´es censure´es ou incomple`tement
observe´es. Cette proce´dure a notamment l’avantage de re´duire conside´rablement la
contrainte computationnelle.
A partir de notre e´chantillon d’e´tudiants Camerounais, nous trouvons qu’un diploˆme
Masters et de bons re´sultats au cours des e´tudes secondaires augmentent les chances
de migration e´tudiante. Il ne semble pas que les e´tudiants de sexe masculin soient
favorise´s par la famille au de´triment de ceux de l’autre sexe. Nous trouvons aussi
que le premier-ne´ a une probabilite´ plus faible d’e´migrer que ces plus jeunes fre`res et
soeurs. Notre interpre`tation est qu’il souﬀre d’un manque de soutien familial.
Le chapitre 2 porte son attention au processus de de´cision au sein de la famille.
En particulier, nous nous interrogeons sur les incitations des membres de la famille a`
participer a` ce processus couˆteux. Nos donne´es sont tre`s informatives sur la distribu-
tion des frais de l’investissement entre les membres de sa famille et sur l’identite´ des
contributeurs. Les parents sont sollicite´s dans la grande majorite´ des me´nages. Plus de
la moitie´ des re´pondants reporte le soutien potentiel d’un aidant dans le processus de
migration. Le mode`le structurel propose´ de´crit un jeu non-coope´ratif de participation
entre les membres de la famille e´largie. Nous utilisons encore une fois les re´sultats de
la litte´rature en identiﬁcation partielle pour de´duire des ine´galite´s de moments qui
servent ensuite a` l’infe´rence sur les parame`tres structurels. Les re´sultats sugge`rent que
les personnes implique´s dans le ﬁnancement de la migration e´tudiante ne devraient
pas eˆtre conside´re´s comme ayant des pre´fe´rences homoge`nes. Toutefois, il serait tout
autant errone´ d’y voir un rassemblement d’individus e´go¨ıstes. Les pre´fe´rences des
128
parents exhibent de l’altruisme en faveur de l’enfant. Les aidants exte´rieurs a` la fa-
mille nucle´aire subissent un couˆt strictement positif pour leur participation, ce qui
de´courage leur implication. Les obligations familiales et sociales semblent expliquer
les cas de participation d’un aidant, mieux qu’un possible altruisme de ce dernier.
Finalement, le troisie`me chapitre pre´sente le cadre the´orique plus ge´ne´ral dans
lequel s’imbriquent les mode`les de´veloppe´s dans les pre´ce´dents chapitres. Avec nos
co-auteurs, nous y avons conside´re´ le proble`me d’infe´rence statistique de mode`les
structurels incomplets et partiellement identiﬁe´s, tels que le mode`le a` choix discret de-
veloppe´ au Chapitre 1. Une caracte´risation de l’ensemble identiﬁe´ pour les parameˆtres
structurels est fournie, en s’appuyant sur un the´ore`me classique d’optimisation com-
binatoire, le the´ore`me “Max-Flow Min-Cut”. Finalement, nous montrons comment
appliquer les me´thodes d’optimisation combinatoires au sein d’une proce´dure boots-
trap aﬁn de calculer des re´gions de conﬁance informatives de fac¸on eﬃcace. Une
application de cette me´thodologie sur l’e´tude des de´terminants des soins apporte´s
aux parents age´s dans des familles ame´ricaines conduit a` la plupart des re´sultats de
la litte´rature, avec cette proce´dure plus robuste.
La proce´dure d’e´chantillonnage propose´ semble une solution eﬃcace au de´ﬁ de la
collecte de donne´es sur des poulations de migrants. L’e´tude des performances sous
des hypothe`ses alternatives de cette proce´dure et des estimateurs qui l’accompagnent
apparaˆıt comme une question de recherche inte´ressante. Les re´sultats sur l’importance
de l’implication de la famille dans le processus de de´cision sugge`re qu’une attention
plus pousse´e soit accorde´e au phe´nome`ne de migration en chaine et a` ses conse´quences
sur la qualite´ des migrants.
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